

Forschungsberichte der ARL 20

CITIES AND METROPOLISES IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

Evelyn Gustedt, Ulrike Grabski-Kieron, Christophe Demazière,
Didier Paris (eds.)



ACADEMY FOR
TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE LEIBNIZ ASSOCIATION

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Evelyn Gustedt

PREFACE

Cooperation between the ARL and French colleagues in the field of research presented in this volume has developed over a period of three decades. In fact, it has been four decades since the first preparatory steps were taken. In all these years we have worked together in various activities, sometimes more intensively and successfully, sometimes less. As in many other fields, success in spatial planning, spatial research and planning sciences is closely linked to the commitment and input of individuals. The places where these individuals live and work, spatial constellations, political and societal events in France and Germany and, last but not least, the ‘chemistry’ between the participants have contributed significantly to motivating and enabling cooperation.

Among those involved from the very start, to name but a few, were Peter Treuner and Hans Kistenmacher and, on the French side, Jean-Louis Guigou and Gérard Marcou, who established contact with the ARL in the 1980s and then published work with the ARL on spatial planning in border regions and on the planning systems of both countries. The German-French working group of the ARL also played a significant role on the occasion of the 1991 scientific plenary meeting (today the ARL Congress) on the theme ‘Perspectives of Spatial Development in Europe’ (ARL 1992). The first issue of the multilingual journal EUREG (European Journal of Regional Development), which was developed together with the *Association de Science Régionale de Langue Française* (ASRDLF) and published in 1994, included ‘A new map of Europe’s spatial development objectives’ (Treuner 1994). In 1999, the ARL regional working groups for Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate and Saarland presented their work on spatial developments and perspectives of cross-border cooperation in the German-French-Luxembourg border region between the Eifel and the Rhine (ARL 1999).

Some time earlier the ARL had extended its regional networking activities (still active today in seven regional working groups) and formed three European working groups. They covered the Baltic region, Central and Southeast Europe and Western Europe. The latter was established in close cooperation with the French spatial planning authority *Délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale* (DATAR – Delegation for Spatial Planning and Regional Action), who also provided financial support. This led to three joint publications by the ARL and DATAR: *Policy vision for sustainable rural economies in an enlarged Europe* (ARL 2003), *Employment and Regional Development Policy. Market Efficiency Versus Policy Intervention* (Karl/Rollet 2004) and *Spatial Implications of the European Monetary Union* (ARL 2004). Even before all the publications had appeared, the ARL disbanded the European working groups – including the one in Western Europe. The lack of interest from actors in both research and practice limited the possibilities for cooperation and for co-financing such projects.

Furthermore, the renewed presidency of Jacques Chirac in the electoral period from 2002 to 2007 brought changes to France’s spatial planning policy and to the structure and tasks of spatial planning. Since this time, the name, structure and tasks of the

former DATAR have been changed on numerous occasions, most recently in 2020. These alterations also brought changes in personnel, which especially concerned the upper ranks of the institution. In 2002, Jean-Louis Guigou, who greatly valued the cooperation with the ARL, was replaced by Nicolas Jacquet. Neither he nor his successors recognised the benefits of such cooperation, despite the interest of individual members of their staff.

Nonetheless, under the aegis of a series of presidents until 2010, the ARL left no stone unturned in its attempts to build on previous joint activities. These efforts were supported by the fact that over the years, individual members of the ARL had built up communication and cooperation structures with French colleagues and were now equally interested in deepening and extending these contacts. In the field of local, regional and federal state planning, Ulrike Grabski-Kieron (Institute of Geography at the University of Münster) – among others – had pursued exchanges for many years. As she was also a member of the ARL, it was only a small step to combining strengths in a joint initiative.

However, it was not until 2015 that a ‘hard core’ of interested parties – primarily the editors and several of the authors – came together to create this publication and were then joined by numerous other partners. This book thus clearly builds upon existing collaboration. A call for cooperation was widely disseminated among French researchers and practitioners interested in spatial development and resulted in the formation of a working committee that identified focal points for future work. Figure 1 gives an insight into the debates at the time.



Fig. 1: From left to right: Olivier Ratouis, Ulrike Grabski-Kieron, Marcus Zepf, François Mancebo, Sylvette Denèfle, Christophe Demazière, Laurent Guihéry. Missing from the photo are: Jean Peyrony, Evelyn Gustedt, Didier Paris / Source: Evelyn Gustedt

A further milestone was the colloquium held in 2016 in Münster, which was generously sponsored by the University of Münster, *NRW-Bank* and the *Institut Français*, Bonn. Many additional colleagues participated here, not just from France and Germany but also from the UK. Existing ideas for the book were critically examined, focal points of interest were sharpened and thus the course for the publication was set. The quintessence of the colloquium was an almost complete work programme for the book project and the elaboration of essential building blocks for the individual chapters.



Fig. 2: Lively discussion in the rooms of the NRW-Bank Münster. Left to right: François Mancebo, Hélène Roth, Marcus Zepf, Kirsten Mangels, Joe Ravetz, Olivier Ratouis, Dominique Charlotte Breier, Didier Paris, Lars Porsche, Hélène Mainet. About half the participants can't be seen here / Source: Evelyn Gustedt

In 2017 the teams of authors were formed, which have since changed minimally in relation to the individual chapters. From the beginning of the project, it was important to the editors to have a mixed team of people from both countries for each chapter. The vision and hope here was that interested readers could thus be provided with comparative findings throughout.

A meeting of all authors in Lille at the end of 2017 served for the teams of authors to meet and get to know one another. Other meetings to discuss all the chapters were then held more or less annually, at the end of 2018 in Dortmund and in 2019 in Cologne. In the context of the German EU Presidency and the exhibition 'LIVING THE CITY – An exhibition about cities, people and stories', it was planned to hold presentations and discussion under the title 'Cities and Metropolises in France, Germany and Beyond' with an extended number of international participants. Like so many other events around the world, this had to be cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Since then, it has been possible to produce the work, undertaken on a voluntary basis, in three languages: French, German and English.

The editors would like to thank everyone who has contributed to this project – those who have been involved since the very beginning, those who have joined in the middle of the process and those who have played the final chord. Without their commitment, their willingness to cooperate even in difficult times, and their perseverance, this book would never have been completed. The editors share the wish that the process of creating this book should only be a stopover on a journey that will continue with similar cooperation in the future. It would be a pity to abandon the work at this point – not least because it is an endeavour that reflects the networking the ARL has promoted for decades and plans for the future, also in an international context.

The people involved in the present work would like to express their sincere thanks to the research assistants at the ARL Headquarters, namely Anna Hachmöller, Sophia Germer, Joyce Gosemann and Julian Gick. In the course of the complex preparation of texts and illustrations of the work, which was published in French, German and English, they contributed significantly to the success of the publication in three languages with great commitment, perseverance and prudence. In the course of the work, other academic assistants helped with individual steps. On behalf of all those involved, we would like to express our sincere thanks to all of them!

On behalf of the editors, Evelyn Gustedt

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Evelyn Gustedt, Ulrike Grabski-Kieron, Christophe Demazière, Didier Paris

TRANSFORMATION IN CITIES AND REGIONS: CURRENT THEMES IN GERMANY AND FRANCE – THREE SIGNIFICANT POINTS OF DISCUSSION

Contents

- 1 Why did we choose the given structure?
 - 2 Differences in the institutional systems
 - 3 Transforming urban systems
 - 4 Cities and regions in both countries face new challenges
- References

Abstract

This chapter concentrates on institutional differences in France and Germany. The stability of the German institutional setting contrasts with the series of institutional reforms that have stretched over decades or even half a century in France. While in Germany transformation has taken the form of successive adaptations, in France the diverse reforms have been hotly debated and sometimes even contested. Often the metropolises and regions form the focus of such discussions in France. These contrasts between stability and change can also be seen in both spatial planning systems and the position of the highest level of territorial authority (*régions* in France and *Länder* in Germany). Starting from the national policy guidelines in both countries, the authors describe different territorial units, their areas of responsibility and their manifold planning instruments. They also address processes of democratisation, participation and metropolisation, the role of the European Union and various crises as drivers of the development of both systems.

Keywords

Policy guidelines – territorial units – planning instruments – drivers of change – role of EU

1 Why did we choose the given structure?

If, as set out in the Preface, the German-French cooperation for this book project concentrates on the situation and development of cities and municipalities and on aspects of the urban system in the two countries, then this is because:

- > Cities and towns are subject to far-reaching processes of transformation,
- > Urban-rural relations are changing,

- > The development of cities and urban regions is also most significant for cross-border spatial development,
- > The potentials of urban areas are being reassessed in the context of differentiated demographic processes, changing lifestyles, digitalisation and new forms of mobility,
- > It is important to re-evaluate and seek approaches to sustainable development in the light of current challenges (climate change, the conservation of natural resources, pandemics, etc.).

In both countries, there is great pressure to change and adapt towards new forms of urbanity and to conceive new strategic approaches for the management of development in cities and urban regions. With limited public finances and the need for economic efficiency, the focus is not only on the conservation and further development of urban infrastructures but also increasingly on the competitiveness and innovative capacity of urban structures. Of course, not all types of urban areas are equally affected by these issues: a distinction must be made between metropolises and metropolitan regions on the one hand and small and medium-sized towns on the other hand, viewed in both cases in the context of the national urban systems. The book aims to do justice to this objective.

Although all those involved in this collective endeavour had ambitious goals, it proved impossible to address all the topics relevant to the spatial development of urban and rural areas. A decision was therefore made to concentrate on a number of important topical themes which are undoubtedly relevant in both countries in different ways and could be significant for a comparison. The focus is thus on issues related to metropolises, small and medium-sized towns and particularly current issues of urbanity, sustainability, Smart Cities, transport and mobility, and the role of cross-border urban development, the latter being a topic that especially affects the German-French border regions. The following chapters are conceived in these terms. They not only take a scientific and theoretical approach but also consider the practical planning perspective and methodological aspects of the topic at hand. Three factors should be emphasised here:

- 1 The urban systems and their processes of transformation are embedded in different institutional parameters as Germany and France have very different institutional systems: one federal, the other unitary. Against this background, the current challenges also promote discussion about adaptabilities, about forward-looking administrative structures and services, and about the future orientation and role of urban development policies in both countries. The comparison allows the advantages and limitations of the two models to be reassessed at a time of considerable change, especially in France.
- 2 The urban systems of both countries are subject to rapid change. However, the processes of transformation are occurring in different national urban systems. They are each characterised by their own development paths and historical

constants. In the context of these different models (the strong primacy of Paris within France, the more balanced network of cities in Germany), a comparison allows an analysis of the reaction of both systems to change. On the one hand, there is dynamic metropolitan development, and, on the other hand, small and medium-sized towns are following a great range of development paths that vary between stagnation and growth.

- 3 Cities and urban regions in both countries are confronted by new challenges, whether in relation to sustainable development, technological innovations in urban development (Smart Cities), issues related to transport or cross-border development. The comparison allows us to understand how these new challenges are addressed on both sides of the Rhine.

The book is structured around these three points of discussion, although the various chapters aim to provide answers to questions that arise through a comparison of experience in the two countries.

2 Differences in the institutional systems

In contrast to the German federal system which is founded on the *Grundgesetz* (GG – Basic Law) that was adopted after the Second World War, France has adhered to the model of a centralised unitary state. Although the country has not been spared radical change, it has remained stable for more than two centuries. Nonetheless, in the Fifth Republic attempts are being made to advance a still incomplete process of decentralisation. Although the administration is perceived as somewhat rigid, this reveals a certain will to change under the terms of Presidents Sarkozy, Hollande and Macron (Demazière/Sykes 2021).

The stability of the German institutional setting contrasts with the sequence of institutional reforms that have stretched over decades or even half a century in France. The primary consequence of these transformations has been the establishment of local and regional territorial authorities and administrations to implement all the reforms. Since the 2000s the pace of reform has even increased. While in Germany transformation has taken the form of successive adaptations, in France the diverse reforms have been hotly debated and sometimes even contested. The mantra used to justify reform in France often refers to simplification, but in light of the proliferation of administrative levels it seems doubtful that this has been achieved. In particular, the financing modalities remain as complex as ever.

A striving for simplification is not the only motivation for the reforms and changes put forward by the two countries. Factors like economic efficiency, austerity and competitiveness are also often cited and linked to issues like diminished reaction capabilities, flexibility and a lack of innovative ability. In the wake of their administrative reorganisation, the metropolises and regions are the focus of such discussions in France. Size is viewed as the equivalent of power, although it is often overlooked that the power of an organisation is expressed primarily through its efficiency and not

through its size. The French *régions* (regions) envy the German *Länder* (federal states) because despite the latest reform, which increased their size, the *régions* still suffer from a lack of finance and competences and thus cannot match the power of the German federal states.

These differences can also be seen in the spatial planning systems of the two countries and the position of the higher level of territorial authority (*régions* in France and *Länder* in Germany). As the above discussion suggests, the historical roots of France's spatial planning system mean that the central state plays a key role. From a planning perspective, the decentralisation reforms of recent decades have led to a moderate redistribution of spatial development competences and to the introduction of new planning instruments. The *régions* and sub-regional, intermunicipal cooperations have undoubtedly profited from this (see for a summary Grabski-Kieron et al. 2013). However, understandings of the state and planning continue to be based on the role of an active and regulative state. Spatial planning as *aménagement du territoire* has its modern roots in the time after the Second World War and is basically understood as the planning and coordination of state activities that have a spatial impact. In this sense there is no clear division between cross-cutting spatial planning and specialist sectoral planning, in contrast to German planning law which distinguishes fundamentally between these two. French spatial planning follows the basic idea of *cohésion nationale* (national cohesion) and social solidarity, which is linked to the fundamental aim of equal opportunities. This is manifested in the public service mandate of the state, which is the basis of legitimation for sovereign state planning tasks (Milstein 2016). Spatial planning thus primarily focuses on security of supply and on maintaining it within functional spatial development despite changing parameters.

This understanding is fundamentally different from the guiding principle of German spatial planning, namely the creation of equivalent living conditions. The focus here is rather on balancing land-use interests and the basic idea of a facilitating state (ARL 2020). Even though France constitutionally adopted the principle of subsidiarity in 2003, the federal organisation of spatial planning in Germany means that this principle is more 'firmly' historically anchored and understood. In addition to the principle of subsidiarity, German spatial planning is also based on a second important principle, the *Gegenstromprinzip* (principle of countervailing influence), which is unknown to French spatial planning. This ensures that decisions about the preparation or amendment of plans are always based on mutual feedbacks between the levels.

In Germany, higher-ranking spatial planning is a mandatory task for the German federation and the federal states. In line with the internal administrative structures of the federal states, the planning hierarchy continues through the levels of intermediary state authorities (e.g. districts) to the municipal level. The German federation regulates the structure and functions of the German spatial planning system with the *Raumordnungsgesetz* (ROG – Spatial Planning Act). For several years the law has allowed the German federation to produce its own legally binding federal spatial plan, but to date the German federation has only made use of this option in the form of a *Bundesraumordnungsplan Hochwasser* (Federal Spatial Plan for Flooding) (BMI 2021). It is rather the case that since the 1970s the primary instruments that lay down

the principles or directions of overall spatial development in Germany have been non-binding documents containing guiding principles and objectives. These are produced by the German federation and the federal states together, in line with the principle of countervailing influence.

Since the 1990s these documents have taken the form of *Leitbilder der Raumordnung* (Guiding Principles of Spatial Planning) (MKRO, most recently 2016). They are regularly updated and adapted to changing parameters and problems (e.g. climate change, services of general interest). They thus frequently address the further development of the urban and metropolitan system. In the federal system, the German federation leaves it to the federal states to transfer these guiding principles into legally binding plans. They are incorporated into the development plans of the federal states and the regional plans for sub-areas of the federal states (regional administrative units that vary according to the administrative structure of the federal states) and implemented in federal state and regional planning through the planning legislation of the federal states. They also fundamentally reflect the obligation to subsidiarity.

Cities and municipalities are not defined as formal parts of the legal system of German spatial planning. They have self-administration rights and planning sovereignty. The *Baugesetzbuch* (BauGB – Federal Building Code) gives them their own legal planning basis. However, the aforementioned principles ensure that they are legally bound to higher-ranking administrative and planning levels in the hierarchy. This means, for instance, that the process of preparing a regional plan involves extensive negotiations between the region, federal state planning authorities, municipalities and others. All these levels can put forward their concerns in the plan preparation process.

In contrast to Germany, French spatial planning exercises influence less through formal legal plans and more through public legal contracts between the state and territorial authorities, in particular between the state and the *régions* (*contrats de plan État-région* – State-Region Plan Contracts). Agreements on objectives and transfers of finance are core elements of these governing instruments. Linked to this is a decided project orientation that gives French spatial planning a much stronger focus on implementation than the German system (Milstein 2016).

French spatial planning does not do completely without planning documents. However, they have a non-binding character and primarily provide guidance. The *régions* have *Schémas régionaux d'aménagement, de développement durable et d'égalité des territoires* (SRADDET – Regional Scheme for Planning, Sustainable Development and Territorial Equality). There are also various strategic and in some cases binding planning instruments for the metropolitan regions (especially *Schéma de cohérence territoriale*, SCoT – Scheme for Territorial Coherence). Such instruments are manifestations of intraregional cooperation and address the growing context of the urban region and its surroundings (see Demazière et al. 2022). The local level below that of the metropolises also has its own planning instruments. At the heart of the planning of small and medium-sized towns is the *Plan local d'urbanisme* (PLU – Local Urban Plan) which regulates land use and protected open-space structures and is similar in content to the *Flächennutzungsplan* (Land-use Plan) in Germany. The PLU may not

contradict the higher-ranking regional development plans and is of central importance for the municipal development of small and medium-sized towns and for intermunicipal associations in rural areas.

The transformation of planning culture that has been seen in planning in many Western democratic social systems since the 1990s has also changed planning in France and Germany, although with different intensities and speeds. Formal legal instruments and planning methods are increasingly being supplemented by cooperative approaches to planning processes where a central role is played by stakeholders, citizen participation and informal cooperative elements.

The democratisation that has been seen in the course of the transformation of planning culture began in both countries with the mobilisation of citizens. This unfolded on the level of the neighbourhood or city, ignited by environmental concerns or critical large-scale technological projects. In Stuttgart a few years ago, a civic movement seriously impeded an urban development project based around the railway station. In Nantes another collective managed to halt an airport project. At the end of the 1990s, innovative citizen groups in Freiburg/Breisgau played a significant role in the prominent urban conversion project *Vauban*, which was implemented using what were then innovative urban design techniques.

Looking back in time, this history of mobilisation in France can be viewed as a significant reason for the reforms of the institutional system: more democracy, i.e. increased participation. With the advance of reforms, new mechanisms of local democracy emerged and the local political actors themselves, especially the most innovative of them, gave the movement its own distinctive character. Over time, this 'movement' has changed planning processes in France. Thus, for example, today the aforementioned SRADDET are drawn up in broad processes of consultation with private and public stakeholders in the *régions*. However, 'governance', which describes this transformation of the governing of the social system, was introduced into German spatial planning earlier and more vigorously than in France.

In light of both countries being embedded in the European Union, it seems fair to ask what role the European project should play in the future development of this dynamic transformation. Indeed, this may be seen as a key issue for two of the countries that founded the EU. With its urban and territorial policy agenda, Europe is a stakeholder in the transformation and simultaneously provides a matrix that demands new ways of thinking and novel approaches. For example, for almost 20 years URBACT has supported reflection about urban change; INTERREG funds initiatives on cross-border cooperation; and the EFRE measures allow the *régions* and *Länder* to position themselves as interlocutors and project sponsors with the EU.

One issue concerns how these systems will develop in the future, for instance in France in the wake of the latest territorial reforms (amalgamation of *régions*, creation of metropolises: see Paris/Gustedt 2022). Will the *régions* use the options provided by intermunicipal entities to link up and reorganise (see Paris/Gustedt 2022)? In the COVID-19 pandemic, the central state has again relied on local actors and the decentralised levels of the state such as the prefects, departments and *régions*. Is this

an indication of a reorientation of public policy in favour of cities and municipalities? Will the city continue to play an important role with direct interventions like *Action cœur de ville* (City Centre Action) (see Grabski-Kieron/Boutet 2022 and Dehne et al. 2022) or with some form of remote government using calls for projects? In light of the new challenges, how should the options for urban development interventions by the German federation and federal states be evaluated? Are there 'optimal' or even 'transferable' modes of intervention that can be used elsewhere?

Despite all their differences, it should not be overlooked that urban development in the two countries must be viewed in the wider context of European spatial development and of a new territorial agenda for the European area. This leads to questions concerning the extent to which national spatial planning policies effectively contribute towards coherence in European spatial development and support the role of both countries in the 'European house'. The challenges outlined reveal how important it is for the future to use differentiated observation to identify options for strategic development in cities and urban regions in both countries, and to use these findings to provide coordinated policy advice, thus supporting European development.

3 Transforming urban systems

In both countries the process of metropolisation has strengthened the position of the higher order centres of the central place systems in the last three decades. The development of the large metropolises has primarily followed the logic of large-scale urban development projects – from the *Hafencity* in Hamburg to the *Euroméditerranée* in Marseille. Such projects have often been implemented through private-public cooperation and have successfully strengthened the attractiveness and high-value functions of the cities involved. The establishment of fast and efficient transport links between the cities (TGV, ICE) and the extension of local public transport in the wider urban regions have helped to consolidate these structures and to further develop the functional areas of the metropolitan regions. At the same time, the process of metropolisation has been linked to spatial segregation. Neighbourhoods characterised by considerable social problems have developed on the periphery of the metropolitan areas, threatening the social equilibrium of 'urban coexistence'. For decades, the implementation of public policy has led to very varied results, especially in France. Here it is possible to identify a trend whereby the metropolitan movement is shifting away from the historical model of '*Paris et le désert français*' ('Paris and the French desert') (Gravier 1947), making space for a vision of a metropolitan France with a Parisian heart and supplementary metropolises (Veltz 2019) such as Lyon, Marseille and Lille. The emergence of these metropolises in cultural and economic terms has often relied on 'great mayors' and presidents of intermunicipal bodies who are political characters on a national scale, sometimes ex-prime ministers (Lyon, Lille, Bordeaux), reflecting the significance of the national on the local level in France.

In contrast, Germany has been faced with the challenge of reintegrating Berlin into the polycentric system of dispersed metropolises in the federal states, completing the system of metropolises and metropolitan regions in Germany (see Demazière et al. 2022). The spatial category of 'metropolitan region' has been the subject of discourses

on spatial planning since the 1990s. It emerged from a changing understanding of spatial development that focuses on innovation and competition and was first anchored in the new Guiding Principles for Spatial Planning of 2006 (guiding principle: Innovation and Growth) (MKRO 2006). This triggered critical debate, e.g. about the neglect of rural areas, but also led to scrutiny of previous municipal policy and paved the way towards more actor-oriented concepts of municipal and regional development. Other guiding principles built upon such aspects in later years and consolidated the system of metropolitan areas in Germany (for a summary see Aring/Sinz 2006).

These metropolitan developments were accompanied by numerous institutional transformations (see Demazière et al. 2022), from the ‘hardest’ (a series of reforms strengthening intermunicipality in France which led to the creation of metropolis status in 2010/2014) to the ‘softest’ (like the metropolitan regions in Germany, formed in 1995, or the metropolitan poles in France, from 2010/2014). The French metropolises are more or less equivalent to the 15 German large cities (see Demazière et al. 2022) or even the around 20 cities with over 300,000 inhabitants (BBSR 2018). The French metropolises are characterised by intermunicipal structures (with the exception of Lyon). The large German cities are unitary municipalities with very varied forms of governance.

In France the intermunicipal structures are very complex (with the exception of Lyon). In contrast, urban and thus metropolitan development in Germany is based on the status of cities and municipalities, which the Basic Law defines as sovereign self-administrative bodies with planning authority. Since the 1990s, however, with increasing problems in cities and their environs and changing understandings of planning (governance), diverse institutional forms of municipal and regional management (intermunicipal cooperation, regional associations, special-purpose associations) have emerged. Such innovations have not directly changed the self-administrative status of the municipalities, they rather cooperate with and supplement it (see Priebs 2019).

Below the level of the metropolises and the large cities, the medium-sized towns and cities in France and Germany (with 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants in Germany but, for the sake of comparison, in France up to 200,000 inhabitants) present great challenges to spatial planning in both countries. The same is true of small towns in France and Germany (under 20,000 inhabitants). Comparisons of these types of towns are hindered by methodological difficulties that arise from the different definitional approaches used in the two countries (see Grabski-Kieron/Boutet 2022 and Dehne et al. 2022). The categories in Germany are more standardised; in France the boundaries between the different categories (intermunicipality, agglomeration, urban region) are less clear-cut.

Nonetheless, the challenges are similar in both countries. There is a great range of different developments among these types of towns and cities. On the one hand, continued metropolisation raises the urgent question of how to avoid the decline of these small and medium-sized towns, which form the capillary network of the national territories. On the other hand, in recent years the medium-sized towns in particular have been among the winners of demographic development and have gained sig-

nificance as commercial locations. This leads to research questions ranging from the decline of retail in town centres, to commercial attractiveness and demographic development, to the future role played by such settlements in regional development. All these topics deserve to be treated with a great degree of differentiation.

In fact, the development logic of the central place system is linked to another, namely that of regional development. Even today, when spatial development in the whole of Germany is considered, there is a significant contrast between the development of the 'old' federal states (those situated in the former Federal Republic before German reunification) and that of the 'new' federal states (in the territory of the ex-German Democratic Republic in the East), which is a considerable challenge for spatial planning. In comparison to the federal states of the former German Republic (West), the new federal states of East Germany continue to display weaker socio-economic development, and this despite the major investment efforts that have been made, also with European support. This contrast in development is reflected in demographic trends with shrinking towns and cities and indeed whole areas that require specific urban planning and regional policy answers. It must, however, be noted that the shrinking is extending into more and more regions that had previously experienced extended phases of growth. A simple east-west division is no longer as significant as ten or 20 years ago, as revealed by the continuous spatial monitoring by the BBSR (2021a) and the latest report on spatial development (BBSR 2021b) (see also: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2021).

In France, the crisis-ridden industrial regions were also the subject of specific, so-called 'conversion' policies. This was particularly the case at the time of the Fordism crisis from about the mid-1970s to the end of the 1990s. A number of industrial areas continue to give cause for concern or are even still dependent on subsidies. State finance is highly concentrated in these conversion regions, especially in Lothringen and in the north of France. Despite certain structural weaknesses (labour force qualifications), economic adaptation and revitalisation based on new concepts has been successful, at least in part. These achievements are currently under threat once more thanks to worldwide challenges (climate change, COVID-19). This is true, for instance, of places where the automotive industry plays a significant role. As in France, in the same period in West Germany structural change and the conversion of large old industrial regions were prominent issues. Among the most well-known are the Ruhr area and the cross-border region *Eurodistrict Saar-Moselle*, both of which profited from the restructuring programmes of the German federation and the federal states. Particularly innovative responses (e.g. *IBA Emscher Park* in the Ruhr) and coherent cross-border developments were initiated in these areas. Nonetheless, social problems are increasingly common, especially in the crisis and conversion areas of today.

Overall this means that, whether in France or in Germany, in the crisis or conversion districts, in the small and medium-sized towns or cities in decline, in the disadvantaged agglomerations with their great social and political issues: social problems are accumulating everywhere. The decline is perceived by the population and is accompanied by frustration about current standards of living. Not least, this is fertile ground for populist parties. Looking beyond spatial planning, the question here is one that concerns the future of European democracy.

4 Cities and regions in both countries face new challenges

In contrast to previous decades, sustainable urban development in both countries is facing the increased urgency of climate change, transforming mobility, digitalisation and many other accelerating trends. Cities in the two countries must tackle the challenge of integrating sustainability and, especially, climate mitigation and adaptation into urban development and planning. This is being undertaken in different ways in line with the different institutional systems and understandings of planning.

In France new provisional regulations connected to the topic of global warming have been put on the agendas of the cities. France remains true to a very top-down model whereby change is driven by the central state in the form of national legislation or government decisions which are then implemented in the territories. A good example of this method was the 2010 *Grenelle de l'environnement* (Grenelle Environment Forum), which took the form of a debate between experts and national political actors, much of which was broadcast by the media and led to the drafting of a law that served as a basis for decisions in the field of sustainable development. The format was repeated at a citizens' climate convention in June 2020, resulting in 146 proposals for the climate. In this case, the experts surrendered their places to members of the public. Those involved drew lots for the right to participate and, before submitting their proposals, improved their expertise through consultation with experts over several months in Paris.

In Germany the movement has much more of a grassroots character. In many places, local civil society initiatives are drivers of climate mitigation and other environmental protection concerns, introducing such issues to urban development policies. Since the 1970s, local civil society initiatives have become an accepted part of life in urban areas. The participatory process is further advanced and is endowed with greater powers than in France, where it is more restricted by law even if the options for public debate have increased in recent years (neighbourhood councils, development councils on the level of the agglomeration, etc.).

In Germany, the culture of environmental protection is undoubtedly older and more developed. As early as the 1960s, fundamentals related to environmental protection were incorporated in the *Bundesbaugesetz* (BBauG – Federal Building Act, 1960) and the *Raumordnungsgesetz* (ROG – Spatial Planning Act, 1962). The breakthrough came, however, with the *Bundesnaturschutzgesetz* (BNatSchG – Federal Nature Conservation Act, 1976) and other sectoral legislation passed in the 1970s. Additional pressure was brought to bear by protests, particularly against nuclear power (at a time when in France the state technocracy established this form of energy with almost no discussion). From the late 1970s, wider society became increasingly aware of issues related to air and water quality. In many cities this led to the establishment of departments of the environment. The success of the political party *Die Grünen* (The Greens) was largely based on this environmental movement, which emerged primarily in municipal contexts such as in Freiburg im Breisgau. In contrast in France, the party *Les Verts* (The Greens), whose name was directly inspired by the neighbours across the Rhine, was formed primarily by a national political apparatus. For a long time, local successes remained very rare, although those that emerged were emblematic (e.g.

Loos-en-Gohelle, in the old mining district of Pas-de-Calais). It was not until the recent local elections in 2020 that *Les Verts* were able to win positions of responsibility in a significant number of larger and medium-sized cities and municipalities in France. In Germany, *Die Grünen* are also represented in the executives of the federal states (currently in 11 of 16). The federal states are also actively involved in sustainable development through the planning, supervision or financing of certain policies (e.g. upgrading the energy performance of buildings).

In addition to the question of climate change, future-oriented mobility is another topic that has gained importance in recent years thanks to the goals related to carbon-free mobility in cities and municipalities. Transport is fundamental to daily life and private motorised transport is still the first choice of transport mode. Beyond the problems of climate, the social costs of fine particulate pollution, noise pollution, congestion and accident-related mortality are becoming ever more prominent in debates about private motorised transport. This topic demands attention in both countries because the importance of the automotive industry, especially in Germany, means economic and political consequences are unavoidable, as ‘Dieselgate’ recently illustrated.

Today, policies on both sides of the Rhine, with certain differences, have declared sustainable mobility to be a priority goal: the booming local public transport in France and the success of car-sharing in German cities are two pertinent examples. Pressure from the European Union, which has tightened the standards for the introduction of electro-mobility, encouraged relevant public policy in both countries to be significantly strengthened. This has led to criticism of a related issue, the problems linked to the production and recycling of the necessary batteries. There is no doubt that we are seeing in-depth restructuring of European production in the automotive industry, with consequent effects on employment and the labour markets. The turnaround has already begun: in July 2020 Mercedes announced the sale of the SMART factory in Hambach (Mosel), even though this plant is one of the symbols of the ‘successful’ industrial transformation of Lothringen.

One risk that comes with this ecological transformation to carbon-free mobility is that a considerable proportion of the population may be ‘left behind’. This would result in a lack of broad acceptance of the new forms of mobility and an accompanying lack of competence in dealing with them. The social, economic and cultural aspects of mobility also vary with the different sizes of towns and cities. On the one hand, the number of households without a car is growing in the large metropolises; on the other hand, a car is often indispensable for households or even for each adult in a household in small and medium-sized towns and their rural surroundings. In France, this divergence between the regions was one of the driving forces behind the *gilets jaunes* (yellow vests) movement in 2019.

One answer is undoubtedly investment in small regional railway lines, something that has suffered particularly in France due to the priority given to the TGV in the last half century (see Guihéry/Jarass 2022). In Germany, the abandonment and demolition of regional and local lines in the once extremely dense rail network have been characteristic of the recent ICE decades and have also been much criticised, especially in recent years. In some cases, lines that were still in existence have been reactivated.

In France, there are serious structural weaknesses connected to rail transport, as clearly revealed by a comparison between the two countries, no matter whether in relation to performance, productivity, quality of service or cost for the taxpayer. The situation in France is catastrophic and much exacerbated by corporatist behaviour which has blocked all developments for many years. In contrast to Germany, competition between the railway companies is in its infancy on the other side of the Rhine, despite European Union directives that stipulate that the relevant authorities (in this case the French *régions*) should implement this competition policy.

German and French cities are also facing new technological challenges. One such challenge arises from digitalisation, which is linked to a comprehensive internet evolution, and future-oriented forms of urbanity, e.g. the smart city. But this also affects the simultaneous 'intelligent' transformation of rural areas. The digital revolution has indeed changed ways of life and systems of production throughout the world. It can be assumed that its influence on urban planning and planning methods will further increase. The practice of land-use planning will not be unaffected by these changes. The smart city is a new paradigm of contemporary urban development (see Douay/Lamker 2022). We should always be aware that there are also risks associated with these challenges and that, for various reasons, the effects are not only positive, even if it is impossible to address all aspects here.

Towns and cities in both countries are at the heart of these movements and processes of change; undoubtedly with a very 'European' specificity and sensibility that contrasts with what is occurring in Asia. Issues concerning the protection of privacy and the safeguarding of our democratic model have been taken up by the public and politicians alike. Indeed, two approaches can be distinguished here. On the one hand is a cyber-optimistic approach that sees the possibility of digital technologies leading towards a more open society in the service of direct democracy where the public can freely participate. On the other hand, the cyber-pessimistic approach sees the internet as the tool of a new technological elite that serves the interests of the hardest form of capitalism and furthermore hinders the participation of those without the necessary cognitive and technological capital.

The former group do not see the digital transformation as being dependent on the ecological transformation because the former provides the latter with the technical solutions necessary to tackle climate change. In contrast, the pessimistic group believe that an uncontrolled internet leads to the waste of considerable resources and energy, especially due to the servers and the use of rare-earth elements. They view digitalisation as running counter to the goals of the fight against climate change and are thus very critical of the introduction of 5G-telecommunications to enable the networking of even more devices, including vehicles of the future, for so-called 'intelligent' mobility. The debate is ongoing in both countries.

From the perspective of spatial planning the question arises as to how regions and cities tackle this topic, especially in relation to catering for future infrastructure needs (e.g. provision of fibre-optic cable). With regard to remote working and communications, the COVID-19 pandemic has clearly revealed the importance of good

internet access for all areas, not only for the metropolises. Internet use has exploded in the face of the pandemic and will undoubtedly remain at a much higher level than it was just a few months earlier. Network investment has thus become an advantageous factor in competition between regions and cities.

The challenges posed by the joint development of the cross-border areas of France and Germany (see Peyrony/Sielker/Perrin 2022) are of a very different nature, although a not insignificant role is played by the specifics of the European situation in relation to perceptions of digital technologies. In many regions of the world, borders are difficult to cross or are locations of geopolitical tension. Sometimes they mark strong prosperity gradients (Mexico-USA) or unsurmountable democracy gradients (North and South Korea). However, borders appear not only as 'hard' impenetrable boundaries; they can also be a field of cooperation between neighbouring countries, regions, cities and partner towns. This has been the case in Europe for about 30 years, ever since the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, which led to the opening of the single market in 1993.

This is one of the significant elements of European integration, a continent that in the last century was ravaged by two world wars, fuelled not least by the historical rivalries between Germany and France. Since Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, the German-French friendship has been at the heart of the historical process of building the European Union. This is an uncontroversial point, but it is also that which motivates the writing of this book by researchers from both countries. This publication developed from the wish to better understand the contribution made by each entity to the European construction, and to capture the differences, peculiarities and convergences between these two nations that now find themselves on the same path.

The cross-border question, which closes the considerations of this book (see Peyrony/Sielker/Perrin 2022), is thus of particularly symbolic significance, as confirmed by the German-French treaty of cooperation and integration recently signed in Aachen. The German-French border is one of the most active in developing cross-border cooperation in Europe, and one of the first to introduce a new framework for cooperation. From the perspective of planning, it provides an example of the growing coexistence of 'soft' forms of governance and planning and the use of legal and administrative instruments or 'hard' forms of governance to overcome concrete barriers. Cross-border or territorial structures of cooperation display more or less formalised or institutionalised structures. In contrast, the authorities involved in them are rooted in national structures and constrained by strict administrative boundaries and a clearly defined legal status. Territorial cooperation is thus largely based on interaction between formal and more informal organisations. The cross-border planning and interaction spaces vary their structures on the regional and municipal level according to joint perceptions of the problem and task at hand, in line with regional governance approaches. Language barriers and different understandings and cultures of planning must be overcome. The creation of administrative bodies like the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) does not mean that these organisations are intended to replace the EU nation states or their subordinate entities

or authorities. The Treaty of Aachen (Auswärtiges Amt 2019) allows both countries to equip the territorial authorities of the border area and cross-border institutions like the *Eurodistrict* with appropriate competences, dedicated resources and accelerated procedures to enable them to overcome barriers to cross-border projects.

Against the background of growing Euroscepticism, cross-border cooperation between France and Germany can play an important role in promoting the potential of the border areas and their contribution to European integration.

The Treaty of Aachen (ibid) recognises the cross-border cooperation and supports it with a binational committee, thus providing important inspiration to the European Commission in terms of cross-border mechanisms. The question arises as to how the nation states can work towards more institutional flexibility on the local scale in order to facilitate cooperation in the service of those living in the border areas. A positive sign of the ability of the nation states to adapt their structures to suit local conditions is the founding of the European Collectivity of Alsace (*Collectivité européenne d'Alsace/Europäische Gemeinschaft Elsass*) on 1 January 2021. This has been achieved by amalgamating the departments Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin, which remain state administrative districts while the new organisation has new and specific powers in the field of cross-border cooperation.

Consideration of the territories and the global challenges facing them opens up a whole range of highly relevant questions. What forms of sustainable development are conceivable in the face of global warming and climate change? How can the smart city be developed so as to serve the public and not work against them? Turning to the European level, what new forms of mobility are desirable in Europe? How can we facilitate cross-border cooperation? And finally, how capable of adaptation are the nation states – in this case Germany and France and their local and regional administrative units? What answers can they offer, do they have new visions and strategies to propose, ones that perhaps break with the past and, in light of the urgency, also exhaust all possible legal options to secure new developments? Such questions highlight the relevance of critically considering spatial development in both countries. This is particularly pertinent in the wake of Brexit. France and Germany are now the driving forces of European integration, and the differences, convergences and innovations discussed in the book can provide inspiration for the rest of Europe. There is also a need to tackle another pending challenge together: Europe must regain its acknowledged place in the global geopolitical debate by promoting the democratic values, protection of the planet, cultural development and solidarity that make it unique on the global scale.

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INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES IN GERMANY AND FRANCE – BETWEEN SPATIAL REFORM AND PERSISTENCE

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Abstract

Germany and France offer two different models of political and administrative organisation: a federal state on one side of the Rhine and a unitary state on the other, albeit one that has become more decentralised over the last 40 years. Thus, the French *régions* have reduced capacities for action compared to the *Länder*. At the local level, the administrative structure was strengthened in Germany by merging municipalities, whereas France chose to use intermunicipal structures. In contrast to the political and administrative stability in Germany, local and regional organisation in France is constantly evolving, faced with a succession of laws, the pace of which has accelerated over time. The same applies to spatial planning, which has been framed from the outset by the German *Grundgesetz* (GG - Basic Law), but which has undergone much more evolution on the French side, even if the *loi d'orientation foncière* (LOF - Basic Land Act) of 1967 and the *loi solidarité et renouvellement urbain* (SRU – Law on Urban Solidarity and Renewal) (2000) represent two fundamental stages. In both countries, the strategic dimension of planning has been strengthened, and each side has developed its own tools for the management of urban projects.

Keywords

State – administrative organisation – local authorities – planning – drivers of change

1 Administrative structure in both countries

After the Second World War, both Germany and France had to rebuild their national administrations. In Germany the Allies created four occupation zones – Russian, American, British and French. After the breach between the Russians and the West, two German states were founded in 1949. In the East, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was a centralised socialist state integrated in the Warsaw Pact. In the West, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was based on a federal model in line with the constitution adopted on 8 May 1949. Konrad Adenauer was the architect of the German-French rapprochement and played an important role in European integration; he was the first German chancellor (1949-1963). The division into 11 *Länder* (federal states) – including the three *Stadtstaaten* (city states) of Hamburg, Bremen and West Berlin – occurred within the occupation zone of the Western powers. The former capital city Berlin was soon divided into two by the ‘Wall of Shame’ (1961). West Berlin was enclosed and surrounded by the GDR and connected to the West by Tempelhof Airport, especially during the crisis of the Berlin blockade (1948-1949). After the reunification of East and West Germany in October 1990, the old pre-GDR districts were abolished, five new eastern federal states joined the FRG and a reunified Berlin replaced Bonn as the capital of the country once again.

In the immediate post-war period in France a provisional government was established (1944-1946), initially led by General De Gaulle until the proclamation of the Fourth Republic and the adoption of a new constitution. This was the regime that committed France to NATO, to the integration of Europe (Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet) and to an ambitious reconstruction programme with the *Commissariat Général au Plan* (General Planning Commission, from 1946 to 2006 the authority responsible for Five-Year Economic Plans under the prime minister). The regime was, however, plagued by chronic political instability, particularly in connection with the crises that accompanied decolonisation, which led to the fall of the government. In 1958 Charles de Gaulle appeared as a saviour and the adoption of the new constitution marked the beginning of the Fifth Republic. The referendum of 1962 changed the nature of the constitution so that the president of the republic was now elected by direct universal suffrage. These episodes marked a return to greater political stability. France remained a strongly centralised state, strengthened by powerful administrative and technocratic mechanisms, particularly by the prefects in the departments and the *Ecole nationale d'Administration* (ENA – National School of Administration), a national educational establishment created to train the high-ranking executives required by the country at the time.

2 Federal state from the outset versus central state developing towards decentralisation and regionalisation

2.1 Germany: the structure of the national state, the competences of the federal states and municipalities

Germany's federal structure and the division of legislative powers between the federation on the one hand and the federal states on the other hand are most important for urban and spatial planning. A distinction is made between exclusive legislation and concurrent legislation. This is governed by Articles 70-74 of the German *Grundgesetz* (GG – Basic Law). According to the Federal Statistical Office, on 31 December 2018 there were the following administrative units in the 16 German federal states: 19 *Regierungsbezirke* (administrative districts) (only in the states of Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia), 294 *Landkreise* (districts), 11,014 *Gemeinden* (municipalities) with 2058 towns and cities including *kreisfreie Städte* (administratively independent cities) (Deutscher Städtetag 2019).

There are many different types of municipalities in Germany. They vary between the federal states due to specific stipulations based on the individual state legislation (e.g. *Niedersächsisches Kommunalverfassungsgesetz* – Municipal Constitution Act of Lower Saxony or *Gemeindeordnung Nordrhein-Westfalen* – Municipal Code of North Rhine-Westphalia, non-existent in Berlin and Hamburg). What they all have in common is a directly elected municipal leader, usually known as the mayor, and a directly elected municipal council. The three so-called city states of Berlin, Bremen (consisting of the two cities of Bremen and Bremerhaven) and Hamburg contrast strikingly with the situation of cities in France. These three city states are federal states in their own right and have competences comparable to those of the other federal states, e.g. in terms of legislative responsibilities. The elected representatives of the people have different titles in these three cities and can be compared with the state parliaments and the state premiers of the other federal states in terms of their rights, obligations and responsibilities. They have something of a dual function: city government and state administration. They therefore are also members of the *Bundesrat* (Federal Council).

There have been various administrative reforms in Germany since the end of the 1960s. They are primarily the responsibility of the states. The federal states organise their own administrations and use municipal codes to provide municipalities with a corresponding framework. The German federation is primarily responsible for reform of civil service regulation and influences the administrative activities of the other territorial bodies by extending or transferring public tasks. The municipalities are by no means merely responsible for execution. As well as having the right to organise their own administrations they also have considerable flexibility in the implementation of measures.

The administrative system as a whole is distinguished by its great continuity and the public administration in Germany continues to bear the characteristics of a classical Weberian bureaucracy. In recent decades it has, however, also been possible to identify clear changes.

2.2 France: the long march towards regionalisation

In contrast to federal Germany, in the 1960s the term ‘regional action’ came gradually to the forefront in the centralised state of France. In the 1950s and 1960s there were numerous regional expansion committees consisting of representatives from regional civil society and elected members. Following the example of the most emblematic of these committees, the *Comité d'étude et de liaison des intérêts bretons* (CELIB – Committee to Assess and Represent Breton Interests), these ‘regional actions’ were intended to promote strategic reflection about the future of the regions and decentralisation. The state defined spatial frames of reference (1960) for these ‘regional actions’, and in the course of the deconcentration reform (1964) these units were placed under the authority of the regional prefects and were led by an advisory body, *Commission de développement économique régional* (CODER – Commission for Regional Economic Development). The consolidation of the regional level in the still centralised state culminated in 1972 in a reform proposed by President Pompidou which created *Établissements publics régionaux* (EPR – Public Regional Bodies). These administrative bodies brought together elected representatives who had not, however, been elected for this purpose and were only provided with a symbolic budget. In actual fact, the territorial organisation of the state continues to be based on a centralised pyramid of three levels: the central state; the departments (today there are 96 *départements* on the French mainland and five overseas), which are led by a prefect as a representative of the state and an elected departmental council (known in the past as the *Conseil général*); and *communes* (municipalities) on the local level.

Decentralisation was a major issue at the beginning of the socialist presidency of François Mitterrand. Legislation passed in 1982 strengthened the competences of the municipalities (especially in the field of urban planning) and the departments, and established the *région* as a territorial authority of equal standing to the departments, with no hierarchies between the levels but with a division of competences. For instance, the primary schools were financed by the municipalities, the secondary schools by the departments, and the grammar schools and professional training by the *régions*, while state influence continued in the form of a national education policy related to teacher training and training programmes. When the departments were established at the time of the French Revolution, their territories often emerged from the provinces that had previously existed, and similarly the boundaries of the 22 metropolitan *régions* were based on past territorial divisions. In 2015 legislation was passed to reorganise the *régions* by amalgamation, leading to the creation of 13 large metropolitan *régions* (five overseas) (Bonnet-Pineau 2016). Two arguments defended this move: economies of scale (in actual fact not particularly relevant) and the strengthening of the *régions* in comparison with other European regions (particularly the German federal states, in line with the common misconception that the German states are equivalent to *régions* without taking into account their actual political and budgetary power). The case of Alsace stands out here: despite opposition from local public opinion and the elected representatives, Alsace was made part of the *région* Grand Est, which also includes Lorraine and the former Champagne-Ardenne. At the beginning of 2021, the two departments (Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin) fused to create a European Collectivity of Alsace with extended competences (particularly with regard

to cross-border cooperation and bilingualism). In contrast, the amalgamation of Bourgogne and Franche-Comté was well accepted, fulfilling or even anticipating the wishes of the elected representatives of both former *régions*.

3 Reorganisation and rationalisation of local territorial structures: the fusion of territorial authorities in Germany versus French-style intermunicipality

3.1 Persistence and territorial changes since the post-war period in Germany

During the post-war years there were four major phases of administrative reform: the phase of ‘active politics’ with the reform of municipal territories at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s; the phase of de-bureaucratisation, de-nationalisation, increased engagement with citizens and the simplification of administrative procedures from the mid-1970s and into the 1980s; the phase of internal administrative modernisation inspired by business practices in the course of the public management movement from the early 1990s; and the phase of discussions about the enabling state or the guarantor state and civil society from the end of the 1990s. In the first phase (financial reform from 1969), the focus was on homogenising the infrastructural capabilities of the federal states by introducing a scheme of financial transfer between the federal states and new instruments for common federal/state tasks (Art. 104a Para. 4 GG). This is seen as an overall success with the primary effect of having largely homogenised the financial resources available to the federal states and municipalities.

Attempts to reform the territories of the federal states (by fusing states) have, however, been unsuccessful, despite continued heated discussion on the topic. The municipal reform aimed to create more efficient administrative units and to generally decentralise the execution of tasks by creating territories that made a transfer of tasks both organisationally and economically feasible. The parameters used were population, administrative capacities, democratic legitimation and infrastructure (schools, transport, swimming pools). Overall, it was possible to drastically reduce the number of districts and municipalities in all eight non-city states of the old FRG within a decade, despite considerable opposition from a number of municipalities that faced annexation (reduction from 24,411 to 8,513 municipalities).

The creation of the five federal states in the former GDR was governed by GDR legislation (*Ländereinführungsgesetz* of 22 July 1990). With the establishment of these states the former 14 districts of the GDR ceased to exist, and the states then joined the FRG in accordance with Art. 23 GG as then valid. The city state of Berlin was a special case as here the former east and west parts of the city were reunified (Bogumil 2006: 369 et seq.)

After German reunification – or more precisely after East Germany joined the FRG – this territorial reform of the federal states was extended to the lower administrative levels, particularly in relation to the *Landkreise* (districts). They were reduced in number by a ratio of between 1:4 and 1:5. As a result, each of the six remaining districts

in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern are larger in area than the state of Saarland. Complaints that the amalgamations led to a loss of identity are heard in the political debate. In the first years after reunification there was discussion about fusing the states of Berlin and Brandenburg, but this failed in 1996. Since then, any attempt to discuss a reform of state territories anywhere in the country has immediately been stifled.

3.2 French-style intermunicipality

In France, the vast number of municipalities (36,000 in 1970-2015 and still 34,968 in 2019) is a recurring topic, particularly in connection to the continued growth of the urban agglomerations. In light of the failure of all attempts to fuse municipalities (e.g. the 1971 Marcellin Act), an answer had to be found in cooperation through the *Etablissement public de coopération intercommunale* (EPCI – Public Establishment for Intermunicipal Cooperation). From the end of the 19th century the municipalities were able to join together in associations with one aim (a specific social issue) or with a number of social objectives (from 1959) or also as a multi-purpose association (from 1935). The association partners are municipalities or indeed other units, particularly departments. In 1959 urban districts were created as the first form of cooperation on the level of the urban agglomerations, but they were of very limited success.

In 1966 an act was passed to create urban authorities (*Loi n°66-1069 du 31 décembre 1966 relative aux communautés urbaines*) in agglomerations, introducing a new form of highly integrated intermunicipal authority known as *communautés urbaines* (urban communities). In contrast to the urban districts, the urban communities were given a large number of competences that were delegated from the municipalities (planning, commercial zones, streets, sanitation etc.). The central state required Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon and Strasbourg to establish intermunicipal communities but seven others were also voluntarily created, Dunkirk as the first (1968) and Arras as the last (1999) before the passing of the *Chevenement* Act on intermunicipality in 1999. This introduced a new type of EPCI and the intermunicipal urban community was restricted to agglomerations with over 500,000 inhabitants. After the *loi de modernisation de l'action publique territoriale et d'affirmation des métropoles* (MAPTAM – Law on Modernisation of Public Territorial Action and Affirmation of Metropolises) of 27 January 2014 came into effect, which reduced the cut-off point for urban communities to 250,000 inhabitants, a number of agglomerations that are too small to be metropolises decided to opt for the status of urban community; to date 14 agglomerations have chosen this option.

In places where it was not possible to introduce an urban community, the question of intermunicipality remained unresolved until the 1990s, despite debate around the topic. The urban cores were criticised for leaving the burdens of the agglomeration (financing of large-scale projects) to the suburban municipalities (without facilities or taxation revenue and with extreme social problems) and the peri-urban municipalities, which are often relatively well-off (taxation revenue from commercial zones,

peripheral shopping centres, affluent middle-class population). In 1992 a new law was passed to create urban communities for towns (*communautés de ville*) and for rural areas (*communautés de communes*), but without much success.

It was 1999 before the *Chevènement* Act brought a more rational approach with *communautés urbaines* (urban communities > 500,000 inhabitants), *communautés d'agglomération* (agglomeration communities > 50,000 inhabitants around a town centre of > 15,000 inhabitants) and *communautés de communes* (communities of municipalities in rural areas), creating a new system that was extremely successful: the French intermunicipal map was quickly filled. Later adjustments were carried out to consolidate the system. In 2015, the *Nouvelle administration territoriale de la République* (NOTRe – New Territorial Organisation of the Republic) stipulated the minimum size of communities of municipalities as > 15,000 inhabitants. The areas not yet affected were thus able to learn from the lessons of the forced political integration carried out at the level of the urban communities and agglomerations, which are provided with very similar competences. These competences, which are delegated to the communities by the municipalities, are being continuously extended and encompass all important fields of local development: planning, economic development, housing policy, large sporting and cultural facilities, public transport, etc.

Intermunicipality thus seemed to be an alternative to the municipalities' longstanding rejection of amalgamation, at least until 2010 when a law reforming local authorities was passed (*La réforme des collectivités territoriales de 2010*). This opened the door for the creation of 'new municipalities' through the fusion of existing ones, a process that was to continue until 2020 (new local elections) and that has witnessed a certain amount of success, particularly for rural municipalities but also for a number of agglomerations (Annecy), with a total of 238 amalgamations completed by 01 January 2019, involving the fusion of 624 previously separate municipalities.

The legislation of 2010 (*La réforme des collectivités territoriales de 2010*) and especially of 2014 (MAPTAM Act) created metropolises and a system for cooperation between agglomerations (metropolitan poles). The creation of this new form of intermunicipality, which was strengthened at the expense of the departments (transfer of authority) represents the latest stage in the development process (see Demazière et al. 2022) but is probably not the last.

4 Differentiated development of planning instruments

4.1 Foundations of the planning system in Germany

The term *Städtebau* (urban design) emerged at the end of the 19th century in Germany (with publications by Joseph Stübben and Camillo Sitte). Previously the term *Stadterweiterung* (urban expansion or town extension) was more common and was usually connected with the more or less free play of market forces (Borchard 2018: 2382). In the 1920s the term *Stadtplanung* (town or urban planning) emerged, which

is understood today as a specialist discipline concerned with the planning and control of spatial development on the municipal level. Even at that time the strong growth of urban areas led to the creation of the Ruhr Association and Greater Berlin (see below). The close of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries saw the laying of scientific, design, normative and legal foundations for the ordered development of built-up areas, not only in Germany. Notwithstanding this, settlement ideology and urban and spatial planning under National Socialist rule was characterised by the systematisation of towns, urban functions and land requirements (with the development of the central place theories of Walter Christaller from 1933, which continue to be prominent today). From the 1960s, Lenort then introduced new terminology: *Stadtentwicklungsplanung* (urban development planning) to refer to all activities related to the creating, sustaining and continual improvement of the functionality of the municipal organism (Wékel 2018: 2435 et seq.). *Stadtentwicklungsplanung* is carried out in municipalities of quite different sizes, no matter whether they are cities or not (Pahl-Weber/Schwartz 2018: 2509 et seq.).

The time after the Second World War was very important for urban planning and thus for the development of the towns and cities, as it led to the creation of the German Basic Law and the federal states in West Germany (see Section 2.1). Art. 28 Para. 2 GG guarantees the autonomy of the municipalities in terms of their planning authority: 'Municipalities must be guaranteed the right to regulate all local affairs on their own responsibility, within the limits prescribed by the laws'.

Guiding principles (e.g. the notion of the car-oriented city) that had emerged in Germany before, during and immediately after the war, were further developed at the beginning of the 1960s in the wake of the intensive phase of reconstruction. In the face of increasingly complex problems, this led to the development of urban planning as an independent discipline. This was connected to specific legal developments and the establishment of university courses in planning (e.g. in Dortmund and Berlin, and at the beginning of the 1970s also in Kaiserslautern). Equally relevant was the development of differentiated specialist strands of planning (for water, waste, energy, etc.) and the establishment of planning authorities in the municipalities.

Thus while in France the administrative units were repeatedly changed through legislation from the end of the 1950s (see Section 2.2), with the 1959 creation of the urban districts until NOTRe in 2015, in Germany building legislation was passed that was directly relevant to urban and spatial development: the *Bundesbaugesetz* (BBauG – Federal Building Code) of 1960, the *Raumordnungsgesetz* (ROG – Federal Spatial Planning Act) of 1965 and finally the *Städtebauförderungsgesetz* (StBauFG – Urban Renewal and Development Act) of 1971. These pieces of legislation regulate the municipalities' autonomous local planning competences throughout Germany. The Federal Building Code (which is today called the *Baugesetzbuch* – BauGB – and has included the *Städtebauförderungsgesetz* since 1987) gives all municipalities the right to prepare plans that regulate land use on their own responsibility. In the public interest, the municipalities may thus restrict private land-use rights, which are also protected by the German Basic Law. Supra-local planning law is equally binding for the municipalities; this takes the form of the ROG and the 16 planning acts of the federal

states (the names of which differ). Both of these types of legislation address a public task that focuses on the common good. They represent a coordinating interface between the various specialist disciplines and politics (Pahl-Weber/Schwartz 2018: 2509 et seq.).

The above-mentioned Federal Building Code is implemented in the municipalities while the supra-local planning based on the Spatial Planning Act is implemented by the federal states and the administrative districts, in several federal states also by the rural districts and in a number of other federal states by specially constituted planning associations.

One of the most important foundations of spatial planning remains the Central Place Theory (*Zentrale-Orte-Konzept*), which has been repeatedly subject to criticism. Nonetheless, it has not yet proved possible for any of the relevant experts to put forward a better and historically more reputable approach. Though we all know that reality is more complex than the Central Place Theory suggests, it therefore continues to be used as a basis for the categorisation of urban and municipal functions in terms of greater or less centrality. This involves normative stipulations on central places in the plans and programmes of the states in accordance with Art. 8 Para. 5 ROG. They represent the Central Place Theory specific to each federal state and thus create a fundamental framework for the development of cities and municipalities.

Supply is the classical function of central places in terms of providing the population with goods and services. The plans and programmes of the federal states generally categorise central place functions in three levels: low-order centres for supplies of everyday needs, middle-order centres supplying more sophisticated needs, and high-order centres for supplies of specialised and diversified goods and services. The categorisation is associated with particular functions, either existing or desired: e.g. the existence of a hospital or a particular educational offer (Terfrüchte/Flex 2018: 2969 et seq.).

4.2 Spatial planning in France: from a normative instrument to a strategic dimension and future perspective for agglomerations

The inter-war period witnessed the passing of the *Cornudet* Law (1919, revised 1924) and planning on the municipal level was introduced. In 1934 the *Plan Prost* organised planning for the Paris region and finally in the 1960s the framework for spatial planning in France was provided by the *loi d'orientation foncière* (LOF – Basic Land Act) of 1967 (Vadelorge/Ripoll 2019). This law, which was fundamentally reformed in 2000 by the *loi solidarité et renouvellement urbains* (Law on Solidarity and Urban Renewal) and further adapted by later legislation, provides the basis for understanding current regulations.

In the wake of the *Plan Prost*, the 1960s saw the Paris region supplied with plans intended to provide a framework for urban development (*Plan d'aménagement et d'organisation générale de la région parisienne* – PADOG 1960; *Schéma directeur*

d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région de Paris – SDAURP 1965) and particularly to create New Towns and the *Réseau express régional* (RER – Regional Express Network). The state also wanted to enable interested agglomerations and the municipalities comprising them to plan their spatial development. This was the objective of the Basic Land Act associated with the *Schéma directeur d'aménagement et d'urbanisme* (SDAU – Master Plan for Development and Urban Planning) on the level of the agglomerations and the *Plan d'occupation des sols* (POS – Land-Use Plan) on the level of the municipalities. Supervision by the prefects ensured that the state maintained control over the plans (prior to the decentralisation of 1982). These plans were normative documents intended to organise urban growth and allow the use of agricultural land with no substantial reserves. The approach reflected an extensive, space-consuming logic within which the strong economic and urban growth of the country was associated with the creation of institutions, housing, infrastructure and new fields of activity.

In 1982 and 1983, following the *lois Defferre* (decentralisation laws), the local authorities were made responsible: the administrative supervision of the prefects (a priori control) was replaced by legality control (a posteriori). The municipal POS was made subordinate to the mayors and new master plans (*Schéma directeur* – SD) – on the level of the agglomerations – came under the jurisdiction of the EPCI or the mixed revision syndicates if the SD extended beyond the limits of the EPCI. In this new context the presidents of the intermunicipal and the SD revision syndicates, who were often the mayors of the large, central cities, wanted to make planning more strategic. The aim was to move beyond mere reflection about the areas of land necessary for development to consider the competitive conditions (in a European setting) that allowed this development. The SD of Lyon was produced in the 1980s and 1990s and, after many highs and lows, that of Lille was completed between 1990 and 2002 (in France, planning is also a risky legal exercise with many opportunities for claiming compensation); both these plans demonstrate the new strategic dimension, as highlighted by the authors (Motte 1995).

In 2000, the *loi solidarité et renouvellement urbain* (SRU – Law on Urban Solidarity and Renewal) was passed, transforming the SD into a *Schéma de cohérence territoriale* (SCoT – Scheme for Territorial Coherence) and the POS into a *Plan local d'urbanisme* (PLU – Local Urban Plan). Behind the change of name was a confirmation of the strategic and project-based dimension of the planning instruments with a new emphasis on controlling urban expansion, further confirmed by the subsequent development of legislation with the 2010 *loi portant engagement national pour l'environnement* (ENE – Law on National Commitment for the Environment), defining objectives for the economical use of space. Later, after debate and in pursuit of rationalisation, the 2014 *loi pour l'accès au logement et un urbanisme rénové* (ALUR – Law on Access to Housing and Urban Renewal) transferred responsibility for the PLU from the municipality to the intermunicipal instance in the form of the *Plan local d'urbanisme intercommunal* (PLUi – Local Plan for Intermunicipal Urbanism). For metropolises under the MAPTAM Act (2014) and urban municipalities this transfer was obligatory, for agglomeration communities and communities of municipalities it

remained optional. After a modest start, today almost half the EPCI have adopted the PLUi. This is undoubtedly a remarkable move towards intermunicipality, although the mayors continue to cling to their rights in relation to urban planning (they are still responsible for building permits).

Another important change in terms of the hierarchy of plans occurred in 2015 when planning on the regional level was strengthened thanks to the *Schéma régional d'aménagement, de développement durable et d'égalité des territoires* (SRADDET – Regional Scheme for Planning, Sustainable Development and Territorial Equality). Unlike the previous regional plans, it was inserted into the hierarchy of plans above the SCoTs, as was the *Schéma régional de développement économique, d'innovation et d'internationalisation* (SRDEII – Regional Scheme for Economic Development, Innovation and Internationalisation), with the exception of the metropolises, which are autonomous here.

5 Specific instruments for the development of urban and rural projects

5.1 Selected development approaches in Germany

Federal programmes based on the aforementioned Urban Renewal and Development Act aim to stabilise and upgrade urban neighbourhoods and centres facing particular challenges. The federal and state authorities make administrative agreements governing the programme funding. The areas eligible for funding are selected by the federal states (competitive process). An integrated approach is taken, so that selected neighbourhoods have to present their promotional measures in an *Integriertes Handlungskonzept* (IHK – Integrated Action Concept) and must also develop neighbourhood management in the course of the funding. A third of the financing of the measures comes from the federation, a third from the state and a third from the municipality in question. The focus of the funding is revealed by the title of the programmes. Thus, for instance, the urban renewal programme for cities and urban neighbourhoods facing severe functional and physical challenges (e.g. caused by demographic shrinking); here the funding allows the demolition and adaptation of buildings to suit changed needs (BBSR n.d.a; here are also references to other programme focuses such as 'Small towns and municipalities', 'Restoration and development' etc.).

One of the best-known German development projects of recent times is probably the HafenCity project in Hamburg. In 1997 the *Gesellschaft für Hafen- und Standortentwicklung* (GHS – Port Area Development Corporation) was founded to manage the development; in 2004 the company was renamed *Hamburg HafenCity GmbH*. It is a 100% subsidiary of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg and is entrusted with a public mandate to develop the HafenCity Hamburg. This process is undertaken in cooperation between the supervisory board of the limited company (made up of members of the senate and thus subject to political control), the Land Commission, the Urban Development Commission and the Authority for Urban Development and

Housing. The jury judging the architectural, urban development and landscape planning competitions is made up of private developers, freelance architects and representatives of the district administration and the *HafenCity Hamburg GmbH*. The limited company administers the *Sondervermögen Stadt und Hafen* (plots owned by the City of Hamburg in the HafenCity zone). The sale of this land finances a large proportion of the public investment necessary, e.g. for streets, bridges, squares, parks etc. It is also responsible for clearing and preparing the land for development, the planning and building of public spaces, the infrastructure, the acquisition of and contractual agreements with property developers and users, and public relations and communications. The projects completed thus far include about 3000 dwelling units, the HafenCity University, the Elbphilharmonie and the establishment of approx. 930 companies creating about 45,000 jobs (HafenCity Hamburg GmbH 2020).

The *Internationale Bauausstellung* (IBA – International Building Exhibition) has repeatedly reconceived itself since its inception at the beginning of the 20th century (BBSR n.d.b). Initially the IBA was primarily an exhibition publicising exceptional architecture (e.g. the development of *Mathildenhöhe* in Darmstadt or the 1957 exhibition known as *Interbau* which led to the popular and much visited *Hansaviertel* neighbourhood of West Berlin). Over the years and certainly by the time of the equally well-known *IBA Emscher Park*, the exhibition increasingly became an instrument of sustainable urban and regional development. These days this federally supported programme is also esteemed by neighbouring countries (Vienna) and in border areas (Basel). The structures necessary for the exhibition vary from case to case. In Hamburg a 100% subsidiary of the City of Hamburg was created as a limited company (IBA Hamburg GmbH n. d.). With a focus on globalisation, climate change, energy transformation, sustainability and the creation of high-quality housing, the first objective here was to transform the image of the urban district of Wilhelmsburg. After the IBA was completed in 2014, the limited company continued as an urban development enterprise creating new neighbourhoods in the city and currently employs 34 staff for ten projects with a total area of 440 hectares.

A similar instrument was created with the international, federal and state garden shows. The *Deutsche Bundesgartenschau Gesellschaft* (DBG – German Federal Garden Show Society) organises a competition to select cities and municipalities to host the shows. The first *Bundesgartenschau* (BUGA – Federal Garden Show) was held in 1951 in Hannover, where the park thus created continues to play a major role in the network of public green spaces. From the mid-1990s such shows became increasingly regarded as overall urban development concepts relevant to an entire city. They are usually implemented by limited liability companies with a range of structures. Funding comes from various federal and state programmes as well as from sponsors and donations from local firms.

5.2 Planning and development of cities through urban projects: ZAC, SEM, SPL (France)

At the same time as the mayors of the large cities were given new autonomy through the *lois Defferre* (decentralisation laws, 1982), several of them started large programmes to develop new urban neighbourhoods, thus leading to a generation of 'Building Mayors' and 'French-style' urban projects. Georges Frêche in Montpellier (*Project Antigone*) and Pierre Mauroy in Lille (*Project Euralille*) were the first representatives of this movement. However, they were only able to embark upon this type of large urban project (*Ile de Nantes*, *Deux-Rives* in Strasbourg etc.) because the necessary instruments had already been introduced.

With the aim of accelerating urban growth, in 1955 the state commissioned the *Caisse des Dépôts* (Saving Bank) to found the *Société centrale d'équipement du territoire* (SCET – Central Corporation for Territorial Infrastructure Development), a state bank specialising in saving deposits to support and finance the municipalities with their various social housing projects. The sphere of intervention of the *Société d'économie mixte* (SEM – semi-public company) was also extended, as was the extent of financial involvement of the local territorial bodies. The SEM companies with their public and private partners gradually established themselves as the administrators of local projects. Despite being organised under private law they remain under the control of the district authorities. This 'French-style' model of public-private company has characterised the development of the district authorities for half a century. It continues to exist today. However, in the 2000s the liberal European Union regulations for public contracts and concessions for public services led to France founding the *Sociétés publique locales d'aménagement* (SPLA – Local Public Development Companies, 2006) and the *Sociétés publiques locales* (SPL – Local Public Companies, 2010), which are 100% public. With the SEMs, some of which still exist although they have to compete with private developers, the overall system meets the requirements of free competition in Europe and the wish of the local elected representatives to maintain control over their large projects.

The Basic Land Act of 1967 was particularly important in introducing a new operative instrument for urban development: the *Zone d'aménagement concerté* (ZAC – Concerted Development Zone). In connection with the great housing shortage immediately after the Second World War, an accelerated urban development procedure was introduced (1958): the *Zone à urbaniser en priorité* (ZUP – Prioritised Urban Development Zone), which was not subordinate to the prefects of the departments but came under the control of the state. These ZUPs were part of France's urban development processes until the second half of the 1970s, producing 800,000 dwelling units, mostly in the towers and blocks of the so-called *Grands ensembles*. From 1967 onwards, the ZAC represented a step in the direction of 'integrated urban planning' between the state and local authorities. After decentralisation (1982), the ZAC came completely under the control of the local elected representatives and thus emerged as a significant operational instrument for the development of large urban projects. (The so-called *lotissements* – housing

estates – are another operational instrument for urban development.) The ZAC was reformed by the SRU legislation in particular. It remains the preferred instrument among elected representatives for large projects. It is usually administered by an SEM or SPL, which is responsible for its development (purchase, redevelopment of plots, urban design studies, streets, sanitary infrastructure etc.). Through the sale of the plots, the development costs are passed on to the private developers who respond to the calls for projects.

6 Conclusions and current issues

The administrative and territorial structures in post-war Germany experienced significant change in two separate phases (1970s: municipal reform, early 1990s: incorporation of the new federal states in eastern Germany in the FRG). This did not create new spatial entities in a piecemeal succession throughout the entire country to the same extent as in France. The changes made to planning processes, the nature of plans themselves and the distribution of responsibilities were, in comparison to the French situation, also rather marginal. On the other hand, development schemes became more differentiated with less classical urban and spatial planning approaches gaining importance, ones that can rather be categorised as informal planning. A plethora of instruments of this sort continue to evolve and become further differentiated, so that it is only possible to mention a selected few (see Section 5.1; for further information, see Danielzyk/Sondermann 2018). Such informal instruments have advantages in terms of adequate, adaptable and creative action in response to specific situations and actors/constellations of actors. There are of course critical aspects to such approaches, particularly related to the democratic legitimisation of planning and development activities.

While in France the territory, the function or even the very existence of administrative units (department) is subject to discussion and solutions are sought, in Germany such debate is far less significant. In contrast, questions concerning legitimisation and the overlapping of jurisdictions and decision-making authorities are clearly of importance in both countries.

In Germany this can be observed with reference to overlaps in spatial and in sectoral terms. More recent developments such as the spatial impacts and planning processes linked to the energy transition in Germany involve new challenges for the relationships between urban planning, spatial planning and the sectoral planning authorities. They also cause considerable tension between the various levels of spatial planning because the implementation of measures, e.g. the route for the 380 KV power lines from the North Sea and the Baltic Sea to the south of the country, rob the municipalities of ‘room to breathe’, i.e. of options for spatial development (designation of building areas). In many cases this arises from multiple claims on the land in question, not just for power lines but also for transport (motorways, railways) or nature and landscape protection. Overlaps between administrative units tend to occur in Germany primarily in the metropolitan regions, which are the subject of discussion in Demazière 2022.

Small and medium-sized towns and also entire regions, often characterised by a shrinking population, are faced with considerable restrictions on their development due to declining budgets. It is now (June 2020) clear that the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will exacerbate the problems of both small and large municipalities. This is certainly not only the case in Germany but will need to be tackled in all countries, also in France.

While certain neighbourhoods and regions continue to lose population, elsewhere there is a significant unsatisfied need for housing. It remains to be seen whether present attempts to solve this problem without endangering the requirements of sustainable development (see Kanning/Scholles/Mancebo 2022 and Douay/Lamker 2022) can be continued in light of the effects of the pandemic, or whether they will be subject to cuts or must even be abandoned.

In France the territorial institutional parameters have undergone considerable developments in recent decades. There still survives the image of a centralised state with a strong central authority far superior to local power, which is split between the renowned '36,000' municipalities. In fact, the state has recognised that it can no longer cope with the task of territorial development alone and introduced contractual types of control in the mid-1970s (*Contrats de ville moyenne*). From this time on, the state contributed to local or regional projects on the basis of contracts that were signed between the state and the local authorities. Contractual control has thus dominated relations between the state and the territorial authorities. This was also true of policies targeting the social development of cities such as the *Développement sociale des quartiers* (DSQ – Social Neighbourhood Development) in the 1980s and 1990s, and the *Programme national de rénovation urbaine* (PNRU – National Urban Renewal Programme, introduced in 2003) or the *Nouveau programme national de renouvellement urbain* (NPNRU – New National Urban Renewal Programme, since 2015), which were implemented by the *Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine* (ANRU – National Urban Renewal Agency). It also applied to urban areas (contracts governing urban districts in the 1990s) and to rural regions (pertinent contracts from the end of the 1970s and again in the 1990s after the *Voinet* law). Particularly since the mid-1980s, relationships between the state and the *régions* have developed in accordance with the *Contrat de plan État-Région* (CPER – Plan Contract State Regions). The current sixth generation of contracts should profit from a state contribution of 12.5 billion euros between 2015 and 2020, in addition to the share assumed by the *régions* and other local partners equalling a total of 30 billion for all the CPER.

Furthermore, the local elected representatives found that the decentralisation laws of 1982 gave them new scope for action as they allowed local authorities to undertake larger projects. The strengthening of intermunicipality and the creation of 'new municipalities' through fusion (2010) gave local actors more influence. The 1966 law on urban communities paved the way for strengthened, integrated power for the agglomerations, and the *Chevènement* Act (1999), MAPTAM (metropolises, 2014) and NOTRe (2015, demographic minimum threshold of 15,000 inhabitants for an intermunicipality) moved in the same direction.

Over time the *région*, via the SRADDET, became the coordinator for local policies. The amalgamations to create large *régions* in 2015 aimed to strengthen the *régions* on the European stage. Nonetheless, neither budgets nor responsibilities are comparable to those of the German federal states.

This development is not yet at an end. The following questions remain unanswered: What is the future of the departments, which are sandwiched between the more powerful *régions* and the metropolises, both of which compete with the departments for jurisdiction? Is there a need for a leading figure for rural areas which are organised in communities of municipalities and *pays*? Will the departments simply be given up in favour of the *régions*?

What are the prospects of democratic representation for metropolises, agglomeration communities and urban communities? When will there be direct elections for these communities, in light of the fact that the municipality continues to be the most important setting in terms of local elections, despite the considerable increases in the jurisdictions of the communities affecting all citizens? The establishment of local committees of civil society, such as the development councils (Voynet law 1999 and MAPTAM 2014), cannot be regarded as sufficient in this context.

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Brigitte Adam, Guy Baudelle, Marc Dumont

SPATIAL DOCTRINES OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT – PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN THE COURSE OF TIME

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Abstract

In the field of urban and regional planning, France and Germany have shown several analogies since the beginning of the modern age. However, there is still a difference between more centralised governance processes (France) and a stronger position of the municipalities (Germany). But the planning strategies of France and Germany have moved closer together. A comparison covering about 100 years must differentiate between German planning strategies in East and West Germany for a considerable period.

Urban planning has been influenced by similar models like the Athens Charter or the Leipzig Charter. The latter, a European document, was renewed in 2020. Furthermore, in both countries, similar paths can be identified: the pursuit of a strong technical focus, the tendency towards sustainable development, more flexibility, the growing importance of integrated policies and the challenges of urban sprawl. Main doctrines like integration, participation and future orientation have accompanied urban and regional planning in Germany as well as in France.

Keywords

Integration – sustainable development – competitiveness – participation – open spaces

1 Introduction

This chapter aims to identify the doctrines that guided urban development at the central level in terms of both spatial and urban planning.

A doctrine can be defined as a set of beliefs or principles reflecting a conception of society and often completed by rules of thought or conduct. A doctrine is a matter of principles and part of an ideology. In this respect the planner Françoise Choay (1965) identified two main models: the culturalist model that refers more to the past and another progressive and modernist model. All doctrinal bodies use a variety of reference frames (Faludi/van der Valk 1994; Scholl/Elgendy/Nollert 2007; Adam/Fritzsche 2017; Baudelle/Gaultier 2018): sustainable urban planning (Carriou/Ratouis 2014), cohesion, diversity, attractiveness, competitiveness, urbanity, polycentrism, urban renewal, compactness, integrated urban development, cooperation, spatial equity and even territorial equality – France thus at one time had a *Ministère de l'égalité des territoires* (Ministry of Territorial Equality, 2012-2014), a claim that was wilfully mocked (Estèbe 2005).

This contribution summarises the main principles that have guided French and German planning since the end of the Second World War and addresses issues such as the dissemination of models and the possible chance of convergence between the two countries, possibly as a result of European integration.

2 France: a long-standing, constantly renewed tradition of centralised government that does not prevent doctrinal evolution

2.1 A centralised system

In France, the crucial role of central government has never been questioned. This is path dependent, due to the deep historical rooting of the relations between national and local levels in the field of urban planning, particularly since the 19th century (Oblet 2005). The lack of any local decision-making process before the 1980s explains the long-standing state power in defining urban planning tools and significant planning policies that shape urban development, even if they were not designed directly for this purpose. Various Five-Year Plans implemented during the post-war decades have aimed to restore production and infrastructure and modernise the production system. In this context, cities were conceived as tools to strengthen national productivity, forcing them to adapt their structure.

At the end of the war, city development was highly supervised by the state with a famous regional policy, the so-called *aménagement du territoire* (spatial planning) (Jean/Vanier 2009; Desjardins/Geneau de Lamarlière 2016), before the progressive decentralisation of planning power from the beginning of the 1980s onwards. This is a rare case in Europe of highly deliberate and iconic, successive policies from the middle of the 20th century (Caro/Dard/Daumas 2002; Alvergne/Musso 2003) to a relatively recent period of strong transformation.

2.2 The technical planning phase and its doctrines (1945-1982)

There are two main phases (Desjardins 2017). The first ran until the early 1980s, dominated by the planning regime, technical and strong-willed, strengthened by the creation of the *Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale* (DATAR – Interministerial Delegation for Spatial Planning and Regional Attractiveness) in 1963. Following the famous pamphlet by Gravier (1947), the objective was above all to rebalance the national territory in favour of the provinces. This effort was to be based inter alia on the structuring of an 'urban framework' (Hautreux/Lecourt/Rochefort 1963), especially by the eight famous so-called *métropoles d'équilibre* (balancing metropolitan areas). Actually, this attempt was not really central as urban development policies were mainly devoted to the implementation of three successive paradigms: infrastructure, modernisation and productivity.

Infrastructure policies were prioritised as in the 1950s most cities had only basic infrastructure for water supply, wastewater treatment or waste management, and few urban departments had the capacity to manage them. Modernisation was viewed as a wider paradigm including the broad scope of housing and experimentation with industrialised construction processes such as the so-called *politique dite des modèles d'innovation* (innovation model policy) (Direction de la Construction 1974). Finally, at a time of full growth (Fourastié 1979), the paradigm of productivity thoroughly shaped urban development, aiming at expanding CBDs in the old historic centres through so-called urban renewal policies which involved demolishing insalubrious central areas.

Hence, an initial spatial planning doctrine was conceived as early as the 1950s in the context of increasing regulatory planning supported by new laws, resulting in the widespread imposition of *Plans d'urbanisme directeur* (PUD – Urban Master Plans) soon renamed *Plans directeurs d'urbanisme* (PDU – Urban Master Plans). These plans were guided by three principles. First, the specialisation of space, resulting from the zoning rules of the 1930s, which led to the designation of *Zones à urbaniser en priorité* (ZUP – Prioritised Urban Development Zones) in the outskirts (1958-1969). France particularly adhered to the Athens Charter's functionalist principles, building 800,000 dwellings in nearly 200 ZUPs which succeeded the large multifamily housing estates (the so-called *grands ensembles*) already mainly made up of towers and blocks of flats, unlike the Northern European countries which were dominated by single-family housing programmes (United Kingdom, Benelux, Federal Republic of Germany, Nordic countries). Centralisation coupled with powerful standardisation and helped by the industrialisation of construction probably explains this zeal. Following the same logic, numerous industrial areas, shopping centres and university campuses were planned. This widespread zoning principle seems to have been inspired by the German *Zonung* allocation, a vision established by the first land-use plans (*abgestufte Bauordnungen*) (Gemünd 1913), like Franz Adickes' 1891 plan for Frankfurt. Today, already in terms of growing cities, this principle is confronted with a critical view that aims at more diversity and flexibility.

The second doctrine at work in urban planning led to a decoupling between urbanity and mobility, which was due to a vision of mobility that aimed to achieve a more efficient process of modernisation (Wiel 2005; Mangin 2004). Bypasses were planned in each city following a new model in line with the Buchanan report (1963), in addition to a very important road and rail policy (especially in Greater Paris for the latter).

Finally, the modernist state doctrine promoted new urban ‘centralities’, leading to contrasting policies towards the historic centres: for some sanctuarisation and heritage promotion (so-called *secteurs sauvegardés* [protected area] policy), for others radical urban renewal by slum clearance and concrete-dominated platforms over underground car parks (the so-called *urbanisme sur dalle* [urban design on slabs]) to establish new *cités administratives* (administrative cities) and Central Business Districts (CBDs) such as La Part Dieu in Lyon or Meriadec in Bordeaux.

These specialisation doctrines also guided spatial planning policies on a wider scale. For example, the New Towns Model inspired by the United Kingdom and Northern Europe gave rise to the unilateral foundation by the central state of eight New Towns in the mid-1960s: five in Greater Paris, three in certain *métropoles d’équilibre* (Lille, Lyon, Marseille) and one near Rouen, initially remaining faithful to zoning and traffic separation principles. These New Towns also served as laboratories for the 1967 *loi d’orientation foncière* (LOF – Basic Land Act) (Vadelorge 2014), which in the 1970s led to the establishment of the first master plans for the metro areas, the highly technical *Schéma directeur d’aménagement et urbanisme* (SDAU – Master Plan for Development and Urban Planning) designed by central state services without consulting the municipalities, which had neither power in urban planning nor engineering resources. There was no further consultation with the first intermunicipal bodies created in 1967 in Lille, Lyon and Marseille. Spatial planning was exclusively based on demographic and econometric growth models.

At the same time, growth and regional policy favoured Fordist-type productive expansion at all levels of the urban system. Since the 1950s, the state had supported the spontaneous process of industrial deconcentration in search of a cheap and non-unionised workforce outside congested Greater Paris, soon followed by a determined manufacturing decentralisation policy run by the DATAR (Saint-Julien 1982; Baudelle/Fache 2015). This policy led to the establishment of new automobile assembly plants in western cities (Le Mans, Rennes, Seine Valley) and in the north-eastern industrial areas affected by the mining recession. This policy has strengthened the spatial division of labour between the capital city (largely monopolising executive tasks and headquarters) and the provinces (confined to low-skilled jobs).

In the 1960s and 1970s the doctrine led to other national development policies, such as tourist resorts sometimes being created ex nihilo both in the mountains (Les Ménuires) and on the seashore (La Grande-Motte), and to new huge industrial port areas (Dunkerque, Fos-sur-Mer, Le Havre, Saint-Nazaire) (De Roo 1988; Baudelle 2008).

Industrial expansion, migration to the cities, the policy of decentralising service jobs, and the dramatic development of schools, hospitals and cultural infrastructure explain why medium-sized cities (20,000-200,000 people) experienced the most growth between 1954 and 1975 at a time when the increase in the urban population was two to three times faster than in subsequent periods. In the 1980s, the expansion of higher education (new polytechnics, engineering schools, universities and campuses) and the feverish development of science parks (Certain, 1988) widened the geographic spread of the momentum.

2.3 A decentralisation phase since the beginning of the 1980s

The second phase is characterised by a gradual transformation of roles in planning and the emergence of a first-generation governance regime (multiplication of intervention scales, enlarged and more complex system of stakeholders). This step matches the 1982-1983 power shift which strengthened municipal abilities in urban planning and the prerogatives of the departments (councils) and *régions* with a move to elected assemblies. Recently (2014 and 2016), two important acts (MAPTAM and NOTRe)¹ have increased the strategic competences of *régions* and so-called metropolises in local development, perhaps along the lines of the German model (powerful *Länder* [federal states], *Metropolregionen* [Metropolitan regions]), in order to foster bodies of European rank and to implement principles of territorial equality and territorial solidarity.

2.4 Two new doctrines: priority geography and competitiveness (1980-2000)

The very interventionist state vision aimed at guaranteeing the equality of territories in support of an isotropic doctrine persisted until the beginning of the 1990s, leading indirectly to dramatic urban sprawl boosted by the equal accessibility principle, which included the accessibility by road (especially by the motorway network) of any place. But this doctrine was not immune to two major rising concerns that changed the previous territorial differentiation principle: on the one hand social mix, and on the other hand competitiveness conceived as an extension of the paradigm of productivity.

There was increasing worry over the impoverishment of large housing estates that resulted from the increase in owner occupation of single-family dwellings in suburban developments by the middle and upper classes. In the early 1980s, this engendered a new generation of urban policies focusing on social mix. This spatial doctrine led to the 'priority geography' of the *Politique de la Ville* (Town Policy), actually devoted to the regeneration of the most deprived peripheral neighbourhoods. This focus explains the first break in the principle of the hitherto equality standard of spatial development

1 *Loi de Modernisation de l'Action Publique Territoriale et d'Affirmation des Métropoles* (MAPTAM – Law on Modernisation of Public Territorial Action and Affirmation of Metropolises 2014) and *Loi portant Nouvelle Organisation Territoriale de la République* (NOTRe – Law on the New Territorial Organisation of the Republic 2015).

with the introduction of the principle of *positive discrimination* inspired by the United Kingdom ‘Educational Priority Areas’ and the US ‘area approach’. Combining economic (employment), social (education, security) and urban (housing, equipment) perspectives, this policy has extended the zoning vision of spatial planning through the definition of priority areas where the state concentrates financial allocations. Aiming to achieve *développement social des quartiers* (district social development), then *développement social urbain* (urban social development), this generously funded priority geographical approach is now superimposed as a world apart from other planning policies. Its culminating point was the 1994 pact of recovery with the implementation of numerous so-called *Zones franches urbaines* (ZFU – Urban Free Zones), *Zones de revitalisation urbaine* (ZRU – Urban Revitalisation Zones) and *Zones urbaines sensibles* (ZUS – Sensitive Urban Zones).

In 2000 this ultra-zoned policy gave way to so-called ‘integrated urban development models’ betting on a leverage effect via the new massive intervention doctrine *Grands projets urbains* (GPU – Major Urban Projects, 1991-1994) and then *Grands projets de ville* (GPV – Major Urban Projects, 2000-2006). The rise of intermunicipal cooperation since 1999 has strengthened the principle of fiscal solidarity between municipalities in the same agglomeration.

The 1990s witnessed both the emergence of sustainable development as a new principle of urban regulation (see Kanning/Scholles/Mancebo 2022) and the promotion of competitiveness in the context of increasing interurban competition (Motte 2006), also influenced by European policies within institutional adaptation processes (Dühr/Stead/Zonneveld 2007). At the same time the central state has suffered from a loss of legitimacy due to its relative powerlessness in the face of the economic crisis and the accentuation of socio-spatial inequalities, resulting in the rescaling of public action (Brenner 2004). The tightening of European competition regulation leading to a virtual ban on state aid to large companies has also considerably limited traditional state capacity for the spatial redistribution of activities based on regional planning grants (so-called *Aides à finalité régionale*). Consequently, the support for competitiveness provided by the 2007-2013 cohesion policy has made the 71 *pôles de compétitivité* (competitiveness clusters) the main regional policy tool in France.

2.5 Empowering territories in the face of ecological imperatives

The new cohesion policy acknowledged the major role of (larger) cities in wealth creation. More broadly, it sustained the principle of an integrated and place-based approach, so that differentialism rather than equality was at the heart of the 2020 creation of the new *Agence nationale de la cohésion des territoires* (ANCT – National Agency for Territorial Cohesion), a European-inspired lexicon. Its creation targeted the integrated implementation of territorial and urban growth policies, through the merger of several national institutions: the former *Commissariat général à l’égalité des territoires* (CGET – General Commission for Territorial Equality) that replaced the former *Délégation interministérielle à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’attractivité régionale* (DATAR – Interministerial Delegation for Spatial Planning and Regional Attractiveness), the *Établissement public national d’aménagement et de restruc-*

turation des espaces commerciaux (Epareca – National Public Body for the Development and Restructuring of Commercial Areas) and the *Agence du numérique* (AdN – Digital Agency) responsible for broadband infrastructure, mobile phone networks and digitalisation. The goal was also to strengthen the relationship with other major agencies in the field of housing (*Agence nationale de l'habitat* – ANAH), urban renewal (*Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine* – ANRU), the environment (*Agence de l'environnement et de la maîtrise de l'énergie* – ADEME) and spatial planning (*Centre d'études et d'expertise sur les risques, l'environnement, la mobilité et l'aménagement* – CEREMA). Moreover, the founding of ANCT confirmed the principle of a differentiation of territories that put an end to the utopia of territorial equality in favour of tailor-made programmes.

So European political orientations have played a central role in the rise of a capacity and capability building paradigm and the opening of a new arena of complex relations between *régions* and official integrated metro areas (so-called *métropoles*, intermunicipal cooperation bodies). This concern for self-government, more technical than inspired by any political philosophy (Lopez/Pellegrino/Coutard 2019), has occurred in the context of the decline of state interventionism and increasing ecological concern about climate change, declining biodiversity, and economically counterproductive and ecologically unsustainable suburbanisation. Beside the aims of social cohesion and diversity (challenging urban ghettos), the struggle against urban sprawl in favour of the environment was strengthened by the Grenelle Acts (2009-2010) which established new spatial planning principles (green and blue belts) through application of the EU's environmental guidelines on ecological and biodiversity corridors, making this regulation the new priority of city planning. In addition, a coercive containment of urban development aimed at re-aggregating mobility and urbanity has been introduced, for example by imposing public transport infrastructure on any new mall or business centre project².

This rise of environmental considerations means the decline of some long-standing city planning theories (Ascher 2000). To stimulate local capacities, subsequent generations of calls for projects have sought to encourage city governance while maintaining state intervention in specific areas, such as the core of shrinking medium-sized cities as illustrated by the 222 *Actions cœurs de villes* (Heart of Town – City Centre Actions) launched in 2018 or, again, the regeneration policies for the poor suburbs now implemented via highly integrated instruments such as the *Programmes d'investissement d'avenir* (PIA – Future Investment Programmes). This '*gouverner à distance*' ('remote government') (Epstein 2005) is changing the techniques of central state monitoring of local urban-planning, decision-making processes.

In the end, French central planning remains true to a traditional governance, dominated by instrumented rationality: top-down decision making, central control, closed action, single authority, directive leadership style, formal policy goals, system behaviour determined by components and representative democracy (Allmendinger 2017). Locally, by contrast, governance is shifting towards collaborative planning, which

2 *Loi pour l'accès au logement et un urbanisme rénové* (ALUR Act – Law on Access to Housing and Urban Renewal) 2014, Article 157.

involves experimentation, discursive design processes, and planning as a communicative process incorporating the construction of various arenas (Healey 1992). It is thus becoming ‘collaborative complex adaptative system (CAS) planning’, including interdependent networks, distributed monitoring, an open system, divided authority, guided interactions providing opportunities, elected agents and resources, a generative leading style, the realisation of collective action, and system behaviour determined by interactions and deliberative democracy (Booher/Innes 2018).

3 Germany: The adjustment of spatial doctrines on the way towards a joint national approach to urban development

3.1 The beginning of modern urban development in Germany

The Athens Charter (1933) has to be mentioned as the central idea that forms the modern city all over Europe. In times of polluting industries, urban functions were to be separated – probably beyond what the Modernists advocated (Gintrand 2020). Rapid industrialisation at the beginning of the 19th century required action to regulate and to compensate the negative consequences, to provide housing and to develop transport infrastructure. Living conditions within the especially highly industrialised German urban agglomerations deteriorated with more and more air pollution and less open and green spaces to relax in and rehabilitate from the hard work. Therefore, at the beginning of the 20th century, open spaces emerged in Germany as a structuring and compensating element of urban planning. Urban agglomerations began to expand beyond their administrative borders. Exhibitions on urban development took place in 1910 in Düsseldorf and Berlin. They brought the idea of regional parks and green corridors from the USA to Germany. Robert Schmidt, a famous German engineer and planner, realised these ideas for the enormously industrialised Ruhr area and set up a network of green open spaces to limit further uncontrolled industrial land use (KVR 1995; Reiß-Schmidt 1996). Another example is the Cologne greenbelt. Promoted during the 1920s by Cologne’s mayor (Konrad Adenauer), Fritz Schumacher planned green areas to protect open spaces and to integrate sport facilities (Bauer 2014). In general, ideas at the time were based on a much older tradition of urban parks that could be traced back to earlier centuries (DGGL 2018).

Furthermore, the growing industrialisation of cities required housing and an expansion of settlement areas. Since the beginning of the 20th century, new models of urban development had emerged and were realised in German cities. They were influenced by the English idea of the Garden City (Koch 1984; see Figure 1). One of the first foundations of a garden city with a strong combination of production and housing was found in Dresden-Hellerau (Lindner/Lühr 2008).

An additional relevant orientation was established by the architectural *Bauhaus* movement, an academic school with a strong position at the University of Weimar (later on in Dessau). Architects, planners and artists created new ideas. They influenced architecture as well as urban development by using the new opportunities offered by industrial production. Along with other models, they paved the way for large housing estates (Baumann 2007).



Margarethenhöhe was one of the early German garden cities. The settlement was initiated and supported by Margarethe Krupp in order to build a liveable environment for working-class people. New housing estates, founded by industrial employers, are among the typical elements of urban development found during the period of growing industrialisation.

Figure 1: Margarethenhöhe Essen / Source: Brigitte Adam 2017

These approaches are visible parts of today's cities and urban regions in Germany. Moreover, they reflect two very important characteristics of urban development as stable doctrines: integration and an orientation towards the future. Integration is particularly manifested as cross-sectorial planning while the future orientation can be seen in attempts to conserve open spaces and to react to obviously unlimited population growth. These doctrines accompanied urban development in Germany over the following decades – modified from time to time in order to adapt them to the changing conditions of each new period.

A third doctrine of urban development did not yet exist at this point: participation in dialogue- and process-oriented planning. At the beginning of the modern age, urban development and planning were exclusively seen as technically determined ideas and affairs.

3.2 Reconstruction, functionality and urban expansion

After the Second World War, two politically different German republics arose. While West Germany's constitution gave a lot of responsibility to the local level, the German Democratic Republic was centrally organised. In total, there was a gigantic lack of housing. In both countries the *gegliederte und aufgelockerte Stadt* (segmented and dispersed city) became the leading model for reconstructing cities. Not far from the ideas of the beginning of the 20th century, green settlements with less multi-storey buildings were created. In this way, particularly in the eastern part of Germany, large housing estates were constructed following the idea of functional separation (BBR 2000).

Old housing stock was rebuilt or radically renewed. Representative axes and open squares became typical new elements of the East German cities. Particularly in West Germany, even soon after the Second World War, the model of the car-oriented city became important. Many cities had been completely destroyed (e.g. Kassel) and could be rebuilt in a new modern form suitable for the growth in car transport (Reichow 1959).

At first, all these reconstructions happened more or less as top-down planning initiatives. But at the end of the 1950s, urban planning in West Germany became a public political affair that gained more and more public interest. The third element of German urban development doctrines became visible: participation. Already in 1955, a conference with the motto *Der Stadtplan geht uns alle an* (the urban plan concerns us all) attracted great attention. This was a signal. Citizens had to be directly involved in planning processes (Albers/Wékel 2008: 28).

Nevertheless, during the 1960s in both parts of Germany, cities grew and expanded outwards without any marked protest. Large housing estates as satellite towns with high residential towers and integrated infrastructure were constructed. These approaches followed the idea of industrialised urban development that had been created in the 1920s. The leading model behind the movement was *Urbanität durch Dichte* (urbanity by density). In West Germany, single-family houses also developed at the periphery (BBR 2000). A strong belief in processes of growth supported the orientation towards the future.

3.3 The era of urban renewal and planning euphoria

The present planning system and planning strategies are mainly based on urban development in West Germany. In 1960, the parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany passed the *Bundesbaugesetz* (Federal Building Code). Later on, in 1971 the *Städtebauförderungsgesetz* (Urban Renewal and Development Act) came into force. In line with the Athens Charter, the *Bundesbaugesetz* focused on a planning strategy based on the idea of functionally oriented land-use planning, which consists of two steps with a difference in precision. The sequential approach had characterised land-

use planning activities since the 1930s (Heigl 1984). Now these steps were established by law. The *Städtebauförderungsgesetz* was aimed at the urban regeneration and modernisation of housing estates. At first entire districts were replaced by new modern constructions and urban structures. This resulted in old central cores disappearing and being lost for the future (see Figure 2). People received new homes instead of conserving and modernising the existing ones, in some cases historic structures (Zöpel 2011). With very negative connotations, these forms of urban development were called *Flächensanierung* (large-scale redevelopment of urban areas).

Cities continued to be developed in a car-oriented manner and large housing estates were given fresh impetus – in West as well as East Germany, whereby at least from the 1970s car-based mobility increased considerably (Albers/Wékel 2008: 39).



Newly built during the 1970s, combined with an extensive and ambitious plan, linked with the environment, functionally oriented on trade and business; housing estates to compensate for the gaps were built outside the centre.

Figure 2: The city centre of Bad Godesberg / Source: Brigitte Adam 2019

Following the first big urban renewal projects and *Flächensanierung* in West Germany, people began to demonstrate and protest against the destruction and neglect of traditional buildings and structures (Der Spiegel 1980). West Germany went through a period when ordinary people outside the German parliament became strongly involved in decision-making processes. The urban development laws and planning

processes provided opportunities for more public participation. In 1976, the *Bundesbaugesetz* established participation as the first of what were to be two participation steps.

In the meanwhile, planning methods were developed. In addition to the growing role of participation, urban planning was established as a multidimensional, future-oriented concept, and cross-sectorial planning was extended and included e.g. financial planning. So-called *integrierte Stadtentwicklung* (integrated urban development) as a comprehensive, informal programme for urban development – passed by local parliaments but extending beyond law-based land-use planning – completed the urban development approach. Along with a set of planning methods, integrated urban development planning became a system consisting of (Albers/Wèkel 2008): stocktaking, monitoring; forecast scenarios; concepts, objectives; combined formal and informal approaches; and guaranteed planning objectives.

Planning appeared as a complete solution. It was a new kind of technically determined approach. Research and an extensive (monitoring and prognosis) database gained great influence over integrated programmes and land-use planning. The requirements of citizens seemed to be calculable – was this a step backwards in times of a politically interested public and participation? Without providing an exact answer: this was the beginning of the dialectical development of the aforementioned planning methods and the convictions behind them during the following periods of urban development. The three main doctrines (integration, participation and future orientation) (also identified by Faludi/van der Valk 1990) were adapted to the conditions of each epoch.

3.4 From ‘planning by projects’ towards sustainable urban development

Soon, the lack of predictability of calculations and trends became visible. People did not act in the manner that had been planned, certain multi-storey housing estates of the 1970s remained without sufficient demand and prognoses on the requirement of natural resources, e.g. energy or drinking water, later proved to be absolutely unrealistic. In addition, the whole system of comprehensive integrated planning was threatened by the shrinking financial basis of the municipalities (BMVBS/BBSR 2009).

The notion of comprehensive monitoring and planning was rejected. A new approach was born: ‘planning by projects’ or ‘projects instead of planning’. Again, participation gained a very high status in urban development and planning, but problems involving the reduced emphasis given to the future orientation and the isolated view of project planning rapidly required correction. Karl Ganser, head of the international Emscherpark construction exhibition (1989-1999), modified German urban development by establishing so-called *perspektivischer Inkrementalismus* (perspective incrementalism). This referred to a kind of project planning embedded in a framework of comprehensive and future ideas for the whole city or urban region (Reicher/Niermann/Schauz 2011). During the Emscherpark exhibition, this model of planning was implemented as a big project to revitalise the old industrialised and structurally weak Ruhr area. Planning was not only combined with building but also with festivalisation projects.

Time passed, Germany was reunified and in 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development delivered a new basic idea for politics and planning: sustainable development. During the 1980s the *Bundesbaugesetz* was reformed into the *Baugesetzbuch*. The former *Bundesbaugesetz* (General Urban Development Law) and the *Städtebauförderungsgesetz* (Special Urban Development Law) were condensed. At the end of the 1990s, the objective of sustainable urban development was included. Sustainable urban development requires the equal integration of ecological, social and economic affairs (and therefore automatically a cross-sectorial view) with a strong focus on participation, dialogue processes and future orientation. Moreover, urban development has moved towards the idea of multifunctional urban districts with short and walkable connections (BMVBS/BBR 2000).

The 'career' of sustainable development led to a further elaboration of integrated urban development. Its new focus could be seen as a synthesis of isolated project planning, on the one hand, and the former comprehensive approach that regarded planning or planners as all-knowing, on the other hand. The 'new' integrated urban development was recognised as an informal and future-oriented urban development strategy interacting with formal building laws. Monitoring and prognosis regained a stronger position. Munich, for example, has a monitoring system for sustainable development and Berlin combines data and strategies to form a climate urban development plan (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung 2011). Moreover, people are increasingly persuaded that data are not only numbers but might also be derived from local urban development monitoring. Citizens can also be experts. Research – studies or model projects – supports planning instead of absolutely determining it (Albers/Wékel 2008: 30).

3.5 The Leipzig Charter against the background of different urban challenges

Integrated urban development was also the leading thesis of the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities. This charter on urban development was adopted by the EU Member States in 2007. It mirrored the spatial doctrines (integration, participation and future orientation) and put them into the current European context. Its main objectives were to further self-determination and the participation of citizens, and to promote multifunctional structures, the qualification of public spaces and the integration of deprived urban districts.

Ten years after German reunification and after many efforts to modernise and to renew the cities in the eastern part of Germany, shrinking processes (also in big cities, e.g. Leipzig or Dresden) have led to a joint programme at national level and at the level of the German federal states: *Stadtumbau* (urban redevelopment). Urban redevelopment is intended to strengthen inner cities by reducing apartments, mainly those built from prefabricated slabs (*Plattenbauten*) on the edges of cities. In the meanwhile, cities in West Germany had to face similar problems. The programme was therefore extended all over Germany. In order to receive local financial support, an integrated urban development concept had to be presented.

The millennium heralded the turnaround. Since then, Germany's big cities have begun to grow again. Today, Leipzig is one of the cities with the highest population growth rates. One of the biggest challenges of today is to offer affordable housing especially in the fast-growing cities. After decades of growth, the per capita living floor space is now shrinking in the largest German cities (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019). Nevertheless, there are still shrinking towns in Germany, above all small towns in rural areas, but also larger ones in old industrial areas.

Another major programme, called *Soziale Stadt* (Social City – an urban redevelopment programme), aims to improve deprived parts of the city. Observing and monitoring the city reveals problematic and growing divergences between urban districts. A very strongly integrated approach is intended to help stabilise and improve the situation in these deprived urban neighbourhoods. Social, environmental and housing issues are considered simultaneously. Action plans are implemented as cross-sectorial approaches with direct local participation (Franke/Löhr/Sander 2000). Once more, financial support is dependent on the development of integrated concepts.

The above-mentioned programmes (*Stadtumbau* and *Soziale Stadt*) are part of the German urban planning and urban development assistance initiative of the federal government and the federal states, intended to support urban development at the local level. They were initiated in 1971 in the context of the *Städtebauförderungsgesetz* and are continuously adapted to changing problems. Since 2007, they have been integrated into the *Nationale Stadtentwicklungspolitik* (National Urban Development Policy) that combines efforts at all administrative levels and involves people and stakeholders in planning and implementation, e.g. by carrying out model projects (Nationale Stadtentwicklungspolitik 2021).

Climate change also requires answers in the field of urban development. At the moment, there are signs of a tendency to enrich – without in any way replacing – the sustainable development concept with a concept of future-compliant 'resilient cities' (Fekkak/Fleischhauer/Greiving et al. 2016). Although the resilient city is more strongly linked to climate change and to climate disasters, it does not change the focus on integration. Furthermore, the importance of green and open spaces has to be recognised as a key factor of success. The recent objective of climate protection and adaptation to climate change goes back to the roots of modern urban development in Germany. In 2017 the German urban development ministry published the *Weißbuch Stadtgrün* (Green Spaces in the City White Paper). The White Paper presents the result of an extensive dialogue process involving many different stakeholders. The preparation and implementation of the White Paper were accompanied by research projects for which the BBSR is responsible. In spite of strong population growth in many cities, green and open spaces have to be conserved and qualified. Along with positive effects on the city, climate green cities increase their attractiveness and their liveability. Moreover, cities need a balanced distribution of green spaces. Again, the social aspect of green areas is being clearly considered in urban development.

4 Conclusion

The comparison between France and Germany reveals similar trends and clear similarities in city planning due to the dissemination of reference frames and models, at least between France and the former Federal Republic of Germany. The main doctrines like integration, participation and future orientation have accompanied urban planning in both countries throughout the course of modern urban planning. On both sides of the Rhine, urban development has developed from an approach based on the functional view of the Athens Charter towards a more specific and collaborative planning approach. Of course the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which adopted Soviet planning principles, remained on a different path until reunification.

Since the 1990s, sustainable development has become a main focus. In recent years, urban development has increasingly evolved as a collaborative framework for national and local levels – and for private actors as well, but without any real neoliberal shift comparable to the UK or USA.

Not surprisingly, differences arise due to the more centralised approach in France compared to federal Germany. Planning at the level of the German federal states always has to let the municipalities exercise their right to control land-use planning. However, the *Baugesetzbuch* is put in place by the German parliament and is binding for all German municipalities. The national level has been seen to play an active role, which is often understated when viewed from France. In similar terms, the decentralisation of town planning in France must not be underestimated by German observers.

Questions remain about the impact of the European Union. The Leipzig Charter seems to have been more influential in Germany than in France, where the Aalborg Charter is more frequently referred to. Can we nevertheless foresee a Europeanisation process in planning through the convergence of objectives? For example, the European Union wants ‘to reach the state of no net land take by 2050’ (EC 2011: 15), an objective taken up by the French 2018 *Plan biodiversité* (Biodiversity Plan), the government think tank *France Stratégie* (Fosse 2019) and an instruction addressed to Prefects in 2019 (Cavailhès 2019). It is likely that such orientations will bring about a convergence of development strategies and urban planning tools in France and Germany, inter alii.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF METROPOLISES IN GERMANY AND FRANCE

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Abstract

The evolution of city regions and metropolises in both countries illustrates the theoretical debates on this particular geographical object. Political legitimacy, significant autonomy and a 'relevant' territorial area should form the basis of these regions. But there is a long way to go from this theoretical vision to practice. In Germany, a slow and contingent bottom-up process can be observed, whereas in France, following a long history of intermunicipality, institutional metropolises are emerging (MAPTAM law of 2014). *Metropolregionen* and *métropoles* thus differ. Germany shows incomplete and variable forms of metropolitan organisation, whereas French metropolises are satisfied with simple criteria of competences and resources. However, these 'intermunicipal' *métropoles* (one exception: Lyon) can also be compared with the large German cities, which are highly individualised political entities, with the city-states (e.g. Hamburg) being the most extreme cases. Two examples, Frankfurt and Lille, illustrate the comparison.

Keywords

Metropolises – governance – local power – Frankfurt – Lille

1 Introduction

In recent decades, most Western cities have experienced strong economic growth and an upturn in population. This has often been accompanied by suburbanisation, an increase in the numbers of commuters, the transformation of built form and redevelopment of land, and has sometimes been associated with conflicts about the location of large infrastructures. Numerous different political and administrative entities are included in these urban agglomerations. The speed of urban growth has often outpaced the pace of adjustment and adaptation. This chapter therefore addresses the following question: in light of institutional fragmentation and numerous social, environmental and economic challenges, what are the current trends in the administration and governance of metropolises in Germany and France?

Several investigations have shown that the process by which metropolitan administrative structures and governance forms emerge is a difficult one that meets resistance from constituted sub-national powers (Sharpe 1995; Lefèvre 1998). Ideally, metropolitan government should be characterised by three main features. First, it should have strong political legitimacy through the direct election of its political representatives. This would allow the activities of the metropolitan government to be recognised by all and render them enforceable, primarily in relation to the member municipalities. Second, such an institution should have significant autonomy in relation to other levels of government, attained through sufficient financial and personnel resources and extensive competences (spatial planning, economic development, administration of technical networks, culture etc.). This would make it possible to tackle the many challenges faced by the metropolises. Finally, the metropolitan government should have a 'relevant' territorial basis, roughly equivalent to the functional urban area (Lefèvre 1998).

However, there is a long way to go from this theoretical vision to practical implementation. As we will see in this chapter, the French forms of metro government only fulfil the criteria of competences and resources and even this does not apply to the large urban areas of Paris and Marseille-Provence. Germany is also characterised by incomplete and variable forms of metropolitan organisation. A comparison between the two countries is not straightforward for a number of reasons. France and Germany have very different urban systems, whereby German polycentricism contrasts with the French system dominated by the primate city of Paris and its region Ile-de-France (see Paris/Gustedt 2022 and Adam/Baudelle/Dumont 2022). Rankings of European cities reflect the different levels of influence of the metropolises of the two countries. Thus Rozenblat and Cicille (2004) categorise Paris as belonging to the first class of European cities, while Berlin and Munich are included in the third class. On the other hand, the fourth class contained four German cities (Cologne, Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Hamburg) but only three French cities (Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse). The institutional systems of the two countries are also very different, with federalism on the one hand and a central state – albeit in a process of decentralisation (see Paris/Gustedt 2022) – on the other. These systems influence the status of metropolises and their institutional anchoring in the two countries. In Germany, the federal government

does not interfere in the organisation of local government. In contrast, for over 50 years France has been characterised by numerous institutional reforms initiated by the national government. This chapter aims to present and explain these contrasts through general discussion (see Section 2) and using empirical examples from the case studies of Frankfurt and Lille (see Section 3). Finally, a comparative analysis reveals the limits of metropolitan governance in the two countries (see Section 4).

2 Theoretical approaches to the institutionalisation of metropolises in Germany and France

The institutionalisation of metropolitan government has long been the subject of debate between two schools of thought (Tomàs 2020). On the one hand, reformers of the metropolitan region have called for the institutional consolidation of metropolitan regions through territorial reforms. In the 1960s, the creation of groupings of municipalities (called *communautés urbaines*) in France and of Metropolitan County Councils in England was a sign of this trend. On the other hand, other scholars – influenced by public choice theories – have emphasised the benefits of competition between autonomous municipalities. In the 1990s, supporters of new regionalism proposed softer institutional structures with variable geometries appropriate for tackling numerous tasks of metropolitan governance. Brenner (2004) supported the notion that the issue of managing the metropolitan regions is part of a more comprehensive process of restructuring state territories in the context of economic globalisation. An institutional structuring of the metropolitan region is said to be required to ensure international competitiveness.

Changes in the administration of metropolises in Germany and France in the last 15 years reflect these theoretical debates. The developments in Germany are part of a slow, bottom-up process contingent on context-specific conditions, while in France *métropoles* have replaced urban communities and represent an alliance between the mayors of the cities and national government.

2.1 Metropolitan regions in Germany

In Germany, metropolitan regions are an indistinct category. The term *Metropolregion* is used both analytically and politically. It became popular in German spatial development policy in the late 1990s when the *Ministerkonferenz für Raumordnung* (MKRO – Conference of Ministers for Spatial Planning) highlighted the new category of European metropolitan regions in various documents (Blotevogel/Schmitt 2006; ARL 2007). However, the federal government did not define the competencies or the institutional form of these new metropolitan regions (Feiertag/Zimmerman 2022). Thus they were not new territorial entities but variable forms of cooperation between municipalities, districts and private actors (including universities). The background was general concern about the competitiveness of the German economy (debate about the attractiveness of Germany as a location for business and industry) and the




Figure 1: The institutionalisation of metropolises in Germany and France /Source: Fatbardha Gela and Patricia Feiertag (TU Dortmund)

lack of a German global city region comparable to greater Paris in France and greater London in the UK. The historical development of Germany's urban system has led to a polycentric pattern of cities which reflects the federal nature of the country. Important economic functions in different sectors are divided between the various city regions such as Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Frankfurt/Rhine-Main, Stuttgart and Rhine-Ruhr. It was assumed that strengthening these metropolitan regions and improving the links between them would benefit the economic development of the country. Five metropolitan regions were initially designated, later eleven, including those that were less competitive on a global scale. The metropolitan regions are nearly all very large (e.g. Berlin-Brandenburg or Hamburg), but their ability to manage regional development is comparatively limited (due to a lack of funding and competences).

The debate about the introduction of European metropolitan regions was also characterised by a focus on increasing disparities. Two strands of conflict were significant here: the question of partnerships between urban areas and the countryside and the question of a focus on a small number of globally competitive 'national champions'. This allowed at least a certain amount of attention to be directed towards the needs of small and medium-sized towns and city regions (Matern 2013). It is striking that the metropolitan regions are almost all in West Germany. It is also unclear how small city regions like Karlsruhe, Braunschweig, Kassel, Leipzig, Freiburg or Osnabrück can be included in this spatial policy discourse.

The discussion about metropolitan regions should not hide the fact that some very strong regional and planning associations have existed on a smaller scale (city regions) for decades. Such associations possess very considerable collective capacities in the fields of regional planning, landscape planning, public transport and economic development (Stuttgart, Hannover, Rhine-Neckar, Braunschweig, Ruhr region). Along with the districts and administratively independent cities, the associations are the most significant institutional structures for city regions.

Overall, the emergence of new spatial scales in German metropolitan policies since the end of the 1990s can be seen as combining a strong institutional core on a small scale (usually planning associations in city regions, some of which date back to the 1970s) with softer forms of governance on a larger scale (metropolitan regions) (Blatter 2006; Zimmermann 2017). The new multi-scale arrangements in German metropolitan regions are not, however, the result of a careful institutional structuring process but are linked to constellations of actors and the initiatives of other levels of government. This means that the agreements are unstable and may disappear.

The rescaling of functions must be considered together with the parallel trend of decentralisation and regionalisation, which can be observed in Germany and in other countries and is often intended as a cost-saving measure (austerity) (Zimmermann 2017; Fricke/Gualini 2019). The creation of European Metropolitan Regions in Germany involves the invention of a scale but is not necessarily the result of a change in political or administrative functions. The introduction of such European metropolitan regions promoted not just a focus on economic development but also – at least in a few regions – a limited degree of upscaling of policies and politics. Although the new and

(in terms of territory) larger scales were not created at the cost of the smaller ones, the process is characterised by conflict. We consider this process to be a further differentiation of regional policy. This differentiation is related not only to the emergence of different spatial scales (city region, metropolitan region, sectoral arrangements) but also to the motivation behind metropolitan policies. Although the primary driver behind the creation of the European metropolitan regions was competitiveness, other motives such as sustainable development and better public transport are found on smaller scales of governance (i.e. city regions). This differentiation can be termed *embedded regionalisation*. This renders the terms metropolitan region and city region somewhat indistinct and, at least in some German regions, leads to ‘overcrowded policy’ (Zimmermann 2017).

2.2 The French metropolitan arena

In recent years, France has also promoted the creation of integrated urban centres of power that are able to participate in global trends and administer large development projects (Zimmermann/Galland/Harrison 2020). However, these reforms stem from more comprehensive and older institutional thinking that aims to rationalise the number and size of municipalities, control public spending and develop financial solidarity on the intermunicipal scale.

The large intermunicipal reforms (*Chevènement* Act, 1999) or reforms of spatial planning (SRU Act, 2000) have not been conceived on the scale of the functional urban regions. Although they represent an important jump in scale, these reforms aim primarily to achieve a voluntary reorganisation of the most important territorial governing elites with indirectly elected representatives for large urban areas (Pinson 2004). The decade from 2000 was characterised by numerous fusions that led to a general increase in the size and competences of French groupings of municipalities.

As a result of this dynamic development, in the last ten years national governments with different political orientations passed two consecutive laws enabling the creation of metropolitan regions (Dubois 2015). The municipal administrative reform of 2010 laid the foundations for new, more integrated and comprehensive forms of intermunicipal cooperation, but continued to comply with the fundamental approach of the law of 1999, i.e. respecting the freedom of association of the municipalities. Confronted with a lack of willingness to act among the local authorities, four years later the government took further action regarding the largest cities (MAPTAM Act, 2014). The *métropoles* thus became a legislative entity and there was a clear break with the policies of voluntary groupings that had dominated proceedings in France since the decentralisation legislation. The law planned to create ten *métropoles* in common law (many of which would replace existing urban communities) and three *métropoles* with special status (Greater Paris, Lyon and Aix-Marseille-Provence)¹, all by 1 January 2015.

1 In the meantime, more metropolises have developed. On 1 January 2020 there were 22 metropolises in France.

The MAPTAM Act is the result of an alliance between the mayors of large cities and the government. The former often linked this position to a mandate in parliament (Demazière/Sykes 2021). In many cases the change of status was seamless as the *métropoles* are only a continuation of existing urban communities, often with relatively identical territories and competences. Like the urban communities which they replace, the municipalities combine strategic competences (planning, land regulations, economic development, transport, sectoral schemata) with the provision of everyday urban services. What is new is the relationship between the *métropole* on the one hand and the superior authorities and the state on the other. The law stipulates that the *métropoles* can extend their competences by using conventional paths to gain specific competences previously carried out by the department, the *région* or even the state.

The situation in France requires closer scrutiny. While the creation of strong metropolitan government in most of the French cities was effective, the three largest city regions, Paris, Lyon and Marseille, were treated differently.

In response to considerable opposition from the local political elites (Béhar 2019; Olive 2015), Greater Paris (131 municipalities, 7 million inhabitants) and the *métropole* of Aix-Marseille-Provence (91 municipalities, 1.8 million inhabitants) profited from specific statutes. In both these cases the obligatory fusion of the intermunicipal territorial bodies was toned down by the creation of *Conseils de territoire* (CT – territorial councils) which group municipalities together. These CTs undermined the development of metropolitan autonomy. In line with the balance of political power, the *métropole* can return a proportion of its authority to the CT. The metropolitan council is obliged to consult the CT on all decisions that concern the *métropole* and the CT has the right to place items on the agenda of the metropolitan council. The law also provides for the transfer of certain competences from the *métropole* back to the municipalities. The two largest French cities are thus weak forms of metro government with territories that are actually governed by three levels of power: the municipalities, the territorial councils and the metropolitan council.

The situation of the third largest French agglomeration, the *Métropole de Lyon* (59 municipalities, 1.4 million inhabitants) contrasts with that of Paris and Aix-Marseille-Provence (Demazière 2021). Political consensus on the local level allowed more advanced legislation. Within the boundaries of the former *communauté urbaine*, the *métropole* brings together the competences of the urban community and of the department of Rhône. The law transfers responsibility for improving competitiveness and solidarity in this new region to the new *Etablissement public de coopération intercommunale* (EPCI – Public Body for Intermunicipal Cooperation) and makes it responsible for all competences in the fields of social integration and the protection of vulnerable groups, tasks that were formerly the responsibility of the department. *Métropole de Lyon* is currently the only city region in France with the status of a regional authority. Nonetheless, these extremely integrated competences, which are often cited by central government as a model, have their price. *Métropole de Lyon* currently includes only part of its functional urban region because several of the local political elites opposed integration in the new institution.

The debate about the metropolises reveals the field of tension between two different scales, that of the urban project as the responsibility of the municipality and that of strategic spatial planning on the scale of the city region, which in the French case still needs to be created. Depending on the individual case and local power constellations, legislators may well have hesitated given the choice between a strong *métropole* with a small territory and a large one which includes much of its functional urban region but is politically weak (like in the cases of Paris and Marseilles). Often, a narrow definition of the *métropole* is not in keeping with the challenges presented by the spread of urban sprawl into the countryside, social segregation, large commercial zones, energy consumption and overstretched transport systems (Demazière 2018).

There are various forms of interterritorial cooperation between the *métropoles* and their surrounding regions and also of dialogue between the *métropoles*, which allow the cities to react to issues that extend beyond their immediate vicinity. Most of these EPCI-initiatives are not, however, particularly institutionalised. In 2010 *pôles métropolitains* (metropolitan poles) were introduced as a very flexible form of governance. They have the legal status of a joint syndicate and consist of a number of EPCI, ranging from two intermunicipal bodies (Nîmes, Alès) up to 20 (Caen, Normandy) (Bariol-Mathais 2017). Since 2014 (MAPTAM Act) the syndicates have been able to open up to include other partners such as the department or region, universities, harbours, economic development agents, tourist agents, chambers of trade and industry, and urban planning agents. In contrast to the *métropoles* the metropolitan poles do not adhere to the two principles of exclusivity of competences and territorial continuity. They can create a network of cities in the form of a group of geographically distant intermunicipalities which work together to tackle interterritorial problems and planning issues (Dugua 2015: 312). This institutional form is valued by local actors as a '*bouffée d'air frais*' ('breath of fresh air') as it is not subject to the general logic of territorial reforms but offers more flexibility and opportunities for experimentation (Vanier 2017: 19). About 20 metropolitan poles have developed. Half of them do not include a *métropole* as a member but are formed by smaller EPCI.

Twelve *métropoles* are members of one or even two established or developing metropolitan poles: Lyon, Saint-Etienne, Nantes, Rennes, Brest, Rouen, Strasbourg, Nancy, Metz, Clermont-Ferrand, Toulouse and Grenoble. The metropolitan poles are thus not an alternative to the *métropoles* but rather a complementary model.

A metropolitan pole can assume responsibility for strategic planning on the level of metropolitan regions, as in the case of Nantes/Saint-Nazaire. This model allows the EPCI to focus on operative activities to implement the *Schéma de cohérence territoriale* (SCoT – Scheme for Territorial Coherence; see Paris/Gustedt 2022). This remains, however, an unusual approach as in many large agglomerations the area covered by the SCoT is much smaller than the scale of the *métropole*, e.g. in Lyon where ten SCoTs cover the metropolitan region (Dugua 2015). The poles tend to be weak structures that can initiate action and offer added value through a joint approach. Could they be a step towards an additional scale of local governance in metropolitan regions?

3 Metropolises: Government or governance? Two case studies

In both countries the way in which the metropolitan governments function differs from territory to territory, reflecting the regional characteristics and the interaction of the different actors. This can be illustrated with two case studies.

3.1 Frankfurt Rhine-Main

In the 1970s, the Frankfurt Rhine-Main region was a pioneer in the field of metropolitan governance structures in Germany. In 1975 an *Umlandverband* (regional association) was created for Frankfurt which was responsible for a whole range of planning functions and other tasks (including waste). The region was provided with a directly elected regional assembly, although its autonomy was limited by a second chamber for the mayors of the region. This meant that the association was never able to achieve its full potential and was little esteemed by local residents (Lackowska 2011). In 2000 the *Umlandverband* was replaced by an institutionally weaker association. The regional assembly was no longer directly elected but consisted of representatives of the municipal parliaments. In terms of functions, the association was largely reduced to its role as a planning association. It was the only planning association in Germany to assume responsibility for land-use planning (actually a municipal task) and for landscape planning, but it lost responsibility for regional transport planning and waste. Despite considerable opposition, the region covered by the association was enlarged and is now roughly equivalent to the functional urban area (with 75 instead of 43 municipalities). This reform was preceded by intensive debates on the governance of the region in the 1990s, in which business representatives also played a major role (Blatter 2006). Thus in 1996 the business initiative Rhine-Main was founded, bringing together about 150 internationally active enterprises which then produced their own spatial vision for the region. Due to the fragmentation of the region, there was concern about its image abroad, as regions like Paris or London had clearer messaging. Other perceived disadvantages included the lack of cultural offerings. While the business initiative tended to represent the large and international enterprises, the *IHK-Forum Frankfurt* – an association of the *Industrie- und Handelskammer* (IHK – Chamber of Commerce and Industry) – pursued a similar but different discourse. The IHK also represented smaller enterprises who called for the development of local infrastructures. It was not, however, possible for a unified pro-development regime to emerge. The reform in 2000 was specifically targeted towards fragmentation and voluntary, issue-specific cooperation. Thus in addition to binding land-use planning and landscape planning, the municipalities and private actors were called upon to find forms of regional cooperation in the fields of transport, the regional landscape park, culture and economic promotion. The regional council was viewed as the appropriate vehicle for this cooperation; here the mayors of the region were to develop solutions under the guidance of the leadership of the city of Frankfurt. This was only partially successful so that the government of the federal state introduced a further reform in 2011: the regional council was abolished and the existing association somewhat strengthened. It was provided with an advisory board made up of representatives of business and civil society and, with the municipalities, was allowed to extend its

activities into other fields (regional park, marketing, mobility, sport and recreational facilities). In 2018 this range of responsibilities was further extended to include energy and digitalisation. The execution of the association’s tasks is based on voluntary cooperation and is pursued with varying levels of commitment.




Figure 2: The metropolitan region Frankfurt/Rhein-Main. Source: Fatbardha Gela (TU Dortmund)

Like other German city regions, in the 2000s discussion in Frankfurt/Rhine-Main turned to the possibility of a larger second level of metropolitan governance. The initiative of the so-called European metropolitan regions in Germany (e.g. Munich, Berlin, Hamburg, Rhine-Ruhr, Stuttgart) was a joint initiative of the federation, the federal states and the relevant municipal politicians with the aim of creating national champions of international standing. However, there were no institutional changes or funding. The focus was rather on a successful attention-attracting policy. In Frankfurt/Rhine-Main the idea was not terribly popular, partly because the metropolitan region crossed the boundaries of three federal states (from Mainz in Rhineland-Palatinate to Wiesbaden, Darmstadt and Frankfurt in Hesse, to Aschaffenburg in Bavaria).

There is a great deal to be said for this large functional urban area, but it is difficult to organise politically because of the different levels of responsibility and competence between the federal states and municipalities. The region therefore remained a fuzzy concept. It was only very recently that new initiatives were launched to develop a concept for this metropolitan region. In May 2018 the IHK Frankfurt organised a *Day of the Metropolitan Region* and founded a strategy forum that included the governments of the federal states together with representatives of the IHKs and the municipalities. This project remains work in progress. Large infrastructure projects such as the extension of the airport (building of the fourth runway complete, Terminal 3 under construction) and considerable investment in regional public transport have also proved possible thanks to the government of the federal state setting clear priorities here. Generally, the situation remains one of metropolitan governance with multilateral structures, numerous actors and no clear centre.

The planning association is now confronted with the problem of finding enough space for the construction of housing in this rapidly growing region. Many suburban municipalities that used to be characterised by strong rates of growth have now left this growth path and do not wish to activate more development land in order to preserve local quality of life.

This case study illustrates the role played by the economy in debates about the organisation of the metropolitan region and the limits of the implemented solutions with regard to space and competences.

3.2 The European *métropole* of Lille

The case of the *métropole* of Lille is a good example of the situation of the *métropoles* in France, both in terms of the age of the administration, formed in the wake of the first reform of 1966 which allowed the creation of urban communities, and also in terms of the challenges faced by spatial planning. These issues are both generic (the relation between the *métropole* and neighbouring regions) and specific (related to the border-crossing location of the *métropole*).

In 1968 the founding of the Communauté urbaine de Lille (CUDL – Urban Community of Lille) led to institutional restructuring with the amalgamation of the Lille agglomeration, the Roubaix-Tourcoing agglomeration (which the Insee² still listed in the 1962 census) and the Armentières agglomeration to the west. At this time the urban community was responsible for technical competences: roads, sanitary facilities, the development of commercial zones, the organisation of public transport, etc. In 1969 the state then commissioned the urban community with the development of the New Town of Lille-Est. In this context the CUDL introduced an automatised metro system. The CUDL also supported a policy aimed at reducing the volume of unhealthy housing left as a legacy of the industrial revolution.

The *bifurcation métropolitaine* (metropolitan bifurcation) (Paris/Stevens 2000) occurred in 1989, when Pierre Mauroy, mayor of Lille and ex-prime minister, became president of the CUDL. A year earlier had seen the start of the large urban project Euralille to complement the introduction of Lille as a halting point for the TGV between Paris, Brussels and London. Pierre Mauroy now campaigned for a large-scale metropolitan project for Lille that supported Euralille but also included other ventures such as the future Union district between Roubaix and Tourcoing. Symbolically, the urban community of Lille was renamed *Lille métropole communauté urbaine* (LMCU, 1997), following the example of the Métropole de Lyon. A metropolitan consensus developed across the political parties but was primarily reliant on the personality of Pierre Mauroy. This political stability proved fragile and lacked a clear majority. There is also a highly active civil society in Lille, following the example of the *Comité Grand Lille*, a coalition of actors founded in 1990 by the emblematic business leader Bruno Bonduelle. The *Conseil de développement de Lille métropole* (Council for the Development of the Metropolis of Lille), founded in 2002, has wholeheartedly continued the task of providing opinions on the public policy of the *métropole*.

The aim is to put Lille on the European map. When France applied to host the 2004 Olympic Games Lille was chosen over Lyon and, more tellingly, Lille was able to increase its visibility by becoming the European Capital of Culture.

The 2002 *Schéma directeur* (SD – master plan) is an important planning document with innovative principles about how to structure the city according to the concept of urban regeneration. This approach to the revitalisation of urban districts in crisis combines the development of the economic and social environments and acts as a model for many French cities. Development on the edge of the city is restricted while working-class areas characterised by unemployment and social disadvantage are prioritised. As a true laboratory of urban regeneration (Paris/Mons 2009), the *métropole* is expediting a process of economic transformation towards a creative economy (Liefoghe/Mons/Paris 2016), for instance with Euratechnologies, one of the largest incubators for start-ups in Europe. However, this process of metropolisation is not sufficient to solve the social problems of those who are excluded from these new developments. Indeed, it is possible that it simply exacerbates their difficulties (Collectif Degeyter 2017).

2 Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (Insee – National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies)

With the majority that the Socialist Party and its allies achieved in 2008, Martine Aubry, ex-minister, mayor of Lille and from 2008 to 2014 president of the LMCU, broke the existing political consensus concerning the urban project. More recently, the government of the region has reflected the lack of a clear majority in the municipal elections of 2014. The political group that represents the small suburban municipalities plays a central role in an executive that includes all parties with the exception of the extreme right. The SCot of 2017 broke with earlier principles and favoured suburban development. Here the limits of representation on the second level are felt: citizens directly elect their municipal councils and thus their mayors but not the metropolitan councils.

Subsequent to the MAPTAM Act, the transition to the *Métropole européenne de Lille* (MEL – European Metropolis of Lille, 2015) led to an extension of its competences, e. g. with social urban development and the resumption of responsibility for the department roads. The region must consider the MEL for its own planning documents (SRADDET or SRDEII, see Paris/Gustedt 2022).

Furthermore, several suburban areas (small municipal communities) were required by law to join the MEL. In 2020 the MEL had 95 municipalities and 1,170,000 inhabitants. Within this region there are 29 municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants; 52 with between 2,000 and 20,000; ten with between 20,000 and 60,000; and four with more than 60,000 inhabitants, including the central city of Lille, which has just under 233,000 residents and hence accounts for almost 20% of the population of the *métropole*. This further reduces the influence of the cities (Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing, Villeneuve d'Ascq) within the institution, which in any case is threatened by the atomisation of political power and characterised by the importance of rural municipalities that control the land available for future development. There is hence interest in a new reform that should follow the example of Lyon by introducing the direct election of the metropolitan councils. This would allow each political grouping to present its urban project to the electorate, thus avoiding negotiations after the elections that are detrimental to democracy.

In the territorial context the Lille *métropole* also faces particular challenges. As the most important urban area in the region Hauts-de-France, Lille is expected to strengthen the region, especially economically. Interaction with the other areas is difficult however, as they often accuse Lille of 'metropolitan arrogance'. In 2007 a DATAR call for cooperation in the *Aire métropolitaine de Lille* (AML – Metropolitan Region of Lille) led to the founding of an association of the wider area of Lille with 2,900,000 inhabitants and elected officials for the larger agglomeration, including the former mining and steel district. A lack of true political will led to the demise of the project and the association was dissolved. Recently the *métropole* signed a cooperation agreement (2018) with the coastal area of Côte d'Opale and, particularly, the urban municipality of Dunkerque. It remains to be seen how this will develop.

Located on the border between France and Belgium, the Lille agglomeration has a unique cross-border location. The agglomeration stretches across the border and for 30 years has encompassed a region of cooperation with 3.8 million inhabitants, while

2.1 million inhabitants reside in the Eurometropolis³ of Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai (with 3550 km²). This French-Belgian agglomeration has developed from the former *Conférence permanente intercommunale transfrontalière* (COPIT – Permanent Intermunicipal Border-crossing Conference, 1991-2006), which in 2008 was replaced by the *Groupeement local de coopération transfrontalière* (GLCT – Association for Cross-border Cooperation) and finally by the *Groupeement européen de coopération territoriale* (GECT – European Association for Territorial Cooperation), the first of its kind in Europe. Many hopes were placed in this cross-border cooperation, which was characterised by the high level of participation of civil society. After a promising start, political changes caused by elections in both countries and political confusion led to a lack of progress in the cooperation region. Initiatives in the fields of the environment, employment, learning languages etc. were launched.




Figure 3: The cross-border metropolitan region of Lille. Source: Fatbardha Gela (TU Dortmund)

3 <http://fr.eurometropolis.eu/> (28 April 2022).

The case of Lille shows the complexity of metropolitan governance, which comes to a head here due to the many different institutional and functional levels that reflect the metropolitan reality (municipalities of greater Lille, MEL, Eurometropolis and the French, Walloon and Flemish intermunicipalities that comprise it, greater Lille including the former mining basin, metropolitan region). As a functional spatial system, greater Lille has developed in variable geometries. But today the MEL has the best integrated and most efficient institutional framework of the French *métropoles* and continues to develop in both spatial terms and in terms of its administration. Nonetheless, the question of the direct election of the metropolitan councils by local residents continues to be an important issue for all the French *métropoles*, with the exception of Lyon.

4 Critical perspectives on the institutional organisation of metropolises in Germany and France

A comparative analysis is used here to address two strands of debate. Attention is directed first to the most important public actors in the metropolitan regions in terms of determining their budgets and competences. In Germany the large municipalities seem particularly relevant here, while in France the pairing of the *métropole* and central city municipality requires consideration (in the case of monocentric agglomerations). We then ask why France has chosen new institutional forms to manage the development of the largest agglomerations while in Germany the term metropolitan region refers to a soft form of governance.

4.1 Who is the most important actor in the agglomerations?

Debates about the governance of metropolitan regions often focus on the capabilities of metropolitan institutions in relation to the diverse issues relevant to the development of the metropolitan regions (employment, innovation, housing, public services, climate etc.) (Zimmermann/Galland/Harrison 2020). This is the background against which we wish to discover whether, among the numerous organisations involved in the administration of metropolitan regions, there is one important public actor best able to influence the agenda of such regions. In other words, who governs the metropolitan region?

In Germany, the administrative structure differentiates between municipalities that are part of a district (*Landkreis*) and administratively independent cities (*kreisfreie Städte*). These administratively independent cities are usually the large ones. They have a broad portfolio of public tasks and a high degree of political autonomy. Municipalities that are part of a district, on the other hand, are small and medium-sized towns and small municipalities and do not perform all public tasks themselves. These are undertaken by the district (e.g. building supervision, public transport, schools, health services, hospitals, waste disposal, roads). There are 107 administratively independent cities and 294 districts. Since administratively independent cities perform both municipal and district tasks and have a directly elected mayor,

they are administratively and politically stronger than the districts, which are associations of municipalities with jurisdictional status. Administratively independent cities are responsible for almost the entire range of services of general interest, social services and welfare, urban planning, infrastructure, public transport, schools, culture, economic development, social housing and health services. This is reflected in the municipal budgets and employment figures (Table 1).

	Cologne	Munich	Frankfurt/ Main	Dortmund
Budget*	€4.7 billion	€6.8 billion	€4.1 billion	€2.4 billion
Employees	18,800	32,845	14,000	9,853 (2018)
Area	405.2 km ²	310.4 km ²	248.3 km ²	280.7 km ²
Inhabitants	1,061,000	1,472,000	758,574	601,000

* Expenditures, debts not considered

Table 1: Figures for some administratively independent cities in Germany (2019) /Source: municipal budget reports, website presentations of cities

For France we investigate the case of four large monocentric *métropoles* outside of Paris. For polycentric *métropoles* such as Aix-Marseille-Provence or Lille, the data related to the central city are not representative⁴. In contrast to Germany, the data must be considered on two scales in the French context: that of the central city and that of the *métropole*.

Table 2 shows that the German and French cities are not alike in any of the criteria considered. In terms of both population and area the French cities seem very small. Thus Lyon, for instance, the third largest city in France, has almost three times less inhabitants than the third largest German city, Munich, and an area that is six times smaller. The difference in population can be linked to the characteristics of the national urban system: polycentric on the one hand and polarised by the Ile-de-France region on the other hand. The difference in municipal territory can be explained primarily by the processes of municipal amalgamation that Germany has experienced (see Paris/Gustedt 2022), while in France the only answer to municipal fragmentation has been the creation of EPCI, with the *métropole* as the newest of these.

4 For example, the 2019 budget of the European *métropole* of Lille totalled €1.828 billion. That of the city of Lille totalled €0.415 billion, €0.331 in Villeneuve d'Ascq, €0.196 in Roubaix, €0.182 in Tourcoing. The sum of the budgets of the four main municipalities thus totalled €1.124 billion, i.e. more than half the budget of the MEL.

		Lyon	Bordeaux	Toulouse	Nantes
Central city	Budget (2018)*	€0.76 billion	€0.45 billion	€0.71 billion	€0.46 billion
	Employees	8,000 (2016)	4,500 (2016)	7,900 (2015)	4,500 (2018)
	Area	47.87 km ²	49.36 km ²	118.3 km ²	65.19 km ²
	Inhabitants	521,000	256,000	480,000	311,000
Métropole	Budget (2018)*	€3,344 billion	€1,958 billion	€1,431 billion	€1,378 billion
	Employees	8,700 (2016)	5,000 (2016)	3,100 (2015)	3,300 (2018)
	Area	533.7 km ²	578.3 km ²	458.2 km ²	523.4 km ²
	Inhabitants	1,390,000	797,000	768,000	646,000

* Expenditures, debts not considered

Table 2: Key figures for several monocentric métropoles in France /Source: websites of municipalities and métropoles, budget reports

If we turn to a comparison of German cities with French *métropoles*, differences remain. The population of the *Métropole de Lyon* is still smaller than Munich, although the area is greater. The same is true of all the examples examined here, with the exception of Dortmund, the eighth largest city in Germany, which lies in the Ruhr area, a region where strong urbanisation is linked to past processes of industrialisation. It should be borne in mind that in France, with the exception of the larger areas of Paris and Aix-Marseille-Provence, the creation of the *métropoles* was not accompanied by a legislative reassessment of the boundaries of the administrative units. Often local elected representatives pushed for the enlargement of existing groupings of municipalities. This was the case for Bordeaux, Lyon, Nantes and Toulouse (and also for Brest, Montpellier and Nancy, i.e. every second *métropole* created by the MAPTAM legislation). The four *métropoles* presented in Table 2 have experienced strong demographic and economic growth and suburbanisation in recent decades, justifying an extension of their territories. There are only a few cases where a *métropole* was created through the amalgamation of an existing voluntary grouping with another EPCI: Grenoble, Nice and Rouen (Demazière 2018). The *Métropole Européenne de Lille* fused on 1 January 2017 with a suburban *communauté de communes* (community of municipalities in a rural area) with a population (5,900 inhabitants) smaller than the threshold stipulated in the NOTRe legislation. This tiny extension had great consequences: it led to the enlargement of the metropolitan council from 179 to 184 members and the re-election of the president and vice-presidents. This example may illustrate why elected representatives of the metropolitan EPCI hesitated (and probably continue to hesitate) to amalgamate with the EPCI of the urban fringes.

Fifteen years ago Alain Motte pointed out that while the size of the functional urban region was viewed by governments, researchers and technicians as a key factor in the analysis of territorial dynamics and the implementation of public planning measures, this is much less the case among local elected representatives (Motte 2006: 19f). Today, with the exception of Aix-Marseille-Provence, French *métropoles* have much smaller territories than the functional urban region. Many of them even have a smaller population than the population of the corresponding built-up area. This is particularly the case for Paris, Lyon, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nantes, Nice, Grenoble and Toulon, i.e. eight of the most populous urban centres in France (Demazière 2018).

With regard to budget and employment figures, comparing France and Germany is not easy. For German cities, Table 1 gives a slightly distorted picture. Since the 1990s, many municipalities have transferred services to new organisational forms (private-public partnerships – PPPs, independent companies still owned by the municipality) or privatised public service providers such as hospitals, energy suppliers and municipal housing companies. In some cases, however, these companies are still under the control of the municipalities, but no longer appear in the balance sheet. A thorough comparison is therefore difficult. In terms of territorial size, it should be noted that almost all independent cities are quite large due to amalgamations and the annexation of smaller municipalities, which mostly took place in the early 1970s, although some date back to the 1930s. To maintain proximity to local citizens, the administrations of larger cities have councils on city district level. The three city-states Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen also have some political autonomy as well as administrative capacity at the district level.

The influence of new public management in France is also considerable. The transformation of urban communities into *métropoles* occurred at the same time as central government reduced funding to local authorities (–11 billion euros in 2015–2017), after a twenty-year period characterised by annual increases in funding levels. The budgets of the *métropoles* tended to grow, a trend that is explained by their assumption of new responsibilities but also by the transfer of competences from the municipalities and the voluntary amalgamation of services with them. In Lyon the budget of the *métropole* more than doubled between 2014 and 2016, from 1.8 to 3.9 million euros, thanks to the transfer of competences from the department of Rhône. In Nantes, the city's spending sank by almost 16% between 2014 and 2018 while the budget of the *Nantes Métropole* increased by 27% in the same period. The same situation can be observed in Bordeaux. The reality of the structure of the French *métropoles* is that it is a zero-sum game: the new institutions are largely fed by transfers of funding and personnel from the municipalities. Figures concerning the human resources attached to the municipality or *métropole* tend to be quickly outdated. In Toulouse, for instance, responsibility for the organisation of large cultural and sporting events was transferred from the city to the *métropole*, leading to a change of employer for a thousand municipal employees. In Bordeaux 15 municipalities (of 28) decided in 2016 to amalgamate a number of their municipal services with those of the *métropole*, thus increasing overnight the number of those employed by the *métropole* from 3,000 to 5,000. The growth in the number of French *métropoles* may have reached its limits. Are they not ultimately hyper-integrated complexes that

may collapse under their own weight? However, the German-French comparison demonstrates that the German cities employ even more staff than the French *métropoles*, some of which still have less employees than the central cities. In France, in the light of current proposals, the elected representatives are calling for responsibility for everyday tasks to be returned to the municipalities to allow the *métropoles* to refocus on their strategic role.

4.2 Hard space or soft governance: Why?

France and Germany show no convergence in terms of their institutional responses to the identification of economic, social and spatial challenges nested in metropolitan regions. We would like now to explore the reasons for such differences between two neighbouring countries jointly engaged in the European project.

To understand why institutional forms of metropolitan government emerge or not, we may ask: under what circumstances do local governments (like municipalities) seek cooperation for planning and coordination? Hulst and van Monfort (2011) studied the horizontal coordination of municipalities in eight European countries, including France and Germany. They found that there is a great variety with respect to the tasks, the scope, the degree of institutionalisation and the decision-making powers of cooperative arrangements. Their main argument to account for the diversity across nations is as follows: 'municipalities are not very willing to establish joint authorities with formal decision-making powers to coordinate local policies. Therefore, quasi-regional governments seldom arise spontaneously. Local governments generally prefer planning forums, where decision-making takes place on the basis of consensus and local government autonomy is not at risk' (Hulst/van Monfort 2011: 131).

According to Hulst and van Montfort (2011), the pressure on local governments to provide for regional coordination and planning through cooperation is lower when there is a strong intermediate tier of government with the formal competencies, resources and willingness to coordinate local policies or to establish regional plans. This is the case with some federal states in Germany, but the governments of the federal states use their powers to different degrees. Some intervene, other demonstrate the 'shadow of hierarchy' but never really use their powers, and the majority take a rather voluntarist attitude. The private sector has restricted influence as well. By contrast, in France, where the *régions* have limited policy domain and do not possess formal competencies in relation to local government, the pressure to formalise a metropolitan tier comes from the national government. The creation of *métropoles* seems marked by a triple continuity. The first is temporal: since the designation of *métropoles d'équilibre* (balancing metropolitan areas, 1964) and the creation of the first *communautés urbaines* (urban communities) in 1966, the point of view of the French national government has not varied on the need to go beyond the municipal level to deal with certain issues. This continuity is also institutional: the MAPTAM Act created a new type of EPCI and not a new form of local government (with the exception of Lyon). Thus the tradition of intermunicipal cooperation prevails, although the democratic deficit increases as more policy fields are attached to the

métropole. Finally, we have already underlined the continuity of territorial perimeters with those of the *communautés urbaines*, Grand Paris and Aix-Marseille-Provence aside.

For its part, the bottom-up German approach to metropolitan government has its limits. Many intermunicipal associations have operational and organisational autonomy but in terms of decision making they are creatures of the municipalities. Only the few regions with directly elected regional assemblies (Stuttgart, Hannover, the Ruhr since 2020) diverge from this pattern. In addition, the bottom-up approach is thwarted by the existence of an intermediate level (the federal states) which coordinates public interventions and defines the institutional framework for 'metropolitan' cooperation. In the case of metropolitan regions straddling several federal states, such as the Frankfurt Rhine-Main Metropolitan Region, metropolitan problems must be spatially redrawn; at worst they are ignored. In France, under the leadership of different governments over the past half century, a form of 'hard' metropolitan government has emerged. In the imaginaries, the metropolitan question is attached to that of large cities (Harrison/Fedeli/Feiertag 2020). This image was essential notably because for thirty years certain elected officials have launched bold and striking urban projects: urban regeneration operations, tram lines, business centres... Metropolitan power is of major importance at the political level and is a notable actor in terms of projects, but it is spatially narrow. Is the movement of intermunicipal cooperation which laid the foundations for the creation of *métropoles* actually a confinement? How is it possible to organise cooperation with peri-urban spaces that are part of the metropolitan system but claim to be autonomous? Here we see the full potential of *pôles métropolitains* to integrate *métropoles* into soft spaces.

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Ulrike Grabski-Kieron, Annabelle Boutet

SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED TOWNS – SITUATION, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF AREAS

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 - 2.8 Small and medium-sized French towns between fragility and macro-regional development trends
- 3 Development paths and prospects of small and medium-sized towns in Germany and France

Abstract

The situation, development lines and perspectives of small and medium-sized towns in Germany and France are compared and similarities and differences within the central place systems and the spatial planning of both countries are discussed. With different approaches to definition, these towns have received new attention in both countries in recent years, albeit with different focal points. The discussion covers the positions and lines of development of these towns in the respective central place systems; the perspectives of their future development regarding the strengthening of central place functions, their attractiveness as residential and economic locations, and contexts of rural regional development and services of general interest. In addition, aspects of research on small and medium-sized towns as well as approaches to spatial policy in both countries are addressed.

Keywords

Central place system – regional planning – regional and urban policy – demographic change – growth and shrinkage – urban-rural relationship – development of rural regions

1 Introduction

In both France and Germany, small and medium-sized towns find themselves in a field of tension concerning their overall spatial development with, on one hand, the impacts of metropolisation, urban growth and the dynamic development of urban regions, and on the other hand, the effects of far-reaching structural and functional transformation in rural areas, which is also associated with stagnation or peripheralisation in a number of regions. Although small and medium-sized towns in both countries have their own spatial and territorial planning contexts with specific development paths and prospects, the parameters for the development of this type of settlement are changing. This is triggered by demographic developments, stronger economic and spatial interrelationships, the development of mobility and accessibility, and also by changed preferences regarding places of residence and work. Various regional effects can be observed. The position of small and medium-sized towns in the core systems of both countries is under close scrutiny. Simultaneously the intrinsic urban qualities of these types of towns seem to be increasingly less tangible. Digitalisation and e-commerce are affecting the development of the town centres while administrative reforms intended to centralise services contribute to the transformation.

In light of such transformation processes, small and medium-sized towns in both countries are subject to continuous spatial observation; they are on the political agenda and in recent years have increasingly been at the centre of debates in the media and in wider society. Parallel to this public focus, spatial and planning research in both countries has also been characterised by a growth in interest in the topic of small and medium-sized towns. However, this has occurred in the context of national research traditions and perspectives, influenced by society's specific perception and comprehension of the underlying problems, and last but not least in line with policy requirements. There is growing awareness that small and medium-sized towns must be understood as specific types in the scheme of towns and cities. Their future prospects depend greatly on their relations with the region and with neighbouring towns.

2 Small and medium-sized towns in Germany and France – Characteristics and spatial planning classifications

2.1 Small and medium-sized towns in Germany – two different types of towns

The programme of continuous spatial observation in Germany (BBSR 2019a) does not classify small and medium-sized towns as one statistical category but differentiates between them as separate types of settlements¹. A distinction is made between the two types using two different categories of criteria: statistical population data on one hand, and criteria related to the central place functions associated with each type on the other. Towns with less than 20,000 inhabitants are classified as *Kleinstädte* (small towns), towns with between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants as *Mittelstädte* (medium-sized towns). For medium-sized towns, a threshold of 50,000 residents is used to identify the sub-group of large medium-sized towns (more than 50,000 residents; see Figure 1). Only 22 % of medium-sized towns (112 of 624; BBSR 2019b: 7) are categorised as *große Mittelstädte* (large medium-sized towns) with a population of over 50,000.

Towns with a population of between 5,000 and 20,000 residents are counted as small towns in the strict sense of the term and their minimum basic central place functions are listed, most of these functions are usually existent. Places with less than 5000 residents are known as *Landgemeinden* (rural municipalities)²

In the German urban system, the 2,106 small towns (46.5% of all categories in 2017) and the 1,719 rural municipalities (38%) are categories worthy of attention (figures according to ARL 2019: 3f; see Figure 1). In terms of area, the small towns account for by far the greatest proportion of German territory (45.4%), followed by the rural municipalities (35%) (Figure 1). 29.2% of the country's total population live in small towns, while small and medium-sized towns together account for almost 58% of the total population (Figure 1).

The distribution of small and medium-sized towns (Figure 2) reflects historical and contemporary development trends. The German urban system has been characterised by fundamental continuity for centuries, although this has been overlaid by changes in spatial structure and settlement (also see Friedrich/Hahn/Popp 2009).

1 More precisely: The basis for statistical comparison in the BBSR programme of continuous spatial observation in Germany are the Einheitsgemeinden (unitary municipalities) or Gemeindeverbände (municipal associations): in Germany the Gemeinde (municipality) is the political-administrative unit with the fundamental right to self-government. Smaller municipalities with between 3000 and 5000 residents are grouped together as municipal associations. NB: in the individual federal states these municipal associations are given different names (e.g. Verbandsgemeinde, Amt) depending on the state constitution/municipal code.

2 More precisely (BBSR 2019a; see Footnote 1): in the programme of continuous spatial observation in Germany, the term Landgemeinden (rural municipalities) refers to municipalities within a municipal association with less than 5,000 inhabitants and/or no basic central place functions (as understood in the statistical definition of a town).




Figure 1: Dominance of types of towns and cities (left to right: cities, medium-sized towns, small towns, rural municipalities) in Germany according to the criteria 'number, area in 1,000 km² and population in millions' (based on data from BBSR 2017) / Source: ARL 2019

Since the 1990s scientific criticism has intensified, arguing that the statistical categories employed no longer adequately reflect the new realities of spatial planning (greater interdependences, better accessibility, changed mobility, urbanisation, differences between West and East Germany) (also see Werring 2017). It is also argued that the categories are obsolete due to changes in municipal structures, such as those introduced in some *Länder* (federal states) by administrative and municipal reforms. As early as 2003, Leindecker (2003) pointed out that there were various types of medium-sized towns that differed from one another in terms of their large-scale settlement structure, proximity to agglomerations, regional development context and location in West or East Germany (see Section 2.7).

The current observation and monitoring programme has therefore refined the categorisation of towns according to their locational factors and characteristics of interdependencies. Thus a distinction is made between small and medium-sized towns in 'central locations' and those in 'peripheral locations'. In order to statistically capture these locations, models of *Großstadtregionen*³ (city regions) and *Stadt-Umland-Regionen*⁴ (urban-suburban regions) are used as spatial-statistical units of reference

3 *Großstadtregionen* (city regions): comprising of cities as high-order supply centres with their surrounding territories. The urban-rural relations are constructed on the basis of population density and the intensity of commuter flows. The BBSR uses the term *Großstadtregion*, which is translated here as 'city region' and may evoke different connotations because the relevant terms and definitions differ between national systems.

4 *Stadt-Umland-Regionen* (urban-suburban regions): these regions consist of urban cores and their surrounding areas. They are based on commuter flows and accessibilities and cover the whole of Germany outside of the *Großstadtregionen* (see above) (BBSR 2019b, also see ADAM 2019).




Figure 2: Types of towns and municipalities in Germany 2017, based on data from BBSR) / Source: ARL 2019




Figure 3: Types of city regions in the programme of continuous spatial observation in Germany / Source: BBSR (2019a); map: BBSR (2021)

and the development trends of the individual towns are presented⁵ (Figure 3, also see Section 2.7).

2.2 Small and medium-sized towns in France: a very stable urban system

Since the 1970s numerous investigations have examined the definition of French medium-sized towns. They have all highlighted two dimensions, using either both together or each individually: 1) the population (between 15,000 and 200,000 residents, depending on the definition) and 2) the supply functions carried out in the residential area (centrality particularly in relation to retail and services, also for the intra-regional area) (Santamaria 2012). Whatever the definition used, France has between 200 and 250 medium-sized towns.

⁵ In addition to the programme of continuous spatial observation, a 2019 study of the situation and development of small towns in central locations introduced the methodological approach of clustering to the debate. Here small towns and regions are grouped in clusters according to functional and structural characteristics. These are then evaluated with regard to specific development trends and prospects, taking into account locational and demographic characteristics (BBSR 2019d).

In 2018 the *Commissariat général à l'égalité des territoires* (CGET – General Commission for Territorial Equality) proposed that medium-sized towns should be defined by three criteria⁶: *unités urbaines* (urban units) with more than 20,000 residents, defined as a *grand pôle urbain* (large urban pole) by the *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques* (Insee – National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) and not belonging to one of the 22 *aires urbaines*⁷ (urban areas) included in a *métropole*⁸. In the six departments without any *unités urbaine* (urban units) of more than 20,000 residents, the prefectures were selected. According to this definition there are 203 medium-sized towns in France, 191 of them are in mainland France and 12 in the departments overseas (CGET 2018a). They account for almost 23% of the French population.

Reflecting the legacy of a hierarchical vision of the urban system, small towns are defined as kind of ‘mirror image’ of the medium-sized towns: they have less inhabitants and those that have central place functions have less services and retail facilities than the medium-sized towns. Again without a uniform definition, there are between 1,600⁹ and 2,200¹⁰ small towns in France. In a country characterised by the dominance of the capital city and a relatively small number of large cities, the small and medium-sized towns are at the heart of the French territorial network.

These types of towns have a very strong image, rooted in their long history. In contrast to Germany or England, where urban structures were significantly changed by the Industrial Revolution, France is characterised by a very stable urban system. The historian Bernard Lepetit (1988) highlighted the strong similarities between the town plans of France in the 1950s and at the beginning of the 19th century. A number of small and medium-sized towns became important trading places or religious centres, housed the seats of the prefects or sub-prefects, and in the *Trente Glorieuses* (Glorious Thirty, i.e. the years of economic boom c.1945–1975) became important locations for economic growth. The persistence of the French urban system (Vadelorge 2013) can still be seen in the organisation of France’s territorial administration as many of the small and medium-sized towns have remained the seats of the prefects and sub-prefects.

6 <https://www.insee.fr/fr/metadonnees/definition/c1501> (28 April 2022).

7 In 2010 Insee used the ‘urban areas’ zoning to describe the influence of cities on the whole territory: <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1281191> (28 April 2022).

8 A *métropole* is a *intercommunalité* that brings together several municipalities ‘in one piece and without an enclave’ which join forces within ‘a space of solidarity to work out and lead together a project for the planning and economic, ecological, educational, cultural and social development of their territory in order to improve its competitiveness and cohesion’. Constituted on a voluntary basis, the status of a *métropole* is accessible to groups of more than 400,000 inhabitants in an urban area of more than 650,000 inhabitants.

9 In 2012, there were 1,666 so-called *bassins de vie* (life basins) in France, including 1,644 in metropolitan areas and 22 in the French overseas departments and regions. According to Insee, the *bassins de vie* is the smallest territory in which the inhabitants have access to the most common facilities and services.

10 In 2010, there were 2,292 urban units in France with just over 51 million inhabitants, i.e. around 78% of the population.

In addition to their strong roots in French territorial structures and in the French mentality, the common perception is that small and medium-sized towns often correspond to the image of an ideal town, situated between the city and the countryside and offering a high-quality habitat. According to the *Baromètre des territoires 2019*, conducted by the *Villes de France* and the market research company Ipsos with the support of the *Banque des territoires*, 43% of the French population want to live in medium-sized cities, compared with 35% who prefer a rural municipality and 22% a city (*Villes de France/IPSON 2019*).

2.3 Position in German spatial planning

In recent years small and medium-sized towns have attracted more attention within spatial planning due to the visible spatial effects of demographic change. The guiding principle of spatial planning entitled “Safeguarding services of general interest” (BBSR 2017) focuses primarily on medium-sized towns and emphasises their role in maintaining such services in rural areas. Medium-sized towns are thus indispensable ‘buttresses’ in the urban system, ensuring the achievement of the spatial planning principle of decentralised concentration (also see Adam/Baudelle/Dumont 2022). In German spatial planning this principle is conceptionally linked to the *Zentrale-Orte-Konzept* (Central Place Theory) and the countrywide system of coordinated supply districts; it is at the same time an expression of the federal state’s mission to ensure that all sub-regions are characterised by equality of opportunities, participation in prosperity and security of supplies¹¹. This conceptual spatial planning approach is closely linked to the mandate to maintain equivalent living conditions throughout Germany (also see Gustedt et al. 2022 and Adam/Baudelle/Dumont 2022). Over the years the principle has stimulated much discussion about the further strategic development of the central place system¹², with a focus on the role of small and medium-sized towns.

The federal states stipulate levels of centrality and the categorisation of central places in their individual state planning (also see Paris/Gustedt 2022). A three-tier system of *Oberzentren* (high-order centres), *Mittelzentren* (middle-order centres) and *Grundzentren* (low-order centres) has been established in almost all federal states. The allocation of higher order sub-functions to middle-order and low-order centres is common practice. Small, low-order centres which only fulfil some of the basic functions or provide limited local supplies are currently not designated as centres in most of the state development plans. A number of federal states do not designate any low-order centres in their state plans.¹³ This reflects the different approaches of the federal states, which aim to adapt the central place system to the varying spatial situations and, particularly, to provide targeted development options. However, this

11 It is an expression of social balance and of justice based directly on the social state principle and on the ban of discrimination anchored in the German Basic Law (GG, Art. 20 and Art. 3).

12 ... with the components: reduction of central towns and degrees of centrality, checking and definition of capacities, introduction of shared functions, definition of standards of accessibility, and scrutiny of minimum standards of supply and services (BBSR 2017).

13 E.g. Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Hesse, Saarland and Lower Saxony.

normative degradation of small towns in state planning has consequences for the attractiveness and development opportunities of the towns. Critical discussions concerning the provision of services of general interest thus focus increasingly on the declining significance of small towns by emphasising the indispensable role they play in providing local supplies. Combined with the supply function of medium-sized towns, this is seen as vital for maintaining the principle of equivalent living conditions in all sub-regions of the country (BMI 2019a; 2019b).

2.4 Position in the spatial structure and spatial development of France

In 2018 the French government began a large programme to revitalise the town centres of 222 medium-sized towns. The *Action cœur de ville* (Heart of Town – City Centre Action) is coordinated by the *Agence nationale de la cohésion des territoires* (ANCT – National Agency for Territorial Cohesion) and mobilised 5 billion euros over five years, involving numerous state partners and actors (e.g. *Caisse des Dépôts* – Saving Banks, *Agence nationale de l'habitat* – National Housing Agency, *Action logement* – Rental Action). Each urban revitalisation package forms part of a territorial development project carried out by the municipalities and the federations of municipalities. The projects are based on an agreement with the government which focuses on five priorities: renovation and restructuring of housing in town centres, balanced economic and commercial development, accessibility and mobility, upgrading of public space and cultural heritage, and – last but not least – access to public institutions and services.

In September 2019 the prime minister announced the publication of a plan targeting small towns entitled *Petites villes de demain* (Small Towns of Tomorrow) (ANCT 2022). The focus here is on strengthening the central place functions of the towns, reinforcing their role for the surrounding region and putting them in a position from which they can tackle the demographic, economic and social challenges of the future. This plan was implemented in 2020 by the ANCT (ANCT 2022).

2.5 Research on small and medium-sized towns in Germany

In recent years urban and spatial planning research has focused increasingly on small and medium-sized towns and on the intertwining urban-rural regions in which some of them are embedded. The start of the new millennium was marked by increased discussion of demographic change and its predicted impact on towns and regions. Research in the field of small and medium-sized towns focused primarily on the latter (see the summary in BBSR 2019b). Contrasting spatial developments were identified. On the one hand, there was dynamic growth and suburbanisation in the catchment areas of urban regions and, on the other hand, the stagnation or decline of towns and rural regions; this highlighted the differentiated nature of the development of this type of town. The supply functions of these towns in various regional contexts as well as their position in Germany's polycentric urban system was subject to scrutiny. In many rural regions the focus was on the preservation of services of general interest and on the sustainability of infrastructures. The discourses about the guiding prin-

ciples of spatial planning (see BBR 2012; Issaoui/Sinz 2010; BBSR 2017) also encouraged varied considerations of this type of town. Over the years, research in the planning sciences, in architectural disciplines and in urban sociology has helped to clarify the great degree of differentiation and the varying growth trends of medium-sized towns – also compared to small towns.

In contrast, small towns in all their variety were systematically neglected as a distinct type of town (ARL 2019). Most recently, however, research into small towns has emerged as an independent field in Germany, responding to calls for systematic, theoretical and applied scientific approaches to the small-town type of settlement (see the summaries in BBSR 2018a; ARL 2019). Research into small towns and research into rural regions have been brought closer together by, inter alia, discourses about the future of rural regions in Germany, their services of general interest and the quality of life they offer, and by changes in attitudes towards and perceptions of rural areas. Small towns and their local retail and housing functions have become a focus of attention. The future perspectives of these towns continue to be much discussed in the light of digitalisation, migration, changing work environments and lifestyles (Maretzke/Porsche 2020; BBSR 2018a; 2018b; Graffenberger 2019).

In both fields of research (small towns and medium-sized towns), large recent investigations have tackled qualitative aspects of urban structures and life and have thus significantly furthered understanding of the distinctiveness of these types of towns. The research has focused on e.g., urban socio-culture, communication, governance, urbanity and building culture (see the summaries in Baumgart/Overhageböck/Rüdiger 2011; Werring 2017). These perspectives also underline the necessity to develop differentiated typologies.

Investigation into urban regions is another pillar of research in this field, providing findings especially about medium-sized towns and their processes of transformation in regional contexts. The focus here is on interactions between towns and their surroundings, related driving forces and the effects on sub-regions. Adam (2019) has traced and summarised the lines of development of the changing perspectives of this field of research. Since the 1990s, discourse about land take, suburbanisation and re-urbanisation has encouraged research into these phenomena. Investigation has particularly focused on large cities and their surroundings. Attention has only recently turned towards the notion that medium-sized towns display independent development trends and logics as urban cores in more extended suburban and rural regions. They can no longer be explained simply in terms of functional interactions with and dependencies on larger towns and cities. It is rather the case that developments in such towns reflect changes in demography, accessibility, lifestyles, migratory behaviour and the broader economy. In a recent investigation on suburbanisation in cities and urban-rural regions¹⁴, Adam (2019) innovatively combined data sets on demography, employment trends and land development to reveal the great heterogeneity of development trends in urban systems and different regional contexts, thereby underlining the ‘new’ significance of medium-sized towns.

14 ...of the programme of continuous spatial observation in Germany.

Pilot projects run by the federal government¹⁵, funding programmes¹⁶ and initiatives by the federal government and the states, e.g. the programme *Kleinstädte in Deutschland* (Small Towns in Germany)¹⁷ and the founding of a federal *Kleinstadtakademie* (Small Town Academy)¹⁸, have prepared the ground for further knowledge production and practice-oriented implementation (see Dehne et al. 2022). Last but not least, continuing discussions on the validity and interpretation of the principle of equivalent living conditions, as anchored in the *Grundgesetz* (GG – German Basic Law), encourages spatial planning research on small and medium-sized towns in Germany (see Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung 2019; also see Adam/Baudelle/Dumont 2022).

2.6 Research on small and medium-sized towns in France: shrinkage and peri-urbanisation

In France, much research on medium-sized towns relates to their demographic decline and also shows that small towns are often affected by demographic shrinkage. However, this phenomenon mainly affects towns in regions with an industrial tradition. Thus Manuel Wolff, Sylvie Fol, Hélène Roth and Emmanuèle Cunningham-Sabot (2013) reveal that there are five different types of demographic decline processes affecting towns (halted decline, recent decline, discontinuous decline, marked decline in the 1980s and 1990s or in the 1970s and 1980s, continuous decline) and that towns in the north-east of the country, characterised by an industrial tradition, are particularly impacted.

Julie Chouraqui showed that two-thirds of French towns with trajectories of demographic decline are also weakened from the point of view of employment. These towns are concentrated in the north-east, the ‘diagonal of low densities’¹⁹, but are also found in the west, in Brittany and in Normandy (see Figure 4).

15 ExWoSt research on the potential of small towns in peripheral locations: www.exwost-kleinstaedte.de (28 April 2022).

16 E.g. Federal urban development programme: www.staedtebaufoerderung.info (28 April 2022).

17 <https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/bauen-wohnen/stadt-wohnen/stadtentwicklung/kleinstaedte-in-deutschland/kleinstaedte-in-deutschland-node.html> (28 April 2022).

18 <https://www.kleinstadtakademie.de/> (28 April 2022).

19 The ‘diagonale des faibles densités’ (‘diagonal of low densities’) or ‘diagonale du vide’ (‘diagonal of the void’) refers to a succession of territories distributed from the north-east to the south-west: <http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/glossaire/diagonale-faibles-densites> (28 April 2022).




Figure 4: Urban areas with cumulative trajectories of employment and population decline / Source: INSEE RP 1975-2016; draft: Julie Chouraqui, ANCT 2021

English translation of captions:

Demography: urban area predominantly shrinking or fluctuating with recent shrinkage; central municipality shrinking (older or recent), rest of the urban area growing.

Employment: older decline (since 1999); recent decline (since 2006) preceded by periods of growth or fluctuation.

Other urban area

Population of urban areas in 2016: over 1,500,000; over 500,000; between 150,000 and 500,000; between 10,000 and 150,000; between 2,000 and 10,000.

Investigations about the decline of supply structures in small and medium-sized French towns have also been published. Matthieu Delage, Sophie Baudet-Michel, Hadrien Commenges, Julie Vallée and Pascal Madry (2019) define and analyse developments between 1979 and 2014, creating an index to capture the decline in supplies. Two different developments are revealed. Between 1979 and 1988 only the very small towns remained relatively unaffected by the decline in commercial supply structures, while the other small and medium-sized towns felt the impact of the trend. Since the 1990s, however, all three sizes of town have displayed a similar loss of commercial supply structures. The authors discovered that towns which offer employment as well as housing have been better able to preserve a diversified commercial structure than thinly populated municipalities with purely residential functions.

Research on peri-urbanisation offers a complementary perspective. On a national scale the *couronnes périurbaines* (peri-urban regions)²⁰ have become the most homogenous territories: income disparities are not particularly pronounced and standards of living are fairly high (CGET 2018b). The researcher Eric Charmes (2019) shows that the phenomenon of peri-urbanisation explains the decline of certain town centres and the dynamic growth of certain peri-urban villages. The latter are characterised by remarkable demographic growth and are generally experiencing a process of peri-urbanisation. They have entered the field of influence of a town or city and become satellite settlements. Only the centres of the most important *métropoles* can successfully make a stand against the peri-urban villages and thus continue to attract middle-class residents, retail and business. In many smaller towns the situation differs as they have less distinct resources and their commercial sectors are less diversified and competitive than those of the commercial centres in the peri-urban regions.

2.7 Developments and prospects in Germany

In terms of demographic change, recent developments in the towns and regions of Germany are characterised by the small-scale spatial juxtaposition of growth, decline and stagnation. It is also still possible to trace differences in trends in West and East Germany (Figure 5), although smaller scale developments clearly modify this contrast.

In many places, there is a great deal of pressure to adapt the allocation of functions undertaken within spatial planning. This derives from current demographic and socio-cultural processes linked to migration, as well as to changed lifestyles and locational preferences. The re-evaluation of business locations in light of international economic trends, regional innovation and digitalisation also plays an important role here. Finally, the town centres face challenges arising from structural transformation in retail and changes in urban planning and development requirements due to the increase in project-based, participative planning processes (Ries 2019)²¹.

20 According to INSEE, a *couronne périurbaine* designates all the municipalities of an urban area excluding its urban centre.

21 In an investigation of medium-sized towns in peripheral rural regions, Ries (2019: 124f) analysed the developmental patterns of socio-economic transformation processes in medium-sized towns and demonstrated their significance for central place functionality.




Figure 5: Growth and shrinkage in towns and municipalities / Source: BBSR 2018c continuous spatial observation

Determinants of spatial location and regional linkages remain extremely significant for the future of small and medium-sized towns. Differentiated interactions between regional development and the development of small and medium-sized towns may be observed. Demographic data on urban regions show that medium-sized towns have experienced clear growth in recent years. It is not only the inner catchment areas of the regional centres which profit from growing interlinkages and improved accessibility, but also increasingly the extended catchment areas. Recent developments in the big city regions have shown that the trends of re-urbanisation and suburbanisation are not mutually exclusive (Adam 2019). Many medium-sized towns have also been able to score in terms of jobs and employment trends²². It is not uncommon for them to attract employment away from the large urban centres, as shown for instance by the region of Kassel with its economically strong medium-sized centres in the surroundings. Towns with attractive residential and employment locations tend to be characterised by dynamic land take and open space transformation. By designating development areas, the growth-focused, medium-sized centres contribute considerably to the continued high levels of land take in Germany.

²² Wandzik, G. (2020): Investigated success factors for positive development in large medium-sized towns.

Many of the developments discussed lead to urgent problems for small towns – not only in terms of the allocation of functions undertaken within spatial planning. Although the *Institut für Länderkunde* (IfL – Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography) suggests that the functions of just over half of such towns remained largely constant from 2001 to 2017, about a third have lost central place functions (Bode/Hanewinkel 2018, see Figure 6). In contrast, only every tenth town was able to gain significance. It should be noted that these different development paths of municipalities are also rooted in administrative and municipal reforms, particularly in a number of the states in eastern Germany (see Figure 6).

The small towns in the urban regions also take on some of the functions of the larger centres, although to a lesser extent than the medium-sized towns. However, small towns do not necessarily share the path of development of their region or that of the medium-sized towns (Adam 2019; BBSR 2019c). They particularly profit from the growth of their region if they provide a convenient residential location, a significant service sector or jobs in industry or technology. Other relevant factors influencing the development paths of small towns are links to neighbouring municipalities, inter-municipal accessibility, settlement structure and built fabric and, not least, population structure (BBSR 2018b).

In peripheral locations, small towns – in addition to medium-sized towns – not only assume residential functions but also provide employment and act as centres of local retail. They thus contribute towards the development or stabilisation of rural areas. However, the development paths of this type of town also vary with the initial socio-economic and infrastructural conditions (BBSR 2019c; RIES 2019). Growth in employment and positive population trends need not go hand in hand. Small towns do not necessarily profit from positive development in the region if the aforementioned influencing factors are unfavourable. Thus small towns with good job offers attract large inflows of commuters without changing their attractiveness as places of residence. Furthermore, many small towns struggle to maintain the sustainability of their infrastructure in light of high rates of out-migration. The challenges caused by the out-migration of young people and the increasing aging of the population are exacerbated by the strained budgets of the municipalities. A lack of scope for action and limited investment capital hinder further development. This is particularly true in light of the fact that many small municipalities in rural areas actually consist of numerous smaller settlements, which often leads to virulent distribution issues.




Figure 6: Changes in the importance of small towns 2001–2017 / Source: Bode/Hanewinkel 2018

2.8 Small and medium-sized French towns between fragility and macro-regional development trends

In recent decades in France, it has become clear that there is great awareness of the problems facing small and medium-sized towns and strong attachment to them. Terms like crisis, decay and structural dislocation are a few of those used to describe these types of towns. Metropolisation, peri-urbanisation and deindustrialisation are seen as the most important factors leading to decline because they encourage the out-migration of the population and the displacement of activities out of the centres. However, it can be argued that these factors have actually affected entire macro-regions with their small and medium-sized towns, cities and rural areas more strongly than they have impacted on just small and medium-sized towns as independent categories (CGET 2019).

Analyses by the CGET confirm research findings about the influence of macro-regional trends on medium-sized towns²³: the most threatened towns are located along a large north-eastern arc connecting Alençon, Boulogne-sur-Mer, Lunéville, Nevers and Villeneuve-sur-Lot (see Figure 7). There are about 30 particularly vulnerable medium-sized towns that are situated in struggling labour market regions. Analysis of medium-sized towns in the territorial system reveals three possible positions: the medium-sized town is integrated in metropolitan development trends, or the medium-sized town causes the polarisation of a department, or there is functional interaction between medium-sized towns. None of these positions seems to be more advantageous than the others: it all depends on the complementary relations created between medium-sized towns and their urban systems. It can be advantageous for a medium-sized town to be integrated into a metropolitan region, but it can also be equally damaging. A number of medium-sized towns act as important development poles in their departments and demonstrate dynamic growth. Others are disadvantaged by unfavourable spatial relations with the main development centres and their catchment areas. It should also be noted that interactions among medium-sized towns can be both complementary and competitive.

23 Medium-sized towns are defined here as urban units with more than 20,000 inhabitants of the 'major urban centre' type according to Insee's urban area zoning that are not included in one of the 22 urban areas encompassing the institutional métropoles. In the six départements without an urban unit of more than 20,000 inhabitants, the urban units whose central town is the departmental capital were considered. There are thus 203 medium-sized towns in France, including 191 in mainland France and 12 in the overseas departments.




Figure 7: Fragility scores for medium-sized towns / Source: CGET 2018a

English translation of captions:

Cumulative fragility scores: 'favourable' situation, average score: 13, 'unfavourable' situation

Fragility scores for medium-sized towns are based on three factors: Demographic change: average annual population growth rate (2008-2013)

Economic change: average annual employment growth rate (2008-2013)

Social fragility: poverty rate (2013)

For each factor, the score of each medium-sized city is attributed according to the decile in which it finds itself within the group of medium-sized cities

Example: for the demographic fragility scores: the 20 medium-sized cities with the lowest growth rate have a score of 9, the next 20 have a score of 8, etc...

The interregional system of Paris

Population in 2014, by urban unit

Urban area large, medium-sized, small

Regional urban systems

The national territory is structured by a set of **urban systems**. These interdependencies between urban areas are demonstrated using different indicators such as home-work relations, residential migration, transport networks, head office-branch relations, etc. Urban areas have several levels of relationships. A first level of 26 urban systems has been identified

3 Development paths and prospects of small and medium-sized towns in Germany and France

The perceptions and appreciation of small and medium-sized towns have changed in recent years in Germany. The current development paths and problems of these types of towns are leading to the rethinking of their positions in urban systems. Thanks to their own urban qualities, they have the potential to develop new urban socio-cultures with innovative forms of civil society action and new ways of living and working. They offer opportunities for new lived urban-rural linkages, e.g. as market forums for regional products, for landscape experiences or for education and training in the region. The importance of small and medium-sized towns as anchor points for supplies of services of general interest is heightened by the need to support innovative activities in rural areas. However, the ongoing transition provides many varied challenges. In recent years, both the federal and the state level have increased their support and finance for the development of towns and municipalities (see Dehne et al. 2022).

As discussed, small and medium-sized French towns are characterised by differentiated development paths that are particularly linked to the development trends of the macro-regions. It is foreseeable that these lines of development will be increasingly influenced by current ecological, digital, demographic and technological changes. With an eye to the future, newer discourses suggest that – despite the widely held image of decline – the shrinking small and medium-sized towns may actually be the source of new urban models that focus on residential attractiveness, wellbeing and environmental health. The industrial tradition of towns can also be used to develop new ecologically acceptable forms of production, work and consumption. Other discussions focus on demographic change and the aging of the population and identify small and medium-sized towns as locations in which a large proportion of older people may well prefer to live in the future. It is worth noting in this context that by the year 2050 every third resident of France will be over 60 years of age. This explains why the

National Agency for Territorial Cohesion helps these towns to carry out processes of reflection and future-oriented action by providing a programme entitled *Fabriques Prospectives*²⁴.

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1 Introduction

Quite apart from the diversity of developments and situations in small and medium-sized towns (see Grabski-Kieron/Boutet 2022), stabilising their town centres and territorial expansion is a major challenge. In both countries, town centres have been weakened by commercial changes, a decline in the supply of services of general interest and transformations in lifestyles. They are characterised by an increase in vacancy rates, which accelerates a spiralling loss of attractiveness and atmosphere of neglect. In the course of 2010, this challenge was placed centre stage of the public debate and public-sector response. The aim was to strengthen the centrality of these towns using various drivers of urban development. In both countries, urban renewal was made a key element of this stabilisation and revitalisation policy. However, although the context of public action in small and medium-sized towns is similar in France and Germany, the modes of urban governance differ. In Germany, the organising of coordination between autonomous local actors is more strongly anchored in social and political practice. In contrast, in France the administrative municipal system continues to provide a narrow and fixed framework despite recent territorial reforms that favour the intermunicipal level.

2 The importance of small and medium-sized towns in policy development

2.1 The current situation – small and medium-sized towns as objects of research and public action

‘After two decades small towns have regained a role [in Germany], especially in the (political) debate [...]’ (Porsche/Milbert 2018: 5). This comment implies that small towns had long been ignored in Germany, as confirmed by a glance at the literature of recent years. Here statements suggest that small towns were a neglected topic not only in scientific circles but also in the public discussion (Herrenknecht/Wohlfahrt 2005: 5; see also Hannemann 2004: 53; Burdack 2013: 5; BBSR 2019b: 5; ARL 2019: 1). The focus of interest has rather been on metropolises and cities (Baumgart 2004: 7; Harfst/Wirth 2014: 464). However, urban renewal in small towns has received increased financial support since the mid-1980s (see Section 2.3).

In the mid-2010s, the German federation initiated two projects that encouraged the revival of research into small towns and that led to concrete policy recommendations. The research fields comprised, firstly, an evaluation of the situation of small towns in central locations and, secondly, an investigation of the potential of small towns in peripheral locations. The findings of both projects were discussed in June 2018 at a congress entitled *Kleinstädte in Deutschland* (Small Towns in Germany), where a federal government initiative with the same name was also presented. The initiative aims to strengthen smaller towns as places of residence and employment and to stimulate positive developments on the municipal level. The initiative bundles, coordinates and extends existing programmes and activities by the federal government that are intended to support the functions of small towns in both rural areas and in agglomerations. The 2018 coalition agreement of the federal government also in-

cluded the aim of further strengthening rural regions and future-proofing regions and urban areas (CDU/CSU/SPD 2018). The Urban Development Support Programme *Kleinere Städte und Gemeinden – überörtliche Zusammenarbeit und Netzwerke* (Small Towns and Municipalities – Supra-regional Cooperation and Networks) and the competition *Menschen und Erfolge* (People and Successes) are cornerstones of the small-town initiative. In addition, the establishment of a *Kleinstadtakademie* (Small Town Academy) will be piloted and a report on the current position of small towns in Germany produced (BBSR 2019c: 13 et seq.).

While several federal states such as Lower Saxony, Bavaria and Brandenburg promote small and medium-sized towns with their own competitions and programmes, such settlements have no particular role in the very well-financed rural development programmes, including EAFRD funding (European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development). Here, there is a clear divide between the portfolios for urban and spatial planning on the one hand and those for agriculture and rural development on the other.

The topic of small towns has also gained considerable popularity in research. For a long time, small towns were only reported upon as part of rural space or in combination with medium-sized towns – usually with a focus on deficits in connection to terms like shrinkage, peripheralisation and provinciality. Recently, three papers on small towns were published (ARL 2019; Steinführer/Porsche/Sondermann 2019; Porsche/Steinführer/Sondermann 2019) with the aim of encouraging a reorientation of research. The papers identified research needs in particular fields, discussed methodological issues and data, and made recommendations for research and teaching. Furthermore, at the end of 2019 the *HochschulCampus KleinstadtForschung* (HCKF – University Campus Small Town Research) was initiated with the intention of tackling the topic in a systematic and interdisciplinary fashion for the first time in Germany. The project is led by the Brandenburg Technical University Cottbus-Senftenberg and is funded by the German federation for a three-year period (2019-2022).

In France, research on small and medium-sized towns has a long history (Edouard 2012). As in Germany, in the 2000s such settlements were over-shadowed and relegated to a marginal position in scientific debate and research by the focus of many investigations on metropolisation (Carrier/Demazière 2012; Berroir/Fol/Quéva et al. 2019). The revival of interest in medium-sized towns was especially notable in France in the decade from 2010 to 2020, as seen in numerous academic and specialist articles (Bekkouche 2011). Small towns, however, remained a poor relation of urban planning for a long time (Edouard 2012). Recently though, they have attracted more interest. Action research programmes have also emerged, such as the 2018 *Recherche dans et pour les petites villes* (Research in and for Small Towns) of the *Plateforme d'observation des projets et stratégies urbaines* (POPSU – Platform of Observation of Urban Projects and Strategies).

In France, two periods were conducive to the conception and implementation of policies particularly focused on small and medium-sized towns. From 1973 to 1982, the finance of infrastructure and urban development measures was ensured by a contract-based policy for medium-sized towns that involved the central state and



Figure 1: Towns and municipalities in the programme Action cœur de ville (Heart of Town – City Centre Action Programme) / Source: Ministère de la Cohésion des territoires et des relations avec les collectivités territoriales 2018: 2

territorial authorities. The analysis of local requirements was relevant here. Medium-sized towns played a pioneering role in testing cooperative contract-based approaches, which broke with the previous top-down, standardised planning methods. In the following three decades, medium-sized towns were not subject to any specific planning or development policy but were variously – both negatively and positively – impacted by a range of sectoral policies (see Adam/Baudelle/Dumont 2022). The *contrats ruraux* (rural contracts) introduced in 1975 were a move in the same direction and supported small towns in their local development. This policy was extended and transferred to the *régions* in the 1990s, but it was part of rural development and not a policy explicitly for small towns. Indeed, for a long time small towns appeared rather part of the rural area than fully fledged urban centres (Santamaria 2016: 142).

Although the *Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale* (DATAR – Interministerial Delegation for Spatial Planning and Regional Attractiveness) initiated the pilot project *20 villes moyennes* (20 medium-sized towns) in 2007, it was only later that attention began to be paid to the particularities of the challenges facing small and medium-sized towns in connection with devitalisation. In 2014 DATAR issued a call for expressions of interest in the small town (*AMI Centres-bourgs*). This led to the programme *Petites villes de demain* (Small Towns of Tomorrow), which was launched in 2020 and had much in common with the *Kleinstädte in Deutschland* initiative. For medium-sized towns DATAR introduced the *Action cœur de ville* (Heart of Town – City Centre Action, 2018-2022; see Figure 1), which aimed to coordinate resources and promote the revitalisation of the centres (see Adam/Baudelle/Dumont 2022).

In the course of the 2010s, questions concerning the future of small and medium-sized towns were addressed in debates on urban research and planning policy in both countries and it became increasingly common to consider small towns as independent urban centres.

2.2 Deployment of funding with a spatial impact

Public funding from the various sectoral policies and their promotion programmes is essential for dealing with the current challenges. A framework for the targeted and efficient deployment of this funding is provided by the Leipzig Charter for Sustainable European Cities, which provides guiding principles for integrated, cooperative urban development policy (Gatzweiler 2012: 94).

A diverse mix of promotion measures are available that involve small and medium-sized towns in different ways. The key elements in Germany are:

- > Urban Development Support (see Section 2.3),
- > *Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur* (Joint federation/federal state Task for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures),

- > Large-scale transport investments,
- > Labour market support and social transfers,
- > The promotion of integrated rural development in the framework of the second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy.

Towns and cities with research institutions and universities also participate in programmes in the fields of research and education (Gatzweiler 2012: 95; BBSR 2014: 4).

Knowledge about the regional distribution of public finance is still very incomplete. Evaluations only consider levels down to that of the districts. The same is true for the determinants of regional distribution and the significance of the funding for regional economic development. Creating an intersectoral and efficient funding policy is thus difficult (Plankl 2013: 2). Investigations show that there are distinct regional differences in the intensity of funding and the relative importance of the individual fields of funding and also of other hard and soft locational factors (ibid.). Regional incidence analyses by the *Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung* (BBSR – Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development) have shown that at times primarily shrinking regions and thus also small and medium-sized towns in these areas participate to an above-average extent in measures of equalisation policy – measured according to the proportion of their inhabitants in the total population of Germany (Gatzweiler 2012: 95). This especially concerns the funding that is, in the broadest sense, intended to create equivalent living conditions in all sub-areas, especially the single farm payments and infrastructure subsidies made in the context of the *Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur* and funding from the Common Agricultural Policy and Urban Development Support.

In France, a general distinction is made between spatial policies and sectoral or social policies with spatial impacts. The former provide funding in the framework of regional policies (contracts between the central state and *régions*, regional plans, investments in the future), the *Politique de la ville*¹ (Town Policy) and rural development policies. Evaluations are fragmentary. There are no broadly based investigations that make it possible to judge the position of small and medium-sized towns in this spatial policy. Nonetheless, small and medium-sized towns in both countries profit greatly from urban planning and renewal. They are thus in no way neglected by the higher levels (Delpirou 2019a).

Sectoral policies, on the other hand, have ambivalent and very varied impacts over time, depending on the national political priorities and the efficiency of the lobbies that represent the small and medium-sized towns. In the 1990s, for instance, the *Plan Universités 2000* made possible the establishment of higher education in medium-sized towns (Santamaria 2012). Around the turn of the millennium, support for industrial districts, enterprise clusters and rural centres of competence was directed

1 The aim of the *Politique de la ville* is to strengthen social cohesion through the spatial integration of socially disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods.

towards small and medium-sized towns (Edouard 2012). However, since the mid-2000s, the implementation of the Lisbon strategy in the fields of higher education and promotion of innovation has led to the massive funding of large cities and metropolises (Fol 2020). Furthermore, in the 2000s and 2010s, small and medium-sized towns suffered from the effects of state reforms in various sectors (health, justice, security) and from the closure of facilities due to rationalisation and austerity drives (Taulelle 2012). These reforms have greatly impacted the development of small towns, both in terms of the loss of functions and employment (Baudet-Michel/Conti/Chouraqui et al. 2019) and in terms of the potential for re-using wasteland (Lotz-Coll 2019). This reveals the lack of coordination between sectoral policies and the absence of a coherent and integrated strategic vision for spatial planning and development in France.

Social policies do not target specific regions or sectors but rather organise social transfers. Davezies (2008) underlined the spatial redistribution effects of social policies (pensions, unemployment allowances, social benefits, etc.) and the role of small and medium-sized towns in the redistribution mechanisms. More competitive areas, primarily large cities and metropolises, produce wealth which is distributed throughout the country and especially benefits the small and medium-sized towns. Public services and services of general interest are overrepresented in such settlements (Davezies/Talandier 2014), which makes them more susceptible to the closure of public facilities.

2.3 The importance of urban renewal for small and medium-sized towns

In France, the comprehensive redevelopment approach of the 1950s and 1960s gave way to less radical urban renewal in the 1970s. The urban contracts, which were introduced in the course of the *Politique des villes moyennes* (Medium-sized Towns Policy) of the 1970s, were an opportunity to bundle diverse planning instruments. The focus was on the improvement and development of living environments (Santamaria 2012; Vadelorge 2013). Since this time, urban renewal has been supported by an enormous arsenal of laws, procedures and financial instruments that make it possible to protect urban heritage, renew urban structures, develop public spaces, combat high vacancy rates, create new facilities and improve the integration of socially deprived neighbourhoods. The extent to which these instruments are actually employed varies and depends on the abilities of the local actors utilising them (see Section 2.1).

The *Opération programmée d'amélioration de l'habitat* (OPAH – Programmes for the Improvement of Living Conditions) introduced in 1977, legally anchored in 1991 in the *loi d'orientation pour la ville* (LOV – Urban Policy Law), were and are very successful in French towns (Badariotti 2006: 10). They are, however, very limited in their spatial extent. The *loi solidarité et renouvellement urbain* (SRU – Law on Urban Solidarity and Renewal), passed in 2000, provides a broader foundation for urban renewal in relation to spatial extent and fields of engagement (urban planning, social development, mobility).

The enthusiasm of the small and medium-sized towns for the *Programmes d'amélioration du cadre de vie* (Programmes for the Improvement of Living Conditions) of the *Agence nationale de l'habitat* (ANAH – National Housing Agency) and the *Programmes de rénovation urbaine* (Urban Renewal Programmes) of the *Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine* (ANRU – National Urban Renewal Agency) reveals their strong dependency on national directives and finance (Gaudin 2018). The massive demolition of housing from the 1950s, 60s and 70s located on the edge of the urban settlements and the renewal of housing in the historic centres indicates the power of cultural heritage references in small towns (Périgois 2006) but also the ideological orientation of the state renewal agency ANRU. French small and medium-sized towns clearly have a set of options for organising and financing urban development and renewal projects. The current devitalisation of centres suggests, however, that there has been either insufficient mobilisation of these instruments or a lack of coherence and global strategy. In the second half of the 2010s, state action therefore focused on implementing integrated mechanisms targeting the revitalisation of town centres suffering from high vacancy rates in both housing and commercial premises (e.g. through programmes such as the call for expressions of interest in small towns in 2014, extended and elaborated in 2020 with the *Petites villes de demain* (Small Towns of Tomorrow) and the City Centre Action Programme (initiated in 2018). These programmes aim to effectively provide funding for local authorities, primarily for the development of capacities in project management. They also offer an important framework for local integrated approaches with workshops, exchanges and networking between local actors, for instance through the Heart of Town – City Centre Action activities (Buch/Griffoul/Ravel 2020). The programmes have put small and medium-sized towns back on the policy agenda and strengthened their centrality, but they do not make it sufficiently possible to tackle multi-scale challenges. Furthermore, they ignore the strategic and regulatory dimensions of urban development concepts and projects (Delpirou 2019b), for example, problems linked to mobility and accessibility remain unaddressed despite the challenges presented by urban sprawl.

In contrast, urban renewal in Germany is successfully pursued as Urban Development Support^{2,3}, which since the 1990s has been divided into a number of sub-programmes. It has diverse economic, social, ecological and urban design effects (BMVBS 2011), encourages other public and private investments (see, e.g., DIW 2004) and has an impact on all urban development. It offers an important organisational frame for bundling resources and local integrated approaches for inner urban development (Schmitt/Schröteler-von Brandt 2016: 12 et seq.).

As early as the 1960s, the German federation and federal states financed the first investigations and pilot projects in the field of Urban Development Support (see Figure 3). This also involved small and medium-sized towns (BMBau 1978; 1983). The passing of the *Städtebauförderungsgesetz* (StBauFG – Urban Renewal and Development Act) in 1971 provided a uniform legal framework for the promotion and

2 Also see www.staedtebaufoerderung.info (09 December 2021).

3 Urban renewal, urban regeneration and urban redevelopment are used as synonymous terms in the following discussion. Urban Development Support refers to the programmatic measures.

execution of urban development. The focus was initially on comprehensive redevelopment, but in the 1970s the aims of urban renewal changed – as in France – to focus rather on cautious, conservationist regeneration with the participation of those affected. Constructional failings and functional defects such as deficient built fabric, poor housing conditions, vacancies and unfavourable transport conditions were to be permanently rectified. Socially disadvantaged areas were also to receive support. In order to achieve these aims, the towns were provided with a bundle of legal, procedural and financial instruments. Urban renewal was undertaken as a comprehensive project in legally designated renewal areas and was financed through the Urban Development Support Programmes of the federation and federal states (BMI 2020).

Until the mid-1980s, smaller towns were underrepresented in the programmes of urban redevelopment. This changed from 1985 when programmatic funding from the German federation was increased to almost one billion German Marks. Small towns with under 10,000 inhabitants profited immensely here. Their share rose from 19% to 29% in the 1988 programme year (BMBau 1990: 13).

In the 1990s, urban renewal contributed largely to the preservation of the historic structure of urban built form, particularly in eastern Germany. After reunification, the town centres of medium-sized towns in rural regions profited over-proportionally, judged in terms of population. This is also true, if somewhat less so, of small towns (Karsten/Hesse 2011: 35; BMVBS 2011: 8). Nonetheless, the massive demographic changes and the concentration of retail in other locations have often made it impossible to fill the built shells of historic old towns with urban life.

In 2010 the German federation and federal states issued an Urban Development Support Programme specifically for small towns. The objective of the programme *Kleinere Städte und Gemeinden – überörtliche Zusammenarbeit und Netzwerke* (Smaller Towns and Municipalities – Regional cooperation and Networks (see Figure 2) was to strengthen the small and medium-sized towns as anchors in rural regions. Neighbouring towns and municipalities were to create intermunicipal alliances and develop a joint integrated development concept. Finance was prioritised for measures targeting the adaptation, safeguarding and development of municipal services and supplies such as social infrastructure or the accessible design of public space, and especially for the strengthening and renewal of urban centres. Up to and including 2018, the federation provided circa 498 million euros for over 600 comprehensive projects in more than 1,400 municipalities (BBSR 2019a: 6), many of which were characterised by a declining population (47%), were located in sparsely populated regions (48%) and had less than 10,000 inhabitants (85%). Only 4% had over 20,000 residents (BBSR 2019a: 17 et seq.).




Figure 2: Towns and municipalities in the programme *Kleinere Städte und Gemeinden – überörtliche Zusammenarbeit und Netzwerke* (as of 2017) / Source: BBSR 2019a: 19

Translation of captions:

Types of town/municipality	City regions
Medium-sized town	Areas outside city regions
Small town	
Rural municipality	
Intermunicipal alliance	

A national transfer agency supported the towns in the programme with knowledge transfer, regular exchanges of experience and regular statutory reports. Despite the success and the high level of acceptance, there was always also a certain amount of scepticism and criticism of the focus on services of general interest and intermunicipal cooperation. The instruments of Urban Development Support targeted redevelopment areas, which did not seem to fit with regional, intermunicipal cooperation. With the reorientation of Urban Development Support in 2020, the programme was discontinued. Instead, measures to secure services of general interest and intermunicipal cooperation were then included in three new programmes⁴ (see Figure 3). The funding rate for intermunicipal cooperation was reduced. The programmes use targeted funding in an effort to provide structurally weak regions with the possibility of meeting the needs of both larger urban centres and small and medium-sized towns.

Urban renewal in Germany is financed via a uniform programme that allows the municipalities a great deal of flexibility. However, in France, despite approaches focusing on political decentralisation and cooperation, towns remain very dependent on the national agencies, both conceptually and in terms of funding (Epstein 2015; see Figure 4).

4 Lebendige Zentren – Erhalt und Entwicklung der Orts- und Stadtkerne (Living Town Centres – the conservation and development of district and town centres), Sozialer Zusammenhalt – Zusammenleben im Quartier gemeinsam gestalten (Social Cohesion – jointly designing community life in the neighbourhood), and Wachstum und nachhaltige Erneuerung – Lebenswerte Quartiere gestalten (Growth and Sustainable Regeneration – designing liveable neighbourhoods).




Figure 3: Timeline urban renewal in Germany /Source: authors

3 Public policies and governance in small and medium-sized towns

3.1 Particularities of governance and policy in small and medium-sized towns

The complex and multi-layered challenges facing small and medium-sized towns are tackled in a specific governance setting, which in both Germany and France is particularly characterised by (Baumgart et al. 2004: 7 et seq.; Rüdiger 2004: 45 et seq.; BBSR 2015: 12):

- > The dominance of daily tasks and, consequently, the insufficient development or total absence of medium and long-term guidelines.
- > A shortage of personnel and the frequent staffing of the urban administration with allrounders who need to take on responsibility for various fields of work and tasks. This means that the way in which specialist policy issues are tackled depends very much on the understanding and availability of specialist (administrative) personnel. It also results in responsibility for urban development tasks resting on only a few or, indeed, one pair of shoulders. There is thus, for example, insufficient capacity available for managing processes, applying for funding (see below), or carrying out participation procedures. Especially with regards to EU funding strategies, local politicians in small and medium-sized municipalities in Germany and France complain that they are de facto unable to participate. They are part of the target group but their ability to satisfy the demands of applications is limited due to the complexity of the necessary processes, the bureaucratic steps required for the necessary processes or procedures, the personnel resources, the financial margins, the technical equipment and the specialist know-how (Rüdiger 2004: 42).
- > The dominance of a technocratic understanding of planning in relation to managing development processes. This results in planning procedures being conducted either as formal routines or extremely informally.
- > The focus of municipal policy decisions tends to be on periodic success as dictated by legislative periods rather than on long-term goals and new scientific findings. The scope and limits of municipal policy are hereby found in the field of tension between regional and local state bodies, local industry and inhabitants.
- > The particular importance of influential individuals (key figures with integrative power e.g. mayors or committed individuals from urban marketing or local business) and of so-called pre-decision makers, especially from the urban administrations.

In general, research by Rüdiger (2004) shows that in Germany these specific governance qualities increase as the size of the town declines. It can be supposed that this is similarly true for France.

A further significant parameter of municipal ability to manage development is sufficient funding. In France, the *Association des petites villes de France* (APVF – Association of Small Towns of France) and the *Banque postale* emphasise the great dependence of small towns on national and local solidarity, as 74% of small towns have no or little flexibility with taxation (APVF - La Banque postale 2019). Model calculations for Germany suggest that due to the demographic situation, public budgets are likely to come increasingly under pressure and therefore the financial position of all municipalities will clearly deteriorate in the medium term (Gatzweiler 2012: 89). No specific trend for small and medium-sized towns can be identified as there are no significant correlations between population and per-capita debt levels or short-term public borrowing to finance routine expenditures (Kaschlik 2012: 15). Local stakeholders also regret that the frameworks and measures of European operational programmes are not always aligned with local territorial issues (Demazière 2014: 138).

3.2 Governance for and in small and medium-sized towns

In light of the limited resources and traditional control and planning models, increasing attention has turned to notions of governance for the development of small and medium-sized towns. Governance can, on the one hand, refer to coordination and cooperation between public actors (multi-level governance and intermunicipal cooperation) (Lang 2007: 3). On the other hand, it can be understood to refer to the social self-organisation of an urban centre involving the interaction of networks and stakeholders from civil society, business, politics and the administration (Urban Governance) (Fürst 2007: 6).

From the perspective of German small and medium-sized towns, three weaknesses can be identified in the political multi-level system (Dehne 2019b: 40):

- 1 The lack of a temporal fit and content alignment between programmes and funding on the one hand and local topics and challenges on the other;
- 2 The failure to strike a balance between state provisions, incentives and support, and local flexibility to enable independent development (Kühn 2013);
- 3 The deficiency of communication between the political and administrative levels (Bojarra-Becker/Franke/zur Nedden 2017).

For many years, German small towns have lacked their own political lobby to introduce their interests into policymaking at the levels of the federal states and the federation. This may change with the increased interest of politics and business in the concerns of small and medium-sized towns. In France, where the holding of dual or multiple mandates was common until 2017, communication between the political levels seems to be simpler and more established, if not necessarily more effective. The political (over-)representation of small and medium-sized towns on the regional (regional councils) and national (senate, national assembly) levels means that such settlements are well-integrated in public activities. Since the end of the 1980s, two associations of mayors have carried out a great deal of lobbying on national level: the *Association*

villes de France (towns with between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants) and the *Association des petites villes de France* (towns with between 2,500 and 25,000 inhabitants).

In contrast, intermunicipal cooperation is more difficult to achieve in France than in Germany, although clear progress has been made in recent years. Cooperation is less common between small and medium-sized towns but occurs rather between such settlements and small, neighbouring local authorities. In reaction to suburbanisation processes, in France a series of reforms of the intermunicipal administration (1995, 1999, 2016) have strengthened small and medium-sized towns as central to spatial cooperation and the execution of projects and as coordinators of spatial planning (*régions, pays, Schéma de cohérence territoriale* [SCoT - Scheme for Territorial Coherence], *Plan local d'urbanisme intercommunal* [PLUi - Local Plan for Intermunicipal Urbanism], etc.) (Taulelle 2010). It remains the case that the municipalities on the edges of urban agglomerations continue to have considerable political influence locally due to a lack of reform of municipal structures, in contrast to the situation in Germany where incorporations have been carried out. The development of a governance system for small and medium-sized towns therefore sometimes meets with considerable local resistance from the periphery (see the case study of Thiers in Section 4.2). Similarly, the division of responsibilities between municipalities and intermunicipal bodies, for example in the field of urban planning and housing development, can be a significant factor in implementation difficulties (Driant 2009: 90). For instance, in the Heart of Town – City Centre Action programme, the mayor of the town centre (rather than the president of the intermunicipal body) has the privilege of leading activities even though the consequences of the issues concerned extend far beyond the territory of the municipality. It thus seems that this programme ‘*confonde l'espace du problème (le coeur de ville) du problème avec celui de sa solution (l'agglomération et ses franges)*’ (‘confuses the space of the problem (the urban core) with that of its solution (the urban agglomeration and its fringes)’) (Delpirou 2019a: 6).

In Germany, intermunicipal cooperation between small and medium-sized towns has something of a tradition. Since the end of the 1990s, pilot projects and funding programmes have promoted and initiated such cooperation in various fields. In addition to the programme mentioned in Section 2.3, particular success was seen in federal states like Hesse with the programme *Stadtumbau West* (Urban Redevelopment West) and in Bavaria with its support programme of intermunicipal agreements. This can involve, for instance, joint initiatives to combat high vacancy rates or intermunicipal agreements to avoid the designation of new building land. Nonetheless cooperation remains difficult in some cases.

Urban development in the sense of urban governance no longer progresses through classical management and control models implemented by policy and the administration. It rather results from the exercising of influence, and the decisions and actions of many stakeholders, networks and institutions in the urban centres. Urban development involves ‘*zwischen und mit verschiedenen Akteuren gemeinsame Angelegenheiten zu regeln*’ (‘settling matters of common interest between and with different actors’) (Selle 2017: 23). Communication and cooperation play a central role,

as do impulses and facilitation provided by policy and the administration. From this point of view, planning authorities find themselves transformed into something more akin to a facilitating administration. The planning and the development of small towns becomes a locally based (Burdack 2013) or cooperative matter (Dehne 2019a). These forms of governance are increasingly significant in practice in small and medium-sized towns and trickle down to influence understandings of planning and control among politicians and administrators.

This trend has also been observed in France since the 1980s (political decentralisation, see Paris/Gustedt 2022), especially in light of cooperation between the political-administrative and business stakeholders (Tallec 2012). Participatory approaches are more recent but are now common practice in the implementation of local projects and programmes. In small towns they are used in a less institutionalised, less systematic and more informal fashion than in cities (Mainet 2016), but they are nonetheless integrated in local management, although the extent of integration varies with local requirements and power constellations (Anquetin/Cuny 2016). In comparison to Germany, the focus is on consultation and joint decision making rather than on mobilisation and active participation in the implementation of projects.

In this context, Kühn distinguishes between two basic types of governance forms: governance by government as classical planning policy led by the mayor and administration; and governance with government, whereby government is extended by informal actor networks. New scope for action can only develop through a combination of internal actor networks and external networks on the supra-local political level (Kühn/Weck 2012). In small and medium-sized towns, however, problems and barriers arise concerning the strategic ability of public actors (see Section 3.1) (Kühn 2013).

4 Case studies

4.1 The model project *Potenziale von Kleinstädten in peripheren Lagen* (Potentials of Small Towns in Peripheral Locations)⁵

In order to tackle the lack of attention that has been paid to the subject and to explore the opportunities and limits of urban governance in small towns, in 2015 the German federation launched the research field *Potenziale von Kleinstädten in peripheren Lagen*. By 2018 cooperative forms of planning and development, like scenario processes, youth barcamps and additional participative formats had been tested in eight small towns⁶. The scenario processes in particular were intended to create a pioneering spirit, develop shared visions and generate joint action for future-proof urban development. The eight model towns viewed themselves as a learning network

⁵ A slightly shortened version of the concluding section of Dehne, P. (2019): Kooperative Kleinstadtentwicklung. In: Kleinstädte. Chancen, Dynamiken, Potenziale. Informationen zur Raumentwicklung, Heft 6/2018: 86-1010.

⁶ Bad Lobenstein (Thuringia), Beverungen (North Rhine-Westphalia), Großschönau (Saxony), Kastellaun (Rhineland Palatinate), Malente (Schleswig-Holstein), Mücheln (Saxony-Anhalt), Rodewisch (Saxony) and Zell am Harmersbach (Baden-Württemberg).

and kept up a lively exchange with one another throughout the lifetime of the project (BBSR 2016).




Figure 5: Location of the model project *Potenziale von Kleinstädten in peripheren Lagen* (Potentials of Small Towns in Peripheral Locations) / Source: BBSR 2019d: 12

The backbone of the processes in the small towns were five one- or two-day scenario workshops. In structured and moderated discussion processes during the workshops, between 15 and 35 local actors developed visions of the future for their small town. The participants reflected a cross-section of the society of the small town and acted as multipliers. Overall, 174 people took part in the scenario processes in the eight model projects. A third were from politics and administration, a third came from civil society and a third represented organisations, associations, institutions or businesses. The development of scenarios is intended to encourage empowerment and participation and thus serves an explicitly communicative purpose in the cooperative process. The scenario process was thus deliberately designed not as a strategic, explorative expert process but as an open, playful discussion space. This was therefore an opportunity to work with normative and narrative scenarios (BBSR 2016; Dehne/Hoffmann 2020).

The results of the scenario processes show how the participants imagined the future of 'their' small town. The visions and potentials identified thus emerge from the small town's individual opportunities, consider general developments and influencing factors, and can be transferred to other small towns. Much of what the stories tell was not necessarily new, such as the railway station being a centre of mobility and communication or a coworking and workation retreat. However, the ideas gained great new impetus through being generated in the scenario workshops. The significance of cooperation is also exciting. When implementation was discussed, cooperation was almost always important to the participants: internally, for instance in the form of business networks, retail initiatives or association cooperatives, and externally in the form of intermunicipal cooperation (Dehne/Hoffmann 2020).

Overall, the model projects revealed that it is possible to trigger governance structures in small towns with external stimuli. Normative, narrative scenario processes can provide impetus and act as catalysts for a cooperative urban development process. They can promote a new form and culture of planning: participative, strategically focused and with a holistic orientation. In a short time, it was possible to create a broad, consensual understanding of parameters, influencing factors, potentials, the future and projects, one with which almost all participants identified. Joint projects were also initiated (Dehne/Hoffmann 2020).

On the other hand, the scenario processes revealed four typical fields of tension relevant to cooperative development and planning processes: 1) a tendency towards the exclusion of certain social groups and an inability to 'reach' them, 2) the significance of attitudes, convictions and strong promoters, 3) competition from analytical urban planning, and 4) the issue of democratic legitimacy and relationships to the municipal parliament. All four fields of tension show how cooperative urban development must be sensitively balanced between planning and policy styles, especially in small towns. It is not the right path in every case and for every topic (Dehne/Hoffmann 2020).

Some of the towns named here have made communication and cooperation a principle of their activities beyond the lifetime of the scenario process. Others closed the window of opportunity at the end of the scenario workshop and continued with

planning and policy led by the mayor and administration, in some cases because there was a lack of resonance in the population, in other cases because the traditional methods of policy design function well. A third group have taken a third path of 'cautious participation' whereby governance forms are differentiated according to the intensity of participation and links to government.

4.2 Two small towns in the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes *région*: Thiers and Crémieu

Thiers and Crémieu are two quite normal towns, even if they cannot be said to be representative for all small French towns. Applying a logic of '*bricolage territorial*' ('territorial do-it-yourself') (Béhar 2011), they are attempting to meet the challenges posed by rundown centres, social developments and the structural transformation of various urban neighbourhoods. Crémieu anticipates development pressure from the metropolis of Lyon, while Thiers struggles with a declining population and the consequences thereof, despite its proximity to Clermont-Ferrand. Like other French towns, they have made the upgrading of urban cultural heritage an important element of their urban development policy. They thereby pursue a more or less successful logic of territorial attractiveness.

For many years, public activities in the field of urban development were a municipal responsibility. The most recent processes of intermunicipal cooperation were imposed upon the towns. The stability of the municipal council in Crémieu has enabled a coherent long-term strategy to be implemented. In contrast, regular changes of leadership in Thiers have been unfavourable for the continuity and coherence of public activities, especially in light of the town's structural problems. In both towns the mobilisation and implementation of numerous national and regional instruments demonstrate that relationships to other administrative levels function smoothly. However, Thiers pursues an opportunist strategy, while Crémieu works towards a long-term, strategic objective. In both towns, local business actors have long been involved in drawing up development and planning strategies. Participatory approaches are nonetheless tentative unless they are obligatory parts of development or urban renewal procedures.

Thiers: a small industrial town searching for economic and demographic renewal

Thiers is a small town in the Auvergne, situated in a low mountain range about 100 km west of Lyon and 30 km east of Clermont-Ferrand, with an *aire urbaine* (urban area) containing 18,000 inhabitants. The traditionally industrial town specialises in cutlery, metallics and plastics and has been facing the consequences of a declining population since 1980 (18,036 inhabitants in 1968 compared to 13,904 inhabitants in 2018, with a slight improvement visible since 2013) (Insee 2021). This decline especially affects the rundown historic centre, which is located on high ground and is characterised by a socially disadvantaged population. The lower part of the town has profited from the development of industrial areas and housing estates.

Since the end of the 1970s, Thiers has worked tirelessly to combat its demographic and socioeconomic weaknesses and urban decline by mobilising various national and regional measures and programmes: a *Zone de protection du patrimoine architectural, urbain et paysager* (ZPPAUP – Conservation Zone for Architectural, Urban and Landscape Heritage), a state-town contract, cluster promotion, an Urban Renewal Programme, a Heart of Town – City Centre Action programme etc. Although these activities affect various fields (urban planning, cultural heritage, the economy, social and cultural development, etc.), the development of an effective integrated strategy is proving extremely difficult. Competition with neighbouring municipalities is fierce and intermunicipal cooperation is dysfunctional. Until 2017 the commercial districts were under municipal administration, which led to spatially dispersed structures and prevented an effective re-concentration of facilities such as retail areas.

In 2017 the founding of the *Communauté de communes* (Urban community for rural areas) 'Thiers Dore et Montagne' was prescribed by the central state. The community of municipalities comprises 30 municipalities and 40,000 inhabitants. It has jurisdiction over important fields (in particular housing development, urban planning and economic development). Its establishment is intended to strengthen the centrality of Thiers and represents an important step in the regeneration of the small town.

Crémieu: a small historic town experiencing demographic pressure, which is upgrading its living environment

Crémieu is a very small, fortified medieval town with remarkably well-preserved built fabric and 3,300 residents. It is situated in the department of Isère, 40 km east of Lyon. The town grew up through the 13th century thanks to its location on the trading routes between France and the Savoy, Switzerland and Italy. Since the 1980s, activities to establish new land uses and develop the town have multiplied, benefitting from the election of a new proactive municipal board. The town has been subject to strong pressure on the property market due to suburbanisation from Lyon accompanied by a growth in suburban areas and increased need for services and facilities. Development has been encouraged by using commerce, trade and crafts for the conservation of cultural heritage. The measures have led to far-reaching transformations and included the redesigning of housing and the facades of the old centre (in programmes to improve living conditions in the historic centre in 1985-1988, 1991-1993, 1997-1999 and 2017-2021), the upgrading of public spaces (in 1985 and 1990 with *contrats de petites villes* [small town contracts] signed with the *région*), and the improvement of cultural and sporting facilities. The aim is to increase the amount of housing while preserving the built heritage and improving the living environment, and thus to regain inhabitants.

The qualitative approach is made clear in various activities. These include the upgrading of public spaces but also, in recognition of the numerous historic monuments, the creation of a conservation zone for architecture and cultural heritage in 1992, and its regular updating, e.g. the creation of a zone for the upgrading of architecture and cultural heritage in 2019. A similar focus has been put on cultural and tourist activities such as an annual medieval festival involving over 300 volunteers, 200 specialists and 35,000 visitors, and membership of the networks *Les plus beaux détours de France* (The Most Beautiful Detours in France) and – since January 2020

– the *Petite cité de caractère* (Little City of Character). Furthermore, in 2018 the town supported the founding of an association to apply for UNESCO World Heritage Site status.

Since the founding of the *Communauté de communes* ‘Balcons du Dauphiné’ in 2017, a number of the emblematic activities of Crémieu have become the responsibility of the intermunicipal body (housing development with the 2019-2024 local housing programme, cultural events, tourism promotion). The SCoT which was developed in 2007 under the leadership of the mixed syndicate *Boucle du Rhône en Dauphiné* and was updated in 2019, has the aim of preventing the centre of Crémieu from expanding too far so as to avoid the old centre from ‘drowning’ in the middle of an overly large urban ring. Such a scenario would threaten the cultural heritage image of the town. Fundamentally, there is also a risk of gentrification in the town centre, which has regained its attractiveness. This would lead to increased property prices and a large proportion of new inhabitants and visitors from the Lyon agglomeration (advertising and communication is targeted towards Lyon).

The developments in Crémieu represent similar processes to those observed in other towns, even though the intensity of the upgrading of the built heritage is striking. This is certainly linked to local political stability: the year 2020 saw the re-election of the mayor who was first elected in 1983.

5 Closing discussion

The similarities and parallel nature of the scientific discussions and political and planning practice in both countries are astonishing. Small and medium-sized towns have attracted increased attention and interest in the last 15 years. The question raised – not only in France – is which guiding principles are judged by politicians and urban planners to be the right ones for small and medium-sized towns. The policies for small and medium-sized towns implicitly draw on urban development models related to spatial competitiveness that were developed in and for different spatial contexts, frequently for large cities and metropolises (Mainet/Edouard 2014). The communication strategies of small towns therefore often use clichés of large cities in a ‘mimicry’ approach (Mainet 2011; Edouard 2014; Roudier 2019). Like the cities, the small and medium-sized towns tend to employ strategies to increase their attractiveness which are often disconnected from local realities (Berroir/Fol/Quéva et al. 2019) and that illustrate that the ‘*mythologie de la compétitivité, de l’attractivité, de la métropolisation, de l’excellence*’ (‘mythology of competitiveness, attractiveness, metropolisation, excellence’) (Bouba-Olga/Grossetti 2018:1) also captivates the local actors of small and medium-sized towns. Ultimately, supporting the residential economy and quality of life seem to be unassailable goals for public sector engagement in medium-sized towns (Demazière 2014). There are few locally based, alternative development strategies that are better adapted to the local dynamics of small and medium-sized towns (Berroir/Fol/Quéva et al. 2019). The time may be ripe for a public dialogue between science and municipal practice to draw up guiding principles for policy and planning that are better suited to the particularities and local challenges of small and medium-sized towns. The governance perspective of cooperative small-town development could provide orientation here.

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MOBILITY AND TRANSPORT POLICY IN GERMANY AND FRANCE: TIME FOR CHANGE AND... JOINT SOLUTIONS?

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Abstract

This chapter is devoted to mobility in France and Germany. First, key mobility indicators for the two countries are presented. This shows that private motorised transport still dominates in both France and Germany. Despite many negative effects on the climate, but also on health and quality of life, no far-reaching measures have been adopted. Hopes are pinned on technological progress and the integration of electromobility. However, this will not solve the shortage of land in cities or the car-dependence of many (low-income) households in rural areas in France. Subsequently, an empirical example from Berlin is used to show how financial and time restrictions affect the willingness of car drivers to switch to alternative modes of transport. Financial measures have a greater influence than time-related measures. For the French example, regional disparities and social dependence on the car are considered more closely. Finally, the current policy initiatives of the two countries are presented in order to assess the potentials of the transport transition.

Keywords

Mobility patterns in France and Germany – active mobility – scenarios for modal shift – sustainable development – social impacts

1 Introduction

Mobility is of fundamental importance for our daily lives. Motorised transport continues to account for a large share of traffic despite its impact on the global climate and negative effects on society, such as air pollution, land consumption, lack of physical exercise, and noise – which causes sleep disorders, difficulties with concentration and learning, tinnitus and cardiovascular problems (UBA 2019). In

addition, the number of car accidents remains on a relatively high level. Motorised individual transport encourages people to neglect gentler means of transport that are more positive for mental and physical health, such as walking. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), it is recommended that children and young people should do at least 60 minutes per day of moderate-to-vigorous intensity physical activity, adults should do at least 150 minutes (of moderate-intensity) or 75 minutes (of vigorous-intensity) physical activity throughout the week (Rütten/Pfeifer 2016). A large proportion of the population do not implement the WHO recommendations for activities of moderate intensity (Finger/Mensink/Lange et al. 2017; Finger/Varnaccia/Borrmann et al. 2018). The use of ecomobility, i.e. travelling on foot and by bicycle and public transport, allows more exercise to be integrated into everyday life (Heinrichs/Jarass 2020). Land consumption in urban areas must also be considered. Often the modal split does not correspond with the distribution of public space in dense urban structures.

To promote sustainable mobility, both Germany and France rely on the development of technological innovations and a growing proportion of vehicles using renewable fuels. Even though electric cars have less local air pollution, they are still responsible for noise, space consumption, traffic accidents and the environmental costs of the production cycle of these cars. The negative effects of traffic are particularly noticeable in dense urban areas but interactions between rural regions and centres of employment are also greatly influenced by the respective transport systems. There are thus close links between urban and spatial development and the planning of transport infrastructure.

In order to better understand the mechanisms of mobility in France and Germany, the following discussion compares mobility behaviour in the two countries. Subsequently, policy measures for promoting sustainable mobility are outlined. Here two digressions are made, one focusing on France and one on Germany. In France, regional disparities and social dependence on the car are considered more closely. In Germany, an empirical investigation in Berlin explores willingness to switch from the car to other modes of transport. The findings are discussed in terms of transferring experience to the other country.

2 Everyday mobility: The dominance of the car in mobility in France and Germany and tendencies for change

A comparison of the figures for daily mobility in France and Germany reveals a number of marked differences but also some similarities (Figure 1). Differences in the infrastructures of the two countries also become clear.

Infrastructure

In terms of territory, France is significantly larger than Germany although population density is only about half as great. The motorway network in Germany is only slightly more extensive than in France but the rail network is about 10,000 kilometres longer (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Comparative mobility data in France and Germany / Source: authors

Car ownership and carsharing

Car ownership in Germany – a country characterised by a strong automotive industry – amounts to 561 cars per 1,000 population, higher than in France (503 cars per 1,000 population). In terms of engine type, conventional vehicles are dominant in both Germany and in France. However, in France hybrid vehicles make up a larger proportion of the fleet than in Germany. The share of cars per household shows that a somewhat larger share of households has no car in Germany (22%) than in France (19%). Residential location plays an important role in the distribution of cars per household: while 42% of households in German metropolises live without a car, in rural areas there are only 10% of households that do not have a car.

Carsharing¹ is a typical urban phenomenon. In 14% of all households in German metropolises at least one person is a customer of a carsharing organisation; in rural regions this is true of just under 1% of households (Nobis/Kuhnimhof 2018: 36). In France, the proportion of carsharing remains very low.

Those who use carsharing tend to originate from households without cars, with higher income and are often young and male.

Mobility behaviour

In France, differences between the urban and rural areas are significantly more pronounced than in Germany. In the rural areas of France, more trips are made by car than in the rural areas of Germany.

Overall, people in Germany and France have become more mobile. In France, the average daily distance of trips rose from 34.4 km in 1992 to 40 km in 2017 (Crozet 2018), which is clearly reflected in the sprawl of the large French metropolises. In Germany, the average daily distance travelled (per mobile person) rose from 44 km in 2008 to 46 km in 2017 (BMVBS 2009; Nobis/Kuhnimhof 2018). On average, in 2017 mobile people made 3.7 trips a day, in 2008 it was 3.8 trips. This reveals a slight increase in average trip distances between 2008 and 2017.

Private motor vehicle transport

The car remains the dominant transport mode for the French and the Germans. Indeed, three-quarters of French employees do not work in the municipality where they live, which implies that a large number of commuter trips are made between place of residence and place of work. Such trips are a key element of current tensions in the mobility policy field. In the last 25 years, there has been a 22% increase in traffic generated by the car and, as the demands of the *gilets jaunes* (yellow vests) show, the car is still a crucial element of social life (work and leisure) in peri-urban and rural areas. France thus remains a country where the private motor vehicle is the dominant mode, accounting for just over 80% of passenger transport, a value that has been very stable for many years. A large-scale survey provides additional detail on these findings. It was conducted in July 2018 with the aim of evaluating daily mobility in France (10,148 people were surveyed) and shows that the car continues to be the central element of

1 The new 2019 loi d'orientation des mobilités (LOM – Mobility Orientation Act) strengthens car sharing in France and makes it possible to subsidise local experiments.

French mobility: 87% of the French use it at least once a day. 61% of those surveyed who are in work use the car to travel to their place of work (61% also use it to visit the doctor and 55% to go to the post office). On average, 31% of those surveyed need more than 30 minutes for their trip to work or school, with this figure increasing to 54% in the Ile-de-France and to 41% in the inner suburbs. On average, the daily return trip to work takes an hour and 10 minutes. Figure 1 shows a spatial comparison between rural areas and metropolises in France, revealing that private motor vehicles are used for 94% of trips in rural regions. This is significantly less in metropolises, but private motor vehicles are still used for half of the trips made here.

As in previous years, in Germany private motor vehicles account for 57% of trips and 75% of kilometres travelled (as driver or passenger) and thus represent the main component of the modal split (Nobis/Kuhnimhof 2018). Between 2008 and 2017, there was nonetheless a slight decrease in this modal share. Here too there is a clear difference between metropolises and rural areas (see Figure 1). 70% of trips in rural regions are made using private motor vehicles, the equivalent figure for trips made in metropolises is only 38%. Germany is thus more multimodal than France, especially in the metropolises but also in rural regions.

Public transport

France is also experiencing a great increase in public transport. Overall, 75% of traffic flows are in the Ile-de-France region, compared to just 25% in the provinces. However, the strongest growth is in the provinces, with accelerated development of the metro (+5.5%) and tram networks (+1.9%). The authorities responsible provide 75% of the population with public transport services. Since the reorganisation of the mobility administration (NOTRe and MAPTAM², see Paris/Gustedt 2022), this figure has steadily increased. France is thus rapidly changing its management of mobility by strengthening the role of regional authorities and metropolises. Public transport accounts for 18% of the total number of trips in metropolises and only 4% in rural regions (see Figure 1). This gap between urban and rural areas reflects the car dependence of the peripheral regions.

Public transport in Germany increased by two percentage points between 2008 and 2017 and now has a modal share of 10%. There is a clear contrast here between the metropolises and rural areas. In metropolises 20% of trips are made by public transport, while in rural areas public transport is only used for 5% of all trips. This is underscored by figures related to season tickets: in metropolises more than a third of people aged over 14 have a ticket of this kind (ibid.: 42).

Active Mobility

Bicycles are only gradually appearing in official statistics in France: in 2018, 2.1% of the labour force used a bicycle to get to work, primarily in cities. In the core cities this figure rose to 4.7%: Strasbourg took first place with 17.3% of the labour force commuting by bicycle, while Grenoble lay in second place with 17.1%. The popularity of cycling has

2 *Loi sur la Nouvelle administration territoriale de la République* (NOTRe – Law on the New Territorial Organisation of the Republic, 2015); *loi de modernisation de l'action publique territoriale et d'affirmation des métropoles* (MAPTAM – Law on Modernisation of Public Territorial Action and Affirmation of Metropolises 2014).

grown in line with rapid increases in the power of electric bicycles. In 2018, turnover was 27% higher than in 2017. E-bikes amounted to 12.5% of the 2.7 million bicycles that were sold in 2018, but in terms of value accounted for 40%.

The number of bike lanes is increasing steadily and as of 1 January 2019, almost 70% of the planned national bike lanes had been realised (15,780 km of 23,330 km). The bike lanes are a real success with the French municipalities actively extending the network and thereby improving their attractiveness for tourism.

Long-distance transport in France

Rail transport, indispensable for coping with the massive growth in volumes of traffic, has been characterised by a 48 % increase in the last 25 years, largely thanks to the success of the TGV which has grown by 200 %. The *Transport express régional* (TER – regional express transport) has grown by 81 % in the last 25 years and is currently undergoing a major reform with the opening up of regional passenger services to competition (tendering) in France. However, this has not led to any particular increase in the market share of rail transport, which increased from 10 % to just 11.7 % between 1992 and 2017. It rather reflects the great increase in mobility among the French and also the delayed modernisation of the rail system in France: there has been a certain amount of reliance on a not particularly innovative ‘Everything-SNCF’ logic and a lack of modern approaches. This has advantaged new *services librement organisés* (SLO – services organised on a liberal basis), such as carsharing and carpools, which advertise with reduced fares, additional services (WIFI) and more flexibility. Correspondingly, they have overtaken certain rail services, e. g. the *Train d’équilibre du territoire* (TET – territorial equilibrium trains) whose share has rapidly fallen in recent years (-7.5 % in 2018 compared to 2017). The modal share of the SLO remains modest, however, just 3 % if TGVs, intercity rail services and inland flights are taken into account.

Rail transport is fairly stable (53 % of public transport measured in kilometres travelled per person) but declined in the second half of 2018 (-3 %) in comparison to 2017 in every way, primarily due to the long SNCF strike. This situation calls for the reform of rail transport in France to be put at the forefront of the restructuring objectives of the entire sector. The railways are still not open to competition although the whole of Europe is moving in this direction.

The other important point is the rapid growth of intercity bus services, which experienced an increase of 19.2 % in 2018 compared to 2017. In comparison, there was only a 7.2 % increase from 2016 to 2017. Almost nine million passengers profited from this new mode of transport, which was introduced in France in August 2015, three years later than in Germany. There continues to be fierce competition between Flixbus and BlaBlaBus. Numerous observations suggest that passengers have shifted from rail to bus transport, especially from the TET trains which, as we have seen, lost 7.5 % of their passengers between 2018 and 2013.*

* To underscore this: on 1 January 2018, six TET lines were transferred to the regions.

Like in France, cycling plays an increasingly important role in Germany, even if the increase in bicycle use is not fully reflected in the mobility statistics. In 2017, 11% of trips made in Germany were undertaken by bicycle. Every twentieth bike trip makes use of electrical support. While e-bikes do not play a significant role among younger age groups, about 12% of elderly people's bike trips are undertaken using e-bikes (Nobis/Kuhnimhof 2018: 5).

The bicycle is a particularly important mode of transport in metropolises: here 15% of trips are made by bicycle while in rural regions the equivalent figure is only 7%.

Even though walking is a fundamental form of mobility, it is largely excluded from the French mobility statistics. For very short distances, walking is however preferred to cycling. An Insee study published in January 2017 (Insee 2017) suggests that a quarter of the labour force walk to work if the distance is a kilometre or less. A fifth of the labour force walk if their place of work is between one and two kilometres away. For distances of more than five kilometres, the bicycle replaces walking.

In Germany, walking is included in the statistics but a distinction is rarely made between short and long trips on foot. 22% of trips in Germany are made on foot and walking is also a particularly popular mode of transport. 83% of those asked (completely) agree that they like to make trips on foot (Nobis/Kuhnimhof 2018: 127).

3 Policy programmes in France and Germany

Climate action plans have been implemented in France and in Germany. In Germany, the *Klimaschutzprogramm 2030* (Climate Protection Programme 2030) aims to achieve a 40-42% reduction in emissions from the transport sector by 2030 compared to 1990 (CFACI 2019). For France, a whole series of action plans³ have been defined since 2015 and in November 2019 the new and very ambitious *loi d'orientation des mobilités* (LOM – Mobility Orientation Act) was passed. The package of measures includes achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and ending the sale of motor vehicles with internal combustion engines by 2040 (CFACI 2019).

The European Union supports and encourages such developments. Since 2020, emissions from new cars may not exceed an average of 95 grammes of CO₂ per kilometre. France provides financial and tax incentives to encourage the electrification of vehicles, especially fleets of company cars (the goal for low-emission vehicles in company fleets is 10% by 2022 and 50% by 2030) and aims to provide seven million charging stations by 2030. In July 2019, there were said to be 26,772 public charging points in France. Between 2010 and May 2019, 248,342 electric or hybrid vehicles were

3 In connection with the Paris Climate Agreements (2015): *Loi de transition énergétique* (Energy Transition Act, 2015), *Plan climat* (Climate Plan 2017), *Stratégie nationale décarbonisation* (National Decarbonisation Strategy, 2015 and 2018), *Trajectoires pour une réduction à long terme des émissions de gaz à effets de Serre* (Trajectories for a long-term Reduction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 2033 and 2050), *Plan pluriannuel énergie* (Multi-Annual Energy Plan, 2019-2023 and 2024-2028), *Stratégie mobilité durable* (Strategy for Sustainable Mobility, 2019-2023).

licensed in France⁴ (ibid.). This is the equivalent of 2% of the French market. The French metropolises play a leading role by establishing environmental zones and prohibiting access for the most polluting vehicles.

In Germany, the *Bundesverkehrswegeplan 2030* (BVWP 2030 – Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2030) has an important role in the planning of transport infrastructure for the next 10-15 years. It calls for the removal of bottlenecks on main transport axes and nodes. Rail is given a privileged position for both freight and passenger travel in order to encourage a shift from road to rail. The introduction of a synchronised train timetable is intended to make travel by rail more attractive. 31% of total investment (269.6 billion euros) is earmarked for new investment or extensions and 69% for the repair and renovation of the existing network. Nonetheless, the priorities here have clearly not been adapted to favour the transport transition because most finance continues to be spent on road transport (132.8 billion euros), followed by rail with 112.3 billion euros and waterways with 24.5 billion euros. In Germany investment is increasing (BMVI n.d.). In particular regions on the French side (e.g. in Ile-de-France), it is also possible to observe a similar shift with a larger share of finance directed towards the roads.

France and Germany continue to be very similar in terms of how they deal with daily commuting. In France, legislation provides for commuting costs to be reimbursed by the employer. In Germany, employees can set off part of their daily commuting costs against income tax. This fixed commuter payment (*Pendlerpauschale*) of 0.3 €/km is based on the shortest route for a one-way trip. For distances longer than 20 km, this rate of payment was increased to 0.35 €/km in the latest climate legislation package. In France, employers, for instance in the Ile-de-France region, reimburse 50% of the costs for a season ticket for public transport. Since the start of the ‘yellow vests’ movement, steps have also been taken to increase compensation measures for mobility in rural areas (halting measures intended to abolish diesel vehicles, suspending CO₂ taxation).

Like in France, Germany is accelerating objectives for CO₂ reductions in the transport sector, especially with the Climate Protection Programme 2030. The aim is to reduce emissions by 40-42% in comparison to 1990 (i.e. 95-98 tonnes of CO₂) by establishing a network of charging stations for electric vehicles, supporting the purchase of electric vehicles, developing biofuels, promoting public transport and the railways – especially for freight, extending cycle paths, various measures on inland waterways and increased ‘digitalisation’ in the transport sector. To finance the measures, the federal government has increased its share in *Deutsche Bahn* (DB – German Railways) by a billion euros. In addition, the price of train travel should become more attractive while air travel prices are supposed to increase. Various activities to promote public transport are under discussion (pilot project for public transport with a subscription of €365 per year).

4 On the European scale, 810,000 electric vehicles and 906,000 hybrid vehicles are licensed (October 2019). Norway leads in the licensing of electric vehicles (43,355 were registered in October 2019, followed by Germany with 40,594 and France with 34,759 (CFACI 2019)).

Like in France, Germany has introduced a price per tonne for CO₂, and this price is intended to increase steadily. In Germany, the CO₂ price in January 2021 was 25 euros per tonne. This is supposed to increase gradually to 55 euros by 2025. The market system for emissions certificates is being extended to include the transport sector, with the exception of air travel. Companies that buy or supply fuel will soon have to purchase certificates for a certain amount of CO₂. The price for the certificates is set at a level of 10 €/t CO₂ in 2021 and will be successively increased by 5-10 €/t per year. These measures are intended to support a learning process among companies and private citizens about the necessity of reducing CO₂. At the same time, a platform for trading certificates is to be established. A European market for emissions certificates is essential for when national requirements for the purchase of emission allowances are exceeded. Decisions must be made in 2025 concerning the upper and lower limits for these emissions prices (BMF 2019). In France, the 'yellow vests' movement has put such measures on hold. The process could be put back on track through better education, tax incentives and compensation for the most vulnerable population groups in rural areas who are reliant on cars.

Overall, it becomes clear that municipalities are called upon to implement the transport transition with appropriate policy measures. Thus, there is a lot of pressure to take the initiative for urban development in cities, but national legislation is not always clear or supportive here with regard to sustainable mobility. As a result, some cities are very actively exploiting and testing the scope for sustainable infrastructures (e.g. the traffic-calming on the Seine riverbank in Paris), in some cases to the point of court decisions (e.g. pop-up bike lanes in Berlin). Other cities, however, remain in the paradigm of the car-oriented city due to the lack of legal obligations.

There are still issues concerning acceptance for and the implementation of such policies in both countries. A total of 75% of French citizens are willing to alter their mobility behaviour to improve air quality – especially by using electric vehicles. However, 52% consider that using an electric vehicle would restrict their autonomy and 42% regard the costs as being too high, while only 20% emphasise the positive effects on the environment. Just 35% express an intention to buy an electric vehicle (CFACI 2019). Although there seems to be widespread agreement in both Germany and France concerning the need to reduce the role of the car in cities, there is still too little change.

3.1 A digression to Germany: Reactions to policy measures to encourage model shifts away from the car

In light of increases in numbers of vehicles and the negative impacts thereof, a large survey was carried out in Berlin about possible policy measures intended to reduce the use of cars in the city (IASS/DLR 2018). In recent years, there has been little improvement in air quality and the allocation of public space, even though the transport transition is an important policy goal and alternatives to the car thus require consideration. The question arises as to whether the results of such surveys should not be used to rethink inner-urban and urban-rural mobility policies in both France and Germany.

The consequences of the diesel scandal demonstrate that a number of municipalities are able to initiate strong measures to limit damaging emissions and to restrict car mobility in urban areas. What regulatory policies or incentives should be implemented to cut emissions in urban areas and reduce the amount of space used for motor vehicle transport and parking?




Figure 2: Modal shift from car to other modes in various policy scenarios. Participants who use their car at least 1 to 3 times a week with the commute to work as the most frequent route. Number of cases = 474-603 / Source: Jarass 2020, data: IASS/DLR 2018)

In Berlin, a survey of 1,000 people was carried out covering four policy scenarios intended to promote a modal shift from the car to other means of transport (ibid.): under which conditions would participants be willing to give up their cars and which other transport modes would they be willing to use instead? Different scenarios were suggested, firstly related to financial measures (congestion charges, increased parking fees) and, secondly, related to travel time (speed restrictions of 30 km/h, increasing the time needed to find a parking space by limiting the number of spaces). The following figure shows that the most potential for a modal shift on trips to and from work is associated with financial measures. With the introduction of a congestion charge or parking fees, more than 70% of the survey participants would be willing to switch to a different form of transport and would thus give up using the car for their trips to and from work. If speed restrictions of 30 km/h were introduced on main roads, then more than a third of the survey participants suggested they would be willing to change their mode of transport. If the number of parking spaces were reduced, then 40% would switch from the car.

According to this investigation, financial measures remain the most effective instruments for achieving large modal shifts to other means of transport. This shows that cities have great potential to reduce car traffic and render mobility more environmentally friendly and less damaging to public health. Nonetheless, the survey only covers preferences and thus indicates trends without depicting real intentions and changes in mobility behaviour. Overall, it seems clear that restrictions can exercise considerable influence towards reducing car usage. However, it is also important to create incentives to promote active mobility and public transport. Of relevance for promoting non-motorised mobility are factors such as well-developed bike infrastructure, mixed land use on a small scale, proximity to public transport stops and other objectives, safety in public space and attractive urban structures (Ewing/Cervero 2010; Holz-Rau/Scheiner 2005; Cao/Handy/Mokhtarian 2006; Jarass 2019).

The COVID-19 crisis is currently demonstrating that rapid infrastructure changes are indeed possible. In Berlin, less than half of all households have their own car but almost 60% of the city's traffic areas are occupied by stationary and moving cars. In Berlin's inner city, almost three times more trips are made on foot and by bicycle (53%) than by car (17%) (SenUVK 2017). This is scarcely reflected in the allocation of public space. However, in order to comply with current distancing regulations, Berlin has established new bike lanes and the streets can be temporarily used to play in and for leisure (Jarass 2020). To facilitate mobility during the pandemic and to satisfy the increased demand for bicycle traffic, a number of Berlin districts have used extremely rapid procedures to set up over ten pop-up bike lanes within the framework of the *Straßenverkehrsordnung* (StVO – Road Traffic Regulations). The bike lanes were extended in keeping with the *Berliner Mobilitätsgesetz* (Berlin Mobility Act) so that they can largely be retained even after the COVID-19 crisis. Similar tactical planning can be observed in France, for instance in Lyon, where bike lanes have been temporarily reinforced (through yellow marking) and lanes reserved for public transport.

During the summer of 2020, on Sundays between 1 and 7 pm there were also a number of streets in the Berlin district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg that were reserved for playing on. The temporary closures were supervised by the local inhabitants and were originally planned for just two months. The idea was to provide more space for children and local residents. Just under 300 volunteers supported the project, which included 19 *Spielstraßen* (play roads). These Sundays were very positively received and civil-society actors were actively involved in creating child-friendly areas. Generally speaking, however, such approaches are very selective and affect only urban areas.

4 Mobility: driving social change in France

If there is one activity that best characterises the dynamic development of the French economy in recent years, then it is the transport and mobility sector. There are world-leading industry players and transport service companies in France such as Keolis, Transdev, Air France and SNCF, as well as a whole range of highly innovative start-ups with strong growth potential like BlaBlaCar. On the international scale, France seems to be a laboratory for new mobility services – electric scooters, autonomous shuttles,

new mobility management systems – and attracts global operators like Uber, Dott, Lime and, of course, Flixbus (Guihery 2019). There are also numerous research centres set up by the giants of the network economy who focus on research into traffic and mobility. Finally, in recent years the French have profited from the liberalisation of transport services and the increase of intra- and intermodal competition. These developments have affected the quality of services and pushed prices down; this is particularly true of the new intercity bus services that have been active in France since 2015 and in Germany since 2013.

In France there is no lack of options for long-distance mobility: private cars or carpools/ carshares (e.g. BlaBlaCar), the TGV and its low-cost version (Ouigo), new intercity buses (which have carried nine million passengers since 2015, compared to 24 million in Germany where they began operations in 2013), and also cheap airlines (strong players include Easyjet, Ryanair and Wizz Air). The wide variety of transport modes encourages innovations with web or smartphone apps, also with regards to customer relations, communication and marketing: apps like Mobility as a Service (MAAS), currently very popular in France for optimising choices of transport mode, are indicative of these developments.

4.1 A digression to France: Regional disparities and social dependence on the car

In France, there is currently intensive discussion about measures that should be taken to progress with an ecological transition to decarbonised mobility. It is assumed that this process will ‘leave behind’ a considerable proportion of the French population. Drawing on the slogans of the meeting of the *agences d’urbanisme* (urban planning agencies), which celebrated its fortieth anniversary in Paris in November 2019, this dilemma can be addressed with the following question: How can we progress from a situation where citizens are ‘lost in transition’ to one where citizens are more committed to a logic involving a ‘love of transition’?

Currently, great efforts are being made to rapidly develop regional rail networks. This seems the only way to provide the regions with a high-quality alternative to commuting to and from work by car. The implementation of a ‘competitive market’ – through tendering – would allow frequencies of connections to be increased, the quality of service to be improved and new services to be introduced at the stations and on board the trains. Here, the *régions* have been made super-organisational authorities and are also responsible for rail transport. The regulation of the sector and the public service tasks have not been forgotten, as seen in the increased role for the *Autorité de régulation des transports* (ART – Regulatory Transport Authority). The French *régions* should benefit from a reduction in the financial burdens associated with the operation of regional railways.

However, the increased demand for and supply of mobility options disguise a tangible unease among certain population groups. The demonstrations of the ‘yellow vests’ in 2019 suddenly returned issues of equality and territorial equivalence to the forefront

of the political scene, revealing the deep concerns of people in rural and peri-urban areas who are dependent on cars and have been forgotten in the face of the innovative and mobile life in the metropolises.

Indeed, the costs of individual mobility have risen sharply in recent years (+11% in ten years) and continue to be closely linked to increases in fuel prices, which triggered the most recent ‘yellow vest’ crisis⁵. Households spend 10% of their budget (145 billion euros in 2017) on personal transport. Fuel accounts for about 26% of the costs of running a car. Insurance costs have also increased in recent years.

Yves Crozet provides a good summary of this problem of the limiting of individual mobility by the costs. For people who earn 1,200 euros a month, the budget for fuel alone (1.5 €/l) represents 10% of their income if they have to travel 70 km a day by car. If this is added to the other sunk costs which account for an increasing proportion of income (over two-thirds with modest incomes), it is easy to understand why *‘une étincelle sur le prix du baril de pétrole a suffi à mettre le feu aux poudres de la frustration sociale et économique’* (‘a spark linked to the price of a barrel of oil is enough to ignite a fire of social and economic frustration’) (Crozet 2018: 47).

In 2017, spending by households on public transport amounted to 29 billion euros or almost 2% of the household budget. In the last ten years, this expenditure has risen much more than nominal GDP, 33% as opposed to 25% (Crozet 2018). This increase is linked to public transport, which has developed strongly in the metropolises (+41%), and to flights (+40%). Rail transport accounted for a moderate increase in household spending (11%).

Most public investment in public transport has primarily benefited the urban centres – new mobility, infrastructure for public transport – and much less has ended up in rural or peri-urban areas, which has further exacerbated the dissatisfaction of residents in peripheral regions. The proportion of public investment in public transport has risen from 6.5% to 27.3%, but this is especially concentrated in the Ile-de-France (ibid.). It should be noted that the French only travel 1,400 km/year by public transport while, for instance, the Swiss use public transport to travel 2,400 km/year.

At its heart then, this is a territorial issue between the large metropolises and the peripheral regions. 20% of trips in Paris are undertaken by car, but cars are used for nearly 50% of trips in the suburbs and for almost 80% of trips in rural and sparsely urbanised areas. Outside the large cities, the working population is therefore reliant on the car. The separation between the workplace and the home is *‘un phénomène récent, puissant et silencieux’* (‘a new, strong and silent phenomenon’) (Broto 2022).

This decoupling of place of work from place of residence means that it is often necessary to travel a long way from home to find employment. This is particularly the case when many rural regions of France are losing jobs, particularly in the areas of the Centre Loire Valley, Champagne, Lorraine, Burgundy and in Alsace – with the exception of Mulhouse. Including the Ile-de-France, there are just nine prominent metropolises

5 As a reminder: 62 dollars in July, 85 dollars in October, 60 dollars in December (Crozet 2018).

where most mobility innovations are concentrated. The gap between the rural and peripheral France and the France of large cities is growing ever larger and is at the root of the latest dissatisfaction. The recent ‘yellow vest’ protests have revealed and highlighted the plight of many families who lack a stable monthly income and the purchasing power to cover the increasing mobility costs, where the CO₂ tax plays a significant role.

Most of the French are therefore dependent on their cars. A recent study by the Automobile Club Association (ACA) on the costs of running a car, which was published in early April 2019, confirms that there has been a great increase in the costs of maintaining a car and the price of fuel in recent years. The emotions that led to a large number of drivers taking to the streets with the ‘yellow vests’ and demanding an end to the carbon tax are thus understandable and, indeed, they achieved the moratorium of this tax in December 2018. The ACA investigation demonstrated that the costs for the owner of a Renault Clio with a petrol engine were 12.7% higher than in 2017. With the exception of the toll charges and garaging fees, all expenditures have risen more quickly than inflation (1.8%). Maintenance costs (+3.4-3.8%) and fuel prices are a burden on incomes. With taxes of 144% for diesel and 167% for SP 95 petrol, fuel costs for the owner of a Renault Clio amount to 1,022 euros per year (ACA 2019). If 100 euros are budgeted for a car, taxes account for 23 euros (or 27 euros for a diesel Logan). Insurance costs also rose by an average of 2.5% between 2018 and 2019. On the other hand, the costs of purchasing a car have remained relatively stable. It can be observed that leasing with a purchase option (75% of new car purchases in France) is increasingly attractive for car drivers.

Thus the ACA study showed that the budget required by the owner of a petrol-run Renault Clio rose by 12.7% to 6,833 euros per year between 2017 and 2018. However, of great interest in this context is that the ‘car budget’ can be stabilised with a hybrid car: with an annual expenditure of 9,764 euros, the budget for a Toyota Prius fell by 1.1%.

In summary, it can be concluded that the average monthly expenditure of travelling by car is just under 204 euros. 46% of the French citizens surveyed who use their car regularly were dissatisfied with the mobility costs incurred, as has been made very clear by the ‘yellow vests’ movement.

France thus stands at a transport policy crossroads. There is a tangible unease about the ecological transition, which is necessary but receives little support from some of the population with modest incomes who are car-dependent. Clearly, a process of redirecting investment towards the peripheral, peri-urban and rural regions is currently underway. However, it will not be possible to quickly bridge the gap between the metropolises where the jobs are located and the peripheral regions where an increasing proportion of the population live. A plausible alternative answer, at least in part, could be found in the renewal of rail transport. The current introduction of competition to regional passenger rail transport should allow the relevant authorities the financial leeway to increase frequencies and improve supply, punctuality and services, while transport costs may be reduced. In France, there is indeed a range of options for fulfilling the expectations of people living in the regions. Germany, France’s

most important European partner, has been able to optimise its regional rail transport to become one of the most dynamic in Europe. All that remains is for France to quickly join this European dynamism.

5 Conclusion

In both Germany and France, the car occupies a central position in the transport system. The majority of daily trips are undertaken by car, especially in rural areas, and the infrastructure caters primarily for cars. In cities, the car is often just one mode of transport among many. Nonetheless, even here public space is greatly influenced by the car.

Policy agendas in France and Germany are increasingly tackling the issue of a paradigm change towards a more healthy and environmentally friendly transport system. To date, however, the focus has been almost exclusively on technological solutions. The transformation of the transport system is often equated with electromobility. The German Climate Protection Programme forecasts a total of between seven and ten million electric vehicles by 2030, and the German manufacturers, who were initially somewhat reluctant, are now more inclined to embrace this objective. Nonetheless, it is clear that policy ideas are not yet being implemented in daily mobility. The Germans keep their cars for an average of 15 years. This means that restructuring the car market towards electric vehicles will be a long process, especially because people who buy electric cars tend to be those with high incomes who live in a house with charging facilities.

The replacement of conventional cars by electric cars is not in itself enough to provide the desired result in terms of sustainability and a reduction in traffic, especially not everywhere or for all segments of the population. Even though electric cars create less local air pollution, they are still responsible for noise, space consumption, traffic accidents and the environmental costs of the production cycle of such cars. It is necessary to use small-scale policy programmes to promote active mobility which does not cause air pollution or damage public health. In this context, incentives to reduce the use of cars are indispensable. As the 'yellow vests' movement shows, many people feel themselves to be dependent on the car, a circumstance also linked to the centralisation and distribution of employment. This dependency must be reduced through the creation of alternatives.

Even if it is rather well hidden, there is nonetheless a great deal of active cooperation between France and Germany around the energy transition in the transport sector. On 19 June 2018, a roadmap for the implementation of the Paris climate agreement (2015) was drawn up at the French-German summit in Meseberg within the framework of a high-level, inter-ministerial working group on climate change. This cooperative body is involved in regular exchange on the level of the ministries, has held two meetings and has drawn up an agreement on maritime transport (May 2019). There is a regular exchange of views on a common strategy for the decarbonising of the transport sector. Three bilateral meetings have led to a convergence of strategies for

the installation of charging stations in cross-border areas, the preparation of EU approaches such as the revision of Directive 2014/94/EU on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure (hydrogen), and incentives for the decarbonisation of the car market. A French-German factory project for battery production has also been launched, an initiative which was joined by Poland. The increase of CO₂ taxes remains on the agenda. There is furthermore a need to develop joint German-French projects on the European level to increase the taxation of short-haul flights – or even ban them.

France and Germany look back on many years of friendship and cooperation. To achieve this paradigm change, both countries can build on these foundations, exchanging knowledge and practical solutions to promote healthy and environmentally friendly mobility, and learning from one another.

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THE SUSTAINABLE AND PARTICIPATORY CITY: A CHALLENGING CONCEPT!

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Abstract

Sustainability and participation have become two priorities of urban policies. They are usually considered perfectly synergistic, but they are not. This chapter aims to disentangle the imbroglio of sustainability coupled with participatory processes in the theory and practice of urban planning and development. To do so, it reflects upon empirical observations in the field of public policies in France and Germany as well as on some cases on both sides of the Rhine. Finally, this chapter describes and analyses policies and governance instruments intended to involve citizens in sustainable decision-making in urban areas of France and Germany.

Keywords

France – Germany – public participation – sustainable urban development – urban planning – Local Agenda 21

1 Introduction

Chapter 23 of Agenda 21 states that the effective implementation of sustainable development can only succeed through the commitment and genuine participation of all social groups (UN 1992, Rio Summit). Indeed, everyone concerned with sustainability issues should be involved in decision making (Mancebo 2017; Kanning 2013: 37). From a strategic perspective, affected persons possess values, experience and knowledge beyond the reach of experts or elected representatives ('tacit knowledge'), which may prove essential for effective sustainability decision making (Fischer 2000). These two complementary standpoints underline that sustainability resonates strongly with the notion of participation (Klinsky/Golub 2016). Scholars have identified two main obstacles:

- > First, the difficulty of including all the actors (regional and local authorities, non-market institutions, NGOs, private companies, local storekeepers, unions, landowners, etc.) (Brenman/Sanchez 2012).
- > Second, a lack of legitimacy (Lang et al. 2012). When trying to generate knowledge through collective action, the process and its outcomes often interfere with legitimised procedures and official policies (Scholz 2011).

The participation ladder concept, which was developed in the USA as early as the end of the 1960s (Arnstein 1969), classifies participation approaches according to the extent of citizens' decision-making power or the 'intensity of participation'. It has been adapted for urban development purposes, among other things. Assessments of participation processes may be based on it (e.g. Bischoff/Selle/Sinning 2006; see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Spectrum of participation /Source: changed according to: IAP2 2018, (c) International Association for Public Participation <https://www.iap2.org/mpage/Home> (23.02.2022); Kanning 2018: 21

To discuss the sustainability of urban policies, plans and programmes, we first must find out which sustainability strategy the initiatives are striving for: efficiency (improving the input-output ratio), consistency (qualitatively transforming industrial

material flows), and/or sufficiency (changing consumption patterns and resource-saving lifestyles) (Behrendt/Göll/Korte 2018; Schneidewind/Zahrnt 2013). These are not alternative strategies, only the triad of efficiency, sufficiency and consistency leads to sustainable development (von Gleich/Hofmeister/Huber 1999; Kanning 2013: 34 et seq.). In any case, sustainability is a dynamic and context-specific process that is constantly contested rather than a static condition to be generally defined (Growe/Freytag 2019).

It is crucial to understand how the population and institutions respond to change in order to develop new forms of participatory governance for sustainability: Who is initiating the participatory processes, and which groups of actors are addressed and becoming involved, or in other words what governance arrangements are built? Which intensity of participation (Figure 1) is achieved? Which types of strategies are followed (efficiency, consistency, or sufficiency)?

To answer these central questions, a comparative approach is chosen. First, we describe the development of policies for urban sustainability in France and Germany, using an analytical diachronic approach starting in the 1970s. Then, we tackle the progress of participatory policies for sustainability in both countries. Finally, we combine the two dimensions, and compare the results in order to identify trends and patterns.

2 Sustainability in urban planning and development

2.1 The French Approach

Over the last 30 years, cities have become the very places where environmental awareness has been transformed into in-depth urban strategies and governance (Béal 2011). But although environmental issues achieved a breakthrough, their translation into specific initiatives took time. Conflicting perspectives and significant discrepancies between antagonistic types of actions have dramatically slowed the efforts. A brief history of the French regulatory framework and cultural background appears necessary for understanding these difficulties.

The post-war boom – called *Trentes Glorieuses* ('Glorious Thirties') in France – was characterised by a sheer influx of people migrating to work in the large cities. This generated a massive housing crisis, the response to which was the authoritarian development of high-density housing in the 1950s and 1960s. This provided clean and comfortable housing. Yet, the developments were cut off from the traditional urban fabric. A growing sense of dehumanisation developed in such areas, crystallising in the first demands for a better quality of life that resulted in the early ecological movements (Mancebo 2010).

The first Ministry of Environment was established in 1971. More precisely, its denomination was *Ministère de la protection de la nature et de l'environnement* (Ministry of Nature Protection and Environment). Initially, its sphere of responsibility was not defined. Thus, diverse competences were hived off from other ministries and

transferred to this new one, including large sectors like urban regeneration or urban social policy (Lacroix/Zaccai 2010). This first ministry was fundamentally a hotchpotch. Throughout the two subsequent decades, it gained consistency, reinforced its competences and consolidated its administration, as a result of two factors:

- > First, an internal one, as the rise in environmental concerns among the population put this matter on the political agenda.
- > Second, an external one, as European directives on environmental issues must be incorporated into national laws and regulations – for example the Habitats directive using the Natura 2000 programme, or more recently the directive on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, for example (Charvolin 2003). In 1995, all these synergistic initiatives were embodied in a general law, which established guiding principles in environmental policies: the *loi relative au renforcement de la protection de l'environnement* (Law on the Strengthening of Environmental Protection) also known as *loi Barnier* (Barnier Law). Since then, this act has become the cornerstone of French law and decision making on environmental issues.

The first institutional instance of the phrase ‘sustainable development’ was precisely in *loi Barnier*, where it was defined as an overarching guiding objective of environmental policies. It was not before 2002 that the term appeared in the name of the ministry, which became the *Ministère de l'écologie et du développement durable* (Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development). As far as cities are concerned, urban sustainability then became a touchy issue, since it was within the field of competences of two different ministries whose priorities were often opposed and competing: the *Ministère de l'écologie* (sustainability priorities) on the one hand, and the very influential *Ministère de l'aménagement du territoire, du logement, des infrastructures et des transports* (Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing, Infrastructures and Transport) (urban priorities) on the other hand. It was only in 2007 that these two ministries merged into one huge ministry. Simultaneously, there was a founding event called *Grenelle de l'environnement* (Grenelle Environment Forum).

The *Grenelle de l'environnement* was a round table that involved representatives of all the members of society: local and regional authorities, professional organisations, labour unions, NGOs and experts. It took place in 2007 and was initiated by the French government, who made the commitment to endorse the outcomes in long-term decisions regarding the environment and sustainability (Boy/Brugidou/Denord et al. 2012). A first programming bill on its implementation – called *Grenelle 1* – was smoothly enacted in 2009. In 2010, a second bill that aimed to provide a complementary second bill level – called *Grenelle 2* – was also enacted.

The *Grenelle de l'environnement* focused on how public policies could manage sound urban transitions to sustainability (Vie publique, la rédaction 2019). Two out of six environmental key priorities designed during this event directly concerned urban sustainability: ‘construction and urban development’ and ‘energy and climate’. The latter was oriented towards the energy performance of buildings, for example, all cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants were required to implement a *Plan Climat*

Local (Local Climate Plan) before 2012. As a matter of fact, the *Grenelle* set objectives that had to be included within all the planning documents at whatever scale – among them the regional *Schéma de cohérence territoriale* (SCoT – Scheme for Territorial Coherence), the *Plan local d'urbanisme* (PLU – Local Urban Plan) and *Cartes communales* (Municipal Land Ownership Maps). The compliance of SCoT and PLU with *Grenelle*'s provisions allows density targets to be exceeded by more than 20% even in protected areas, provided that the new buildings are characterised by good energy performance (Némoz 2011).

In general, the *Plan ville durable* (Sustainable City Plan) established in the aftermath of the *Grenelle* aims to foster the emergence of a new way to design and build urban areas. *ÉcoCité* and *ÉcoQuartier* programmes are two key instruments for this new approach. The scale of *ÉcoCité* actions is the city as a whole, more specifically the *Villes nouvelles* (New Towns) developed in the 1960s and 70s. On a far more local scale, *ÉcoQuartier* initiatives aim to catalyse the creation and development of eco-districts within cities. The *Programme national de rénovation urbaine* (PNRU – National Urban Renewal Programme) evolved so that every new renewal scheme became part of the *ÉcoQuartier* programme after 2009.

It can be stated that sustainable cities have enjoyed new policy tools following the *Grenelle*. Thus, today most cities – whatever their size – enact their transition to sustainability along four tracks: eco-districts, wastelands and brownfield redevelopment, building energy performance and mobility, and the Local Agenda 21 centred on quality of life and nature.

2.2 The German approach

German municipalities have planning sovereignty over their territories. The federal level may only influence urban development through laws on urban planning and with model projects or support programmes. The federal states may influence urban development, e.g. with building regulations. Because the implementation of sustainable development is a voluntary task of municipalities, approaches vary widely. For a brief overview, we distinguish between three modes of governance: (1) formal instruments of urban planning, (2) informal approaches to (integrated) urban development, (3) Local Agenda 21 (LA 21) and civil society processes.

(1) As early as 1960, the *Bundesbaugesetz* (BBauG – Federal Building Act) was adopted, with a few elements of sustainable urban development. This has institutionalised two-tiered land-use planning as a local competence. The act distinguished interior from exterior development and its article 35 allowed only so-called privileged land uses (agriculture, forestry, horticulture, fisheries, utilities, energy) to build in exterior areas, thus preventing urban sprawl but not land take. Environmental regulations from the EU and national levels were slowly incorporated in the act and its successor, the *Baugesetzbuch* (BauGB – Federal Building Code). Sustainable development was legally anchored as a guiding principle of urban planning in the code in 1998, urban sustainability criteria were listed in its article 1 in 2004, but no fundamental substantial or instrumental changes were made (Wolfram 2002; Weber 2004; Scholich

2008; Hofmeister 2014). The focus continued to be on the environmental dimension instead of transformation (Wolfram 2002), as sustainability was introduced when transposing EU directives on the environment.

Formal land-use planning only controls the type and intensity of land use. Thus, the first national sustainability strategy (Bundesregierung 2002) introduced the ‘30 ha target’ for sustainable urban development to reduce daily land take for settlement and transport from 129 ha in 2000 to 30 ha in 2020. Despite some regional successes, land take in 2018 was still at about 56 ha per day (Destatis – Statistisches Bundesamt 2020) and compact greenfield development has recently reappeared (Altrock/Krüger 2019). Material and energy flows can at best be indirectly controlled through formal planning (Kanning 2005).

(2) Informal local approaches to integrated sustainable urban development have increased since the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities (European Ministers for Urban Development 2007). They have a much wider scope than formal urban planning.

As illustrated in the ‘sustainability triangle’ or the ‘3-pillar model’, the Leipzig Charter perceives the three dimensions of economic prosperity, social balance and a healthy environment as equally significant aims which must be balanced. Therefore, nature conservation actors in particular tend to perceive sustainable development as a drawback or dilution of what has already been achieved by environmental policies since the 1970s. Academics, however, stress that the ecological dimension represents the foundation for economic and social development that must be preserved for future generations in the long term (WBGU 2014). Overall, the sustainability triangle and the associated thinking seem to have led to a dead end (SRU 2002; Kanning 2013: 27).

The Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU 2011) set a milestone, recommended a ‘Great Social Transformation’ and triggered a new substantial discussion on the sustainability model, especially at the federal level and among academics. Important functions were attributed to urban and regional planning.

Cities regained relevance internationally in the Agenda 2030 (UN 2015), which includes sustainable development goal (SDG) 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities, the New Urban Agenda (UN 2017), adopted during the HABITAT III World Summit, and the Urban Agenda (EU 2016). SDG 11 goes far beyond the ‘30 ha target’. Some pioneering cities, such as Dresden, Hamburg and Hanover, have set out to adopt the various SDGs. However, cities pick easily achievable targets from among the 63 defined in the second national strategy (Bundesregierung 2017), without considering the strategy as such (Dähner/Slupina/Klingholz 2017).

In 2019, federal urban development funding was restructured to promote ‘growth and sustainable renewal’. This term is characterised by a dilemma: although more innovative approaches at the local and particularly neighbourhood levels also promote more sustainable economies (e.g. the resource-optimised development of commercial areas in Karlsruhe), the concept of growth is unchallenged and socio-ecological transformation is unsupported.

Efficiency and consistency strategies dominate, e.g. energy efficiency in buildings, renewable energies, environmentally sound mobility. There is, however, a lack of sufficiency strategies, except for sharing approaches, e.g. in housing (Sinning/Spars 2018).

(3) In parallel to the integrated urban development processes, Local Agenda 21 (LA 21) processes have mostly been separately set up since the early 1990s. German cities responded early to the Agenda 21 call and have turned LA 21 into a broad participatory movement with a sufficiency understanding of sustainability. In 2009, there were still some 2,600 LA 21 processes in Germany (Kirst/Trockel/Heinrichs 2014: 552). After the early 2000s, however, the number of new LA 21 initiatives declined and existing ones began to expire. For an overview of the development phases, see Heinrich Böll Stiftung (2018).

In addition, numerous ‘pioneers of change’ or bottom-up processes initiated by civil society are developing new lifestyles and economic activities that consume less and share goods, e.g. within the Transition Town Initiative, urban gardening projects, repair cafés and loan shops. They are leaving behind the growth orientation of urban planning (Hülz/Mayer/Sondermann 2020). However, most of them are connected neither to municipal urban development strategies nor established LA 21.

3 Participation in sustainable urban development and planning

3.1 The French approach

The *Grenelle de l’environnement* is considered as a participatory turning point in public decision making (Livet 2007). It stipulates that sustainability policies and actions must include participatory procedures. During *Grenelle’s* round of discussions, a task force was even named *Construire une démocratie écologique: institutions et gouvernances* (‘Building an ecological democracy: institutions and governance’). Its final report included the following statement: ‘*Les électeurs souhaitent que les opportunités de faire valoir leur point de vue ne se limitent pas aux échéances électorales, et il devient nécessaire de mieux combiner démocratie participative et démocratie représentative.*’ (‘Voters want opportunities to express their views beyond electoral events, and there is a need to better combine participatory and representative democracy.’)

But participatory concerns did not begin with the *Grenelle de l’environnement*. This event has rather been a factor in the consolidation of many existing procedures and tools. In fact, participatory procedures developed incrementally and haphazardly in the 1970s and later, in response to emerging conflicts concerning the development of large-scale facilities. To deal with this type of conflict a commission was created by *loi Barnier* in 1995: the *Commission nationale du débat public* (National Commission for Public Debate), which, by the way, is now used as a strong arm for the implementation of *Grenelle’s* policies. Well before that but in the same vein, in 1983 *loi Bouchardeau* (Bouchardeau Act) stipulated that any *étude d’impact sur l’environnement*

(environmental impact assessment) had to include a public consultation – in the form of an *enquête publique* (public enquiry) – to ensure that public interests and values are addressed effectively.

Generally speaking, the practical implementation of an urban transition to sustainability policies takes the form of technical devices, the most iconic initiatives being passive energy houses, zero energy buildings, smart grids that manage a city's energy demand (Dujin/Moussaoui/Mordet et al. 2011), and real time optimisation of street traffic (Sokoloff 2016). These very technical approaches are favoured at the expense of other aspects of urban sustainability such as environmental justice, living conditions or landscape diversity. For example, the PNRU drastically transformed urban public action, but not in the sense of more interactive and transferal initiatives. In this sense, it can be seen as a regressive mechanism as far as urban sustainability is concerned (Epstein 2011). There has in fact long been an impervious divide in French urban policies between participatory initiatives in the realm of what is called *Politique de la ville* (Town Policy) – which has no relation to urban planning or design but is rather, in a nutshell, concerned with social issues in housing developments –, and top-down initiatives – mainly technology-oriented – in the realm of ecology and environmental policies. As a result of this cultural background, urban project stakeholders are still struggling to combine technical with participatory dimensions in spite of the *Grenelle* legal framework (Theys 2002). In many cases, initiatives are limited to the planning of a few green areas as if it were sufficient to display 'green' to become suddenly sustainable, and the involvement of local residents in the project is limited to information meetings pompously named *réunions de concertation* (consultation meetings). Frequently – as far as urban sustainability is concerned – effective participation cannot take place based simply on the will and skills of the administration, architects, planners and surveyors (Mancebo 2020). Such a process needs time, quite different from the frenetic timeline and knee-jerk reactions to any opposition that elected officials and developers impose on urban policies (the next election, compliance with construction deadlines etc.).

Let us take the case of the city of Nantes, an active French city of 303,382 inhabitants with an above-average rate of growth. Nantes is developing an official programme to make transition to sustainability inherently participatory (Comeliau 2007). It is focusing on regenerating large parts of the industrial and port wastelands. But in fact, this programme is limited in terms of consultation (EDD 2007). Behind the scenes, significant choices were made by the municipality, which then tried to gain inhabitants' acceptance by asking for their opinion on details. The humorous part of this is that spontaneous participatory initiatives were already seen in Nantes more than 30 years ago, without any encouragement from the municipality. *La Fournillière* – a former wasteland of more than 3 ha in the city of Nantes – was transformed into an unusually large area of urban farmland in the 1990s as the result of a conflictual bottom-up initiative, which ended in co-management between the neighbourhood and the municipality (Pasquier 2004). More than 70 illegal urban gardeners were squatting on this wasteland when Nantes municipality decided to develop a park there in the 1990s. Something unusual then happened. The gardeners spontaneously united their forces and organised to impose their views upon the municipality. They claimed that they wanted to be decision-making partners in the project. At the end of a long process of

negotiations – and against all odds – the gardeners’ alternative project was chosen, and the municipal proposal abandoned. The new project envisioned a park organised around the existing gardens, which then formed islets or patches with paths for walkers and runners entwining and connecting them. At the very centre of the park, a venue was placed to introduce visitors to waste recycling in urban gardening. This case symbolises the potential of participatory approaches to planning procedures outside any official procedure, i.e., bringing everyone to the table so that citizens understand that urban affairs are fundamentally their affairs.

3.2 The German approach

Participation has a long tradition in German urban planning and development. As early as 1960, the Federal Building Act made it possible for the affected population to obtain information and comment on land-use plan drafts. Today, participation as shaped by the Århus Convention is an integral part of formal and informal local planning and a main feature of a planning culture based on cooperation and self-governance (Healey 1992).

From the 1970s, environmental awareness and participation was strengthened by strong grassroots movements campaigning against nuclear energy, for better air and water quality especially in industrialised urban regions, and for nature conservation. This led to the foundation of municipal departments and state ministries for the environment as well as the Green Party (Grober 2010) in the 1980s. A federal ministry for the environment was founded later (after the Chernobyl communication disaster) to integrate dispersed competences.

Turning briefly to participation processes in the various modes of governance – (1) formal urban planning, (2) informal urban development, and (3) local agenda processes.

(1) Formal participation is rarely more than consultation. Rare exceptions include the internationally acknowledged neighbourhoods of *Tübingen-Französisches Viertel* or *Freiburg-Vauban*, where a collaborative approach (building groups) was implemented by formal urban planning. Federal ministries headed by conservative politicians have even tried to change the law in order to restrict the participation guaranteed by the Århus Convention, allegedly to accelerate planning and approval procedures.

(2) Informal urban development processes usually choose more sophisticated participation formats.

The city of Karlsruhe serves as a good example of civil society involvement. Like Nantes, it is growing at an above-average rate and, with a population of around 310,000, it is one of the medium-sized large cities in Germany. Unlike Nantes, however, it has already undergone socio-economic transformation by developing from a production site to an innovative research and development site. Based on a policy of systematic citizen participation (Stadt Karlsruhe 2012a), various formats enable cooperation, e.g. citizen idea competitions, future conferences, planning workshops.

Processes range from the scale of the overall city to the neighbourhood level and include spatial visions for urban planning as well as sectoral policies such as traffic development.

Karlsruhe drew up the interdepartmental *Karlsruhe Masterplan 2015* for urban development in an extensive two-year cooperative process. Based on a future conference, the master plan was extended to the *Integriertes Stadtentwicklungskonzept Karlsruhe 2020* (Integrated Urban Development Strategy Karlsruhe 2020; Stadt Karlsruhe 2007; 2012b) in a cooperative process with five future forums, open to the public. Citizens, local government and the administration thus jointly developed an orientation framework for decision making that provides a long-term perspective. It integrates economic, social, cultural, urban developmental, environmental and civil society action (ibid: 8).

(3) LA 21 features cooperative approaches and more recent Agenda processes even include more intensive public participation. Numerous bottom-up movements are developing in civil society in parallel, attempting to establish new lifestyles and economic activities.

The emerging transformative science (WBGU 2011; Schneidewind/Singer-Brodowski 2013) is adding to the various participatory processes that exist in urban planning and development, promoted by federal government policy: living labs are currently highly praised as a ‘new’ format for transformation towards sustainability, especially at the local level.

Participation is a core feature in living labs (Defila/Di Giulio 2018: 40). Instruments and methods from participatory planning processes can largely be transferred or adapted (Eckart/Ley/Häußler et al. 2018: 131 et seq.; Kanning 2018). However, planning focuses on the relationship between the state/public sector and civil society, whereas living labs concentrate on the relationship between academics and practitioners (including urban planners) (Eckart/Ley/Häußler et al. 2018: 105; Arnold/Piontek 2018; Beecroft/Trenks/Rhodus et al. 2018; Seebacher/Alcántara/Quint 2018). The latter contribute local knowledge in particular (Kanning/Richter-Harm/Scurrrell et al. 2021). Ideally, ‘change agents’ should be among the practitioners (Grin/Rotmans/Schot 2010).

The living lab complex established by the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) in *Karlsruhe-Oststadt* (<http://www.quartierzukunft.de>) has shaped the scientific development of this methodology. A ‘five-step model’ (Brinkmann/Bergmann/Huang-Lachmann et al. 2015; Stauffacher/Flüeler/Krütli 2008) provides the conceptual basis and has been further developed for living labs. It builds upon the participation ladder presented in Figure 1. Participation is perceived as initiating a transformation towards sustainability by aiming to achieve empowerment to the highest degree possible. Local actors shall be empowered to act sustainably, which includes a change from non-sustainable lifestyles and consumption habits towards sufficiency (Kopfmüller/Brandl/Jörissen et al. 2001). This living lab model thus goes way beyond what is customary in participation in urban development, both in substance and in terms of process. However, it is not interlinked with other urban development processes in Karlsruhe.

In contrast, the living lab ‘Go Karlsruhe’ was better interlinked with actors from urban planning and other urban development processes. However, the focus here was more on change in the mobility sector only, developing and testing new participatory approaches to promote walking (Häußler/Blaszczyk/Eckart et al. 2019).

4 Comparison and conclusions

Based on four questions, it is possible to compare the types of governance arrangements that address urban sustainability through a participatory approach in France and Germany:

Who initiates the process?

In France, we predominantly find a top-down approach, whereas in Germany there are more bottom-up approaches. Besides, cities from both countries actively participate as NGOs in the world summits and habitat conferences or have organised conferences; they are well prepared and often return with new impulses. They have proposed and influenced new support programmes or model projects set up by ministries to initiate processes. The French national level mostly initiates the process, based on laws that have set milestones since 1995. Municipalities and their corporations may act as informal initiators when sustainability is high on the agenda of an active and well-networked mayor, frequently merely for electoral reasons. In contrast, in Germany local groups and initiatives have strongly influenced sustainability processes and policies in quite different ways. The federal level disseminates best practice by financing model projects and initiating innovation with support programmes. A number of cities have developed the know-how to intensively participate in the programmes, while others are lacking human and financial resources. Recently, some federal states have also put programmes in place to support new forms of participation like living labs. Academics as well as developers have entered the arena as initiating actors, sometimes independently of the municipality, sometimes in cooperation. Nevertheless, bottom-up approaches also exist in France and have increased in number over the last ten years. They are usually the outcome of conflicts concerning infrastructure proposals or landscape and environmental quality issues. In these cases, environmental NGOs, landowners or neighbourhood associations are usually the initiators of the process.

Who participates?

In Germany, citizen initiatives are the most important participating actors besides individual, mostly better educated citizens. Sometimes they are formally organised in building groups. Living labs try to reach a representative sample of the population that also includes ordinary people. The situation is a bit different in France, where the main actors in participatory procedures are, on the one hand, local authorities and representatives from the national and regional government that generally are the formal initiators, and, on the other hand, local and environmental NGOs as well as local business, landowners and residents’ associations. Academics and urban practitioners are usually also involved. Finally, there are quite a few citizen grassroots initiatives, and when they occur, it generally is on a NIMBY basis, or at least arises out of conflict.

What intensity of participation is achieved?

In both countries, consultation is the minimum requirement, especially in formal processes with an environmental impact assessment or a strategic environmental assessment. Cooperative approaches have been undertaken in France in rare cases, but generally the public is just informed – although the process is formally called *concertation* (dialogue). In Germany, a number of local showcase projects have applied cooperative approaches to create not only acceptance among citizens but also a sense of ownership. These showcases have sometimes impacted formal standards in the same municipality by intensifying participation, but implementation is strongly determined by growth and spatial constraints and is locally contingent (Growe/Freytag 2019). Both showcases and living labs are sometimes isolated or poorly linked to established urban development processes. Some leading cities or city regions have established participation by starting with an integrated urban development strategy, continuing with planning workshops and participatory master plans, and ending with binding land-use plans for neighbourhoods that transfer key points into regulations. Despite very important advances in the matter of participation in the aftermath of the *Grenelle de l'environnement*, public actors and local authorities remain reluctant to engage in participatory governance in France. The relative failure of sustainability policies to meet their targets is related to neglect of the participatory scope. Seen as unfair and technocratic, such policies are not supported in the public arena. For instance, the focus put by French local authorities and developers on the energy performance of buildings leads to the development of showcase buildings and utilities to the detriment of more holistic approaches, such as active land management and transformation of the urban fabric (Mancebo 2020). In fact, describing a city as sustainable only by counting the number of passive buildings, the total length of bike lanes, the surface of vegetated roofs or the percentage of recycled waste is absurd and leaves no room for people to get involved in the decision-making process (Ascher 2008; Elliot 2006). An unintended effect of this situation is that local knowledge is commonly underrepresented in final decisions.

Which type of sustainability strategy?

In France and Germany, there is a predominance of efficiency strategies. Sustainability has become a guiding principle of urban planning in both countries' building codes but without mentioning the type of strategy approach. France has institutionalised completely new urban planning instruments that claim to foster sustainability, whereas Germany has attempted to slowly and incrementally make existing urban planning instruments more sustainable. Especially the national level in both countries strongly supports technology-centred action like low energy housing and insulation. The municipalities react by redeveloping derelict land e.g. for spin-offs in these fields of technology and helping owners to take part in the programmes. In addition to renewable energies, consistency-oriented projects include, for example, building groups providing shops for local retail and services, as have been intensively described in the literature. It is striking that we find the largest number of these in prosperous R&D-focused university cities in Baden-Württemberg. Good examples of sufficiency approaches are rare (e.g. sharing initiatives). In any case, sustainability strategies should also think the city as a whole, taking into account uses and the everyday life issues of its inhabitants, and including them from scratch in the design and planning of their city. The effectiveness of sustainability policies depends largely on collective ownership.

What does urban sustainability mean and how can it be achieved at the local level, which seems to be the more adequate scale as the cases of *Karlsruhe-Oststadt* and the Nantes harbour area show? Living labs in particular could be an important tool to promote such transformation towards sustainability. Participation in living labs can learn from established participation in urban development and planning and vice-versa. Living labs offer an experimental space for a more sophisticated transformation towards sustainability beyond classical growth strategies and may include, for example, sufficiency strategies. But there are still many open questions regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of cooperation in living labs: How is innovation jointly developed by actors in individual projects transferred to local administrative processes in the long term? Can selected actors develop solutions that can be democratically implemented? How can role conflicts be overcome? How can results from these labs become binding without formal administrative procedures?

In both countries, such living labs could prove crucial to determine what a good environment for the affected communities is, an essential issue for involving people in the decision-making process: an environment in which the improvement of environmental conditions *stricto sensu* (water quality, air, biodiversity, prudent use of resources, land and energy, etc.) will lead to improved living conditions; one in which technical devices and ecological processes will lead to new lifestyles. This means adopting more organic, collaborative and transforming forms of governance, which can be coined as participatory governance.

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Nicolas Douay, Christian Lamker

NEW TECHNOLOGIES, NEW TOOLS, NEW ORGANISATION OF THE CITY: TOWARDS A NEW DIGITAL PLANNING?

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- 1 Introduction: digitalisation of cities and regions
 - 2 Digital technologies in spatial planning in France and Germany
 - 3 Positioning planners in smart city agendas
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Abstract

A full digital transformation is unfolding and great hopes are vested in the potentials of digital tools for communication and visualisation in planning processes, for analysing and modelling spatial information, and also for managing whole cities and regions. However, actual practices differ vastly, and the debate increasingly points to the pitfalls and dangers of a disconnect between citizens, spatial justice and democratic decision making. Examples of smart cities show a huge variety of interpretations and implementations in Europe. Therefore, digital tools should not become a goal in themselves, but need a clear societal and spatial vision and open political debates. This chapter looks at digital technologies in spatial planning as an increasingly political agenda in France and in Germany. In many regards, both countries must deal with similar opportunities and challenges posed by digital technologies, companies and global platforms. These are mediated differently through national political and planning systems and a more centralised approach in France versus a much-decentralised agenda in Germany.

Keywords

Digitalisation – smart city – France – Germany – technology – role of planners

1 Introduction: digitalisation of cities and regions

Digitalisation has become one of the dominant forces driving an ongoing transformation of societies, the making and shaping of our cities and spatial planning theory and practice (Colding/Barthel/Sörgvist 2019; Douay 2018; George 2020; Potts 2020; Raco/Savini 2019; Sielker/Sichel/Allmendinger 2019). A full digital transformation is unfolding: entire economies, the flow of goods, the provision of public and private services, political debates and social contacts are digitalising. Great hopes are vested in the potentials of digital tools for communication and visualisation in planning processes, for analysing and modelling spatial information, and also for managing whole cities and regions. In effect, the digital is pervasive (Boullier 2016): it cannot be located

because it penetrates all our activities, from the most intimate to the most collective. It affects the way in which we perceive, use and transform urban and regional spaces and brings forward notions of smart cities, smart villages and smart regions. In sociological terms, 'smart cities bring form-function tight-fit into the digital age, aiming to become self-sustaining environments' (Sennett 2018: 161).

More than any previous time, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the great potentials of digital communication for staying connected and organising public life from local communities to global networks. Smart cities have become even more prominent as an ideal type of an efficient, sustainable and environmentally friendly future city. This goes so far that it is possible to see hybrid spaces (such as augmented reality and gamified environments) emerging in which the real and the virtual merge (Yamu/Poplin/Devisch et al. 2017). New technologies and tools are being developed and used, but to an even greater extent basic assumptions and the organisation of urban space is changing. Smart cities mean that 'technology is a central feature in cities that can spark urban regeneration and increase urban efficiency' (Hatuka/Rosen-Zvi/Birnhack et al. 2018: 161). The ongoing process of intertwining digital technologies with spatial planning raises questions about accountable decision making and local democracy, which is in danger of being replaced by an 'algorithmic technocracy' with new powerful governing elites (Kitchin/Coletta/Evans et al. 2019: 210). New generations of digital technologies offer more than analytical tools and increase the risk of a disconnect from citizens, spatial justice and democratic decision making. The debate increasingly discusses the pitfalls and dangers of digital technologies becoming cornerstones of all elements of spatial planning, communication and decision making.

Planners and (digital) city making

In traditional accounts of city making, planners and urban designers play a crucial role with their tools and instruments, but also with their designs and visions (Sennett 2018: 19 et seq.). After industrialisation in the 19th century, European cities witnessed both engineering solutions (such as sanitation) and also architectural answers (such as Bauhaus). Post-war reconstruction led to large-scale comprehensive planning and the rational planning model. Best decisions were developed by experts and through rational analysis. This approach was later supplemented by communicative and collaborative planning ideals and an orientation towards citizens and participatory planning processes. Best decisions were facilitated in open dialogues oriented towards consensus. Since the later 20th century, planners have paid much attention to strategic planning as a means to foster the interaction between private actors and governments. Public and private resources are brought together to develop and implement projects. All these approaches have in common that they are about planners as city makers and the role they play in organising and shaping spaces. Without the specific role played by planners, cities are not made in industrialised countries.

The trend is becoming more diverse today. New emerging forces impact city making, often stronger than established approaches of governing cities. Digital technologies are framed as providing solutions to all urban problems (Kitchin/Coletta/Evans et al. 2019: 199). Technologies change the way in which we use space and how we move in space. Global digital platforms shape forms of living, travelling and moving around. Examples are multi-local living, home-sharing, co-working, e-scooters, ride-sharing

services and many more. Smart cities combine urban sensory with sophisticated technology to optimise cities and urban flows, mostly using central management mechanisms. Smart city definitions encompass definitions of open and co-productive cities in which people engage with data in real time and build up a diversity of buildings and street designs (Sennett 2018: 254). In contrast, they also cover scenarios of an automated management of urban issues that is highly prescriptive and closed, and that leaves people as passive users (Kitchin/Coletta/Evans et al. 2019: 201). They have in common that technological tools, urban sensory and big data drive comprehensive urban change without providing a specific position for planners. In fact, the hope is that smart algorithms might deliver the better decisions that people strive for. Vast financial investment and technological knowledge produce a diverse landscape of applications and are shifting power to technology companies. The search for a new 'material-virtual interface' (de Roo/Yamu 2017: 34) even changes the language of planning and is a starting point for re-positioning planners in the complex process of city making.

(Re-)positioning planning

Picon (2015) notes that the ideal of the smart city is often presented as an opposition between a search for efficiency, especially in terms of infrastructure management, and a broader vision which would also seek to promote exchanges and a better quality of life. From this perspective two approaches can be distinguished. First, a critical one, advocated for example by Greenfield (2013), notes that smart city projects (mainly the examples of Masdar in the United Arab Emirates, Songdo in South Korea and PlanIT in Portugal) are part of a capitalist logic that perpetuates economic growth by providing new markets for the largest private groups (such as IBM, Cisco, Veolia, Dassault, General Electric, Siemens, Phillips), but do not meet the real needs of citizens. Second, a more optimistic approach notes that the use of new information and communication technologies improves quality of life and the resolution of environmental problems (Scholl/Scholl 2014; Caragliu/Del Boy/Nijkamp 2009; Giffinger/Fertner/Kramer et al. 2007). The first approach is cyberoptimism and sees the emergence of the internet as a possible development towards a more open society in the service of a direct democracy where citizens could participate more freely. The second is a cyberpessimism approach, diametrically opposed to the first and seeing the internet as a technical development in the service of a new technical elite, which responds to the interests of large private groups and prevents the participation of those who are not technologically up-to-date, or even organises a generalised monitoring of behaviours. This divide between cyberoptimism and cyberpessimism recalls Mumford's (1970) vision of the risks that accompany the deployment of industrial civilisation, where the promises of modern technology would be betrayed by an authoritarian 'megamachine'. In other words, it is an issue of distinguishing between utopia and catastrophism.

Existing debates acknowledge an often-unquestioned belief in smart technologies by public decision makers and ask for more evidence and informed discussions. Countries with a strong democratic tradition struggle to position themselves between cyberoptimistic and cyberpessimistic visions of the future, or what Sennett (2018: 254) calls a coordinative (open) and a prescriptive (closed) smart city. The two largest countries in Europe, Germany and France, both follow policies to support

smart cities, and also smart villages and regions. This chapter aims to make the distinction between, and even to go beyond, the traditional divide between optimism and pessimism as regards the impact of digital technologies on spatial planning and on our societies.

Compass of digital planning




Figure 1: Planning the smart city /Source: Douay 2018: 148

Douay (2018) has identified four potential types that are already emerging (see Figure 1). More than previous planning approaches, smart cities allow for open planning approaches that are dynamic and that include a variety of institutional and non-institutional actors. If digital infrastructure, knowledge and access are provided, the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ could be efficiently and democratically used by open governments. On the other hand, demands to establish technological foundations and to run the smart city also show processes of closure by operators of digital platforms and technology companies. The oldest platform used to decide upon public issues, the public space (Greek: *agora*) and its successors in the form of town halls and physical public meetings might be replaced by new platforms – or by just one.

This leads us to the following questions: What is the situation regarding the realisation and use of digital technologies in spatial planning in France and Germany? In both countries, ‘smart cities’ are anchored in public policy. Is ‘smartification’ likely to produce an even more powerful digital divide, strengthening populations that are able

(financially, intellectually) to participate in the use of technologies? In other words, will it lead to a more or less egalitarian society especially in the context of the development of digital economy platforms (e.g. Uber, Airbnb) that have an impact on the ability of public actors to plan the city? How will it change the planning methods of the built environment with the development of tools related to algorithms and artificial intelligence? Could it change the processes of citizen participation and the dynamics of city governance? These questions are part of a dynamic debate and this chapter aims to contribute to the development of productive future uses of digital technologies in spatial planning.

2 Digital technologies in spatial planning in France and Germany

The following sections investigate France and Germany and their digital policies for cities and regions. In both countries, the term smart city has a central position in naming efforts to integrate digital technologies in spatial planning and the organisation of cities and other parts of the wider territory. The first section of each sub-chapter introduces smart cities on the national urban agendas. The second part outlines recent policies and strategies and provides an overview of the status of use and implementation of smart cities. This part shows the meaning of ‘*smart*’ in both countries, what smart policies emphasise and where they differ from previous urban and planning policies. The review focuses on recent years in which dynamic change has been observed. In 2014, a study conducted for the European Parliament found less than 50% of all cities in France and Germany displayed smart city characteristics, and ranked both countries way behind most large European countries (European Parliament 2014). The third section delivers specific examples that show the bandwidth of recent applications in both countries. The variety of uses opens up space for discussing potentials and pitfalls and (re-)positioning planners in smart city agendas (see Section 3).

France

Following the French institutional context and public policy traditions, the issue of digital technology in regional planning in France was first considered from the point of view of equipment (Debie/Douay 2016). The deployment of new infrastructures was thus approached in the same way as more traditional networks such as the train or the phone. The challenge was therefore to connect the national territory to the internet network by following the different technological standards offering increasingly high speeds. Indeed, the mainstream use of the internet started only in 1994 and was truly democratised at the beginning of the 21st century with the advent of faster connections and then high-speed broadband in the last ten years.

The digitalisation of the French territory thus reflects the way in which spatial planning policies are evolving under the contemporary prism of equality between territories. This became an object of national public policies intended to connect citizens to the most modern technologies, as had already been the case with the telephone in the 1970s and with the mobile phone at the end of the 1980s. The state launched the Very High-Speed Broadband Mission in November 2012, and a national strategy was

adopted in February 2013. This strategy aimed to achieve 80% coverage of the territory with very high-speed broadband by 2022 (today the objective is for 2025) thanks to a total investment of 20 billion euros. In the current context of a shortage of public finances, the plan is based on the search for coherence between the public initiatives of the state and the local authorities and good coordination with the private investments of operators. This plan follows the main objective of equality between territories, which became a central point of the national planning narrative in 2012 with the idea of achieving equality between larger cities and rural areas with lower densities. For digital issues, the main challenge is to address the digital divide by reducing the amount of 'white zones' with no digital connectivity. This policy is based on a sharing of space between national operators. The most profitable and least costly areas to cover were defined in return for subsidies to local authorities in the areas that are most expensive to equip and where the prospects of profitability are remote. As a result, financial aid to territories is proportional to their 'rurality' rate. More concretely, territorial digital plans were introduced in 2009 in a law on 'the fight against the digital divide'. These plans are thus added to the corpus of planning documents for major infrastructure. These operational documents define an objective and, even if they are optional, their existence conditions state financial support for local authority projects through the *Fonds d'aménagement numérique des territoires* (FANT – Digital Territorial Development Fund).

The digital divide approach in the construction of digital public policy therefore allows us to observe a very interesting and innovative method of deployment in rural areas, involving a bottom-up perspective by local actors from the public sector but also including the private sector and civil society. In this context, we can mention the 'Smart City versus Stupid Villages' report of 2016 by the *Caisse des dépôts* (Savings Bank), which served as a call to mobilise elected officials to consider digital technology as a catalyst for development in order to encourage innovative projects. We can also mention the networking of local initiatives through the association Internet Cities with their online atlas of more than 2100 local authorities who share 35,000 digital initiatives; the association also awards a label to the local authorities with the most innovative initiatives (following the traditional floral town label). There is thus a strong appropriation of 'smart' perspectives, as reflected in the proactive policy and initiatives by private and civil actors where digital technology provides answers to the specific challenges of rurality (dematerialisation of public services, withdrawal of local services, ageing of the population).

In urban areas, the concept of the smart city is as popular as it is in other Western countries. Thus, the city of Montpellier entrusted IBM with the task of setting up urban control and management tools for a few years, while Nice developed a partnership with Cisco, and finally Angers now has a similar project with ENGIE. There is also experimentation with innovative urban projects that combine smart and ecological dimensions. This is the case in Issy-les-Moulineaux near Paris, which is a pioneer in the deployment of new technologies (Douay 2018). Thus, in 2014, the European Commission and the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Technology published a study on smart city projects implemented in 15 Chinese and 15 European cities. In this ranking, only two French cities – Lyon and Issy-les-Moulineaux – were singled out.

Indeed, as early as 1995, the municipality of Issy-les-Moulineaux deployed the internet in its libraries, created a digital public space and began to establish more direct links between citizens and the administration, with information sharing (the city was the first to broadcast city councils online) and the possibility of requesting documents. The use of new technologies also concerns urban projects with the creation of a smart grid. The IssyGrid project aims to be a full-scale laboratory for experimenting with these new technologies. It was created at the initiative of the municipality and brings together a large number of (often French) urban players such as Bouygues, Alstom, EDF, ERDF, Microsoft, Schneider Electric, Steria and Total, as well as many innovative start-ups. This eco-district in the city's former military fort aims to create 2,000 housing units for 5,000 inhabitants as well as 160,000 m² of office space for 10,000 employees.

In the institutional practice of planning, digital technology is not (yet) integrated into the hierarchy of legal regulations. However, we are seeing the development of strategies that focus wholly or partly on digital approaches. The digital issue is part of wider debates on the evolution of spatial planning practices with the emergence of transitions towards a more sustainable and resilient city (Douay/Minja 2021), so the digital is often presented as one of the possible and complementary paths, with the digital transition complementing the ecological, social, energy and/or democratic transitions. This is the case with the strategic plan *Paris intelligent et durable* (Intelligent and Sustainable Paris) which was prepared in 2015 with the ambition of transforming Paris into a digital city, based on a new method that systematically values citizen participation and co-construction: *‘Les citoyens doivent être au cœur des projets simplement parce qu’ils vivent la ville au quotidien. La co-construction des projets avec toutes les parties prenantes, l’ouverture des données publiques, le soutien sans faille à l’innovation et l’implication personnelle des citoyens pour réagir et proposer des idées sont des éléments essentiels pour construire la ville de demain. Le socle de la ville intelligente conçoit la ville ouverte, comme une plateforme sur laquelle les entrepreneurs, les associations et les citoyens peuvent se connecter.’* (‘Citizens must be at the heart of the projects simply because they live the city on a daily basis. The co-construction of projects with all stakeholders, the opening of public data, the unfailing support for innovation and the personal involvement of citizens to react and propose ideas are essential elements for building the city of tomorrow. The foundation of the intelligent city is the open city, which is conceived as a platform on which entrepreneurs, associations and citizens can connect’) (Gonguet/Rolland 2015). Furthermore, the case of the European Metropolis of Lille is also remarkably interesting with its *‘résolument numérique’* ‘resolutely digital’) strategy. This proposes a shared ambition to give greater visibility to the actions of a group of public and private players involved in the digital transition.

Germany

The start of a deeper focus on information and communication technologies in planning was already seen in the mid-1990s (Ravin 2020; Wiegandt 2018: 958). However, it is widely acknowledged by private and public actors in Germany that the country was slow to embrace digital and smart city policies across all scales of government. In 2019, 95.4% of all German households had access to broadband

connections with at least 16 Mbit/sec, an increase from 87.2% since 2015 (BMVI 2019: 2 et seq.). However, broadband coverage differs vastly between urban areas (99.0%, ca. 23.2 million households), semi-urban areas (93.7%, 13.8 million households) and rural areas (81.9%, 4.4 million households). Germany has witnessed intense engagement in providing the necessary digital infrastructure for smart cities and regions in spatial development and planning policies, though the provision of basic infrastructure was first left to infrastructure providers without guidance from a digital agenda. The federal structure with the guaranteed local self-autonomy of cities and municipalities (Article 28 of the Basic Law) has allowed a multiplicity of ideas and projects. But it has also led to scattered policies, their incoherent implementation, and problems with scaling up good examples. In 2003, initial work began on developing a standard for data collection, management and exchange on planning and building. Since 2017, all public authorities are obliged to work towards using the open standards XPlanung and XBau by 2023, with the aim of making processes smoother, more efficient and more transparent (Leitstelle XPlanung/XBau 2018). Furthermore, four pilot projects, funded by the Federal Ministry for Transport and Digital Infrastructure, have worked on establishing Building Information Modelling (BIM) since 2017 and aim to mainstream it from 2020 onwards for infrastructure and related projects (BMVI 2020). Such standards, open data and interfaces are the groundwork necessary to digitalise planning processes more broadly.

The term smart city emerged mostly in connection with technological infrastructure (broadband connections), the energy transition (smart grids, smart metering), mobility (multimodal transport), and the digitalisation of production (industry 4.0), administration (digital town hall) and communication (social media). More recently, the focus has shifted to include public services, the cohesion between urban and rural areas, supporting equivalent living conditions and a focus on citizen participation. The smart city agenda has broadened to also address inequalities and divergent dynamics within the country and to act as a vehicle to support disadvantaged regions. The coalition agreement of the three ruling parties (electoral period 2017-21) points out the two most important aspects of federal policies: to implement pilot projects and to support cities in their efforts (CDU/CSU/SPD 2018). This explicitly covers smart cities, the Smart Rural Area and relations between cities and hinterlands, but also European and international competitive successes (CDU/CSU/SPD 2018: 47). Furthermore, federal government commits itself to continuing the dialogue platform for smart cities and to funding model projects (ibid.: 113). The major goal is to improve life for all citizens, to hold together the whole country, to take it forward safely and to take up responsibility in Europe and the world. The dialogue platform comprises 70 members of federal ministries, cities and civil society. In 2017, their engagement led to the Smart City Charter that builds the basis of federal engagement until today (BBSR 2017a). This charter aims to develop intelligent cities, building upon the idea of the European City outlined in the Leipzig Charter (BMU 2007) and the New Urban Agenda (UN 2016). Since 2019, the German government has funded 13 model projects throughout Germany in four categories (BMI 2019): large cities (four projects), medium-size cities (three), small cities and villages (four) and intermunicipal cooperations (three). This mirrors the search for a diversity of smart practices. The second round of projects will focus on public interest and the network city / city networks from 2020 onwards (BMI/KfW 2020: 1).

Beyond these federal efforts, many associations and networks involving public institutions, universities, research institutes and private companies are involved in smart city projects. The *SmartCityKompass* (Smart City Compass), based in Hamburg, outlines projects on big data, the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, robotics and more. Furthermore, numerous private actors, associations and research institutes engage in developing or providing smart city solutions, like Deloitte Smart Cities (Deloitte 2020), *Bundesverband Smart City* (Bundesverband Smart City 2020) or *Fraunhofer Morgenstadt* (Morgenstadt 2020). Research, development and implementation projects are often conducted by research institutions or university departments that did not engage much with spatial development and planning policies beforehand.

In 2019, Germany's digital association (*Bitkom*) introduced the Smart City Index 2019 by stating that there is a spirit of departure for smart cities throughout the country (Bitkom 2019: 4). The association represents more than 2700 companies of the digital economy. The analysis included the 81 cities in Germany with more than 100,000 inhabitants and ranked them according to a set of 35 indicators and 96 criteria. Among the five first places are three of the four German cities with more than one million inhabitants (namely: Hamburg first, Berlin fourth, Munich fifth). The study indicates that cities with distinct personnel (chief digital officers), universities and digital strategies score much better; these features are more often found in large cities (ibid: 19 et seq.; European Parliament 2014: 9).

Most high-ranked examples or those that are called 'best practices' have been supported by research projects on state, federal or European level. An important point of departure for Hamburg's smart city agenda has been the mySMARTLife project. Hamburg achieved the status of an EU Lighthouse City with Helsinki and Nantes in 2016 (Späth/Knieling 2018: 346). This project also outlined the necessity to develop legitimacy for smart city policies, to engage with individual citizens and to critically support governance processes. Hamburg first published its strategy for a digital city in 2015. A major update with a new digital strategy was finished in January 2020 with a focus on making Hamburg a fully 'digital city' (Senat Hansestadt Hamburg 2020). Another often-mentioned recent example is the living lab *Lemgo Digital*, run by Fraunhofer in the medium-sized city of Lemgo (41,418 inhabitants) in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The focus of this initiative is on mobility, the environment and an attractive inner city. For rural areas, a good example is the initiative *Digitales Dorf* (digital village), funded by the state of Bavaria since 2017 with five pilot regions. The project is a joint research initiative between TH Deggendorf and groups within the Fraunhofer association. The digital village Spiegelau-Frauenau (Spiegelau: 3,990 inhabitants, Frauenau: 2,713 inhabitants) focuses on providing better living conditions for elderly people with digital solutions, health services in rural areas and a central online platform (Dahoam 4.0) for all inhabitants to support community life. The project targets citizens in their individual living and health conditions as well as fostering a stronger relation to public institutions and services (in this case schools, local village buses and town halls). The broad use of the term 'smart city' entails the danger of it becoming a marketing label that does not yield long-term sustainable

effects (Soike/Libbe 2018: 24). The most recent German debate frames smart city agendas as part of a political and deliberative process that uses technology to benefit the quality of life of all citizens and equivalent living conditions in different regions.

3 Positioning planners in smart city agendas

Smart city agendas crystallise the use of digital technology for more purposes than simply as an analytical tool (such as Geographical Information Systems). Furthermore, they aim to extend the scope of such approaches beyond a focus on digital technologies as a single means and end. This section looks more closely at smart city agendas and examples in France and Germany. It adopts a spatial planning perspective in two steps. First, it sets out where existing planning institutions and strategies take up smart city ideas and how the 'smart' is framed from a planning perspective. The second part then looks at upcoming uses in spatial planning, in discussing spatial plans and in public communication and citizen participation. It sets out the processes of digitalisation in planning itself and the implications for the role of planners.

France

Local actors are using and abusing the term 'smart city' to put forward new imaginaries and new innovative tools. So, planning organisations are already integrating solutions to represent the territory and its environmental issues and simulate development projects in 3D. We also note the development of many start-ups that propose the use of an algorithm to help landowners, real estate professionals and local authorities to identify land opportunities, their constructible potential and their availability. These tools allow the calculation of real estate project opportunities based on real estate market databases and socio-economic activities. These innovations are often supported by public authorities, for example by the French Tech operation which serves as an incubator for these new companies at the national and metropolitan levels. But the start-ups do not always find a market to secure their services and it is often the evolution of regulations that makes it possible to perpetuate such tools, like with the open government movement.

Indeed, some of these innovations are made possible by the democratisation of the different levels of the administration with the opening and transparency of data and especially of decisions. Today, the French approach has three objectives: to improve democratic functioning, to enhance the effectiveness of public action, and to propose new resources for economic and social innovation. The adoption of the Digital Republic Act in 2016 made data openness the rule for all administrations and local authorities, including the various urban plans and all the legal requirements associated with them. In practice, at the national level, the opening of data is sometimes complex when data have usually been monetised. At the local level of urban planning documents, constant progress is seen on the websites of local authorities and, in addition, a national portal makes it possible to centralise all the land-use plans.

More broadly, the government has embarked on a dematerialisation process for the entire procedure of urban planning authorisations, from the user applying for a building permit to the processing of the application. Deployment is ongoing, but it

opens up new perspectives for the integration of BIM solutions on large scales, thus systematising the creation of a digital duplicate of the map and the city using City Information Modelling (CIM) like the platform *3DEXPERIENCECity/Virtual Rennes* made by Dassault Systèmes in Rennes.

Online platforms are also used for the participation process during the preparation or modification of various urban plans. For example, when the City of Paris decided to update its *Plan local d'urbanisme* (PLU – Local Urban Plan) all Parisians were invited to give their opinions on planning principles at public meetings associated with exhibitions. In addition to this classical consultation, an innovative online collaborative platform known as *Imaginons Paris* (Imagine Paris) was made available to the public. This initiative is part of the participatory mapping movement with the flagship example of Open Street Maps. These maps are communicated through different socio-technical devices that correspond to multiple degrees of openness, with a degree of tension between the map-support to participation and the map-product of participation. The first allows ‘understanding’ and brings together a wide range of information and documentation. The second enables ‘participation’ through different devices. Within three months, the site generated 22,838 visits, with 88,553 page views. A total of 2,268 contributions and comments were assembled, of which 981 were from public meetings: 60% from the debate part and 40% from the interactive map part; in addition, 154 questions were asked via the online contact form. Regarding the 1,287 online contributions, there is a tripartition in the use of the site, with 3.6% of visits leading to a contribution, 1.3% to comments and, thus, more than 95% of visits that do not give rise to any concrete action.

Today, digital is at the heart of many narratives on urban development. The changes are numerous, often widespread but still quite significant. The digital city allows the advent of more sustainable or participatory urban planning with a new narrative, but it is also more often subject to the influences of large private groups or the temptations of citizen surveillance.

Germany

In the German spatial planning debate, the term ‘smart city’ is still comparatively new and encompasses older attempts at digitalising and harmonising data collection, management and exchange within public administrations. The landscape of actors (private and research bodies) that engage in spatial issues has widened and planning is challenged to position itself in a coordinating role. In the early years, much of the debate was driven by private companies and some frontrunners (Soike/Libbe 2018: 4). Other digitalisation aspects, such as BIM, have not yet scaled up to a larger urban level (BMI 2020). For example, the recent pocket dictionary on spatial development and planning (ARL – 2018) does not include smart city or digital city among the 284 terms and concepts explained. Smart cities are part of information and communication technologies (Wiegandt 2018). For planners, smart cities mean dealing with the consequences of technologies on spatial structures (ibid.: 960). Smart city agendas extend their scale from individual examples to a comprehensive spatial agenda. Studies like Wiechmann/Terfrüchte (2017: 8) point to the benefits of supporting economic development and providing public services, especially in rural areas. The federal

Raumordnungsbericht (Spatial Planning Report) of 2017 makes only a few references to digital and smart city policies. It points to the importance of broadband infrastructure, digital opportunities for mobility solutions (BBSR 2017b: 106) and potentials for providing public services, especially in rural areas (ibid.: 122). This debate on smart villages, smart regions or a smart countryside is the most recent one. A major task is still to connect especially low-density rural areas to high-speed internet connections (BMVI 2019).

The most recent call for model projects of smart cities in 2020 uses an encompassing definition of smart cities that almost mirrors definitions of sustainable and participatory planning (BMI/KfW 2020: 1). The importance that is given to actors, networks, responsible development and its social, economic and spatial consequences in a network of cities could put planners in a central managing role. However, whereas smart city agendas usually refer to spatial aspects, they focus less on spatial plans. The smart city is framed as a city of movement, of flows and of connections – both in large cities like Hamburg and in medium-size cities like Lemgo. Open, adaptive, flexible, agile, even algorithmic management challenges the established roles of planners in cities. Large platform operators like Airbnb, Uber and, in 2019, the emergence of e-scooters in most larger cities have proved how spatially relevant large platform operators can be and how difficult it is for local authorities and planners to provide coherent answers. Furthermore, the digitalisation of citizen participation and planning processes themselves and the use of virtual and augmented reality are agenda points for the upcoming years (Dembski/Wössner/Letzgus et al. 2020), probably much boosted by the COVID-19 crisis in 2020.

The *Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen* (WBGU – German Advisory Council on Global Change) entitled its recent flagship report ‘Towards our Common Digital Future’ (WBGU 2019) and proposes ‘a holistic approach to digitalization in the context of the sustainable development of our civilization, which is under threat from many sides – an approach that has been missing up to now’ (ibid.: 1). The report reminds federal government to include dystopian and utopian discourses in an extended view on sustainability and human beings therein (ibid.: 4), with an especial emphasis on positioning human dignity at the core of a process to make digitalisation sustainable (ibid.: 17). At the same time, the German academic planning debate also analyses the downsides of smart cities, emergent injustices, privacy and tracking concerns, and problems with an open city and local democracy and control (Novy 2015; Bauriedl/Strüver 2018).

4 Smart cities and regions in the making – a comparative view

Smart city and spatial planning agendas started as separate agendas that slowly intertwined. The following section will look at four main aspects of smart cities in comparison. Attention is then directed to more specifically uncovering the role of planners in these policies. Smart cities are an increasingly political agenda in France and in Germany. Developing smart cities has extended from the increased use of technologies and pilot projects to a comprehensive agenda. In many regards, both

countries must deal with similar opportunities and challenges posed by digital technologies, companies and global platforms. On the other hand, these are mediated differently through national political and planning systems and a more centralised approach in France versus a much-decentralised agenda in Germany.

Smart cities in comparison

Regarding digital platforms (such as Airbnb, Uber, Bird) and emerging start-ups, both countries are characterised by a scattered landscape of reactions. Some digital start-ups, e.g. in the field of multimodal mobility and the Internet of Things (IoT), provide high user value and high potential for organising cities. Others, e.g. in the field of rent sharing and ride sharing, are intensively contested for their effects on urban development. Many initiatives have started to regulate or control platforms, but cities struggle to keep up with change and spatial impacts. Spatial scales diverge between global companies on the one hand and decentralised local reactions on the other. Second, large technology companies (such as SIEMENS and Dassault), big construction groups (like Vinci and Bouygues), energy companies (like EDF and ENGIE) and associations of these companies (such as Bitkom in Germany and AFNUM in France) are continually active in France and in Germany promoting, developing and implementing smart city ideas. They are strong and powerful actors who work with research bodies and explore technological options that provide a business model. Many such initiatives are in large international cities or the wealthier parts of the countries (e.g. Hamburg in Germany and Paris, Lyon or Nice in France). Commitment and investment are successful in a combination of public or private research, private enterprises and city governments that are committed to technological smart city agendas. In the French context, interaction between public and private is made by state engagement through examples like *La French Tech* which recognises cities for their start-up ecosystems.

A major third part of smart city policies works on citizens, participation and democracy. Governments in both countries have high hopes of more inclusive and participatory developments through smart cities and especially smart villages and smart regions. The more recent German pilot projects focus on demographic change, easing urban/rural divides, the use of new tools for participation and the increasing use of online and social media communication. France has witnessed a similar development that was much boosted by the *gilets jaunes* (yellow vests) protests in 2019. In the aftermath, the big national debate included online fora, and this hybrid system became the standard for every larger reform, such as that of the retirement system more recently. Lastly, smart cities in France and Germany put a strong emphasis on the provision of public services, on open government (e-government) and on public transparency and accountability. This includes strategies to provide open data portals and standardised data exchanges, but also increasing BIM and CIM implementation projects in both countries. France and Germany have national guidelines for their open data policy. Smart city ideas are used to improve decision making with better evidence. They also allow for smoother relations between citizens and public administrations, and the accessing of public administrations without physical contacts (e-government). Such strategies are especially put forward for rural and remote areas, though these areas struggle more with implementation. Smart cities need investment first, both for

infrastructure and software and for enhancing the skills of people involved. Whereas initial projects often started in large cities, the French and German governments now support more projects in small villages.

Planners in smart cities

Planners take four different stances on smart city development. The most established approach is adapting spatial structures to technological developments and the digital transformation of society (Wiegandt 2018: 960 et seq.). Planners are passive actors in that they first observe the ongoing transformation and then adjust with their tools and instruments as much as possible. In Germany, planning instruments foster the provision of infrastructures for a digitalising society and use these to promote equivalent living conditions and the provision of public services (BBSR 2017b). The second option is to build new alliances with research bodies and technology companies to actively use the advantages for planning. Such efforts are often driven by private actors, and focus on technologies (sensors, automation, mobility) and on agendas of economic change and competitiveness. In this way, planners take an active role and participate in processes of decision making where technologically developed answers are increasingly relevant. Initial projects in German cities are starting to make use of urban digital twins and representations in virtual reality, as in the recent case of the town of Herrenberg (31,456 inhabitants) in the state of Baden-Württemberg (Dembski/Wössner/Letzgus et al. 2020). Pilots are moving towards CIM applications and the digital is becoming central to planning as some cities continue to develop strong smart city strategies.

The third approach is to put a strong emphasis on citizens, on public services and on integrated spatial development, and to frame these efforts within a more digital and smart approach. In this way, planners keep a central role in bringing together diverse ideas, mediating them, and taking them forward for spatial change, e.g. in the name of sustainable development (Meschede/Mainka 2020). This approach is at the core of the federal smart city agenda in Germany. The digital is becoming supportive to planning, but it requires distinct knowledge by planners. In France, the *Centre national de la fonction publique territoriale* (CNFPT – National Centre of Territorial Public Service) (in charge of ongoing training for territorial civil servants) has made digital technology one of its training priorities. The fourth stance refers to planners working in public administrations who may well have the most critical opinions of smart city developments. However, though progress differs vastly across cities in France and Germany, there is little evidence of cities and planners deliberately opposing smart city agendas at all.

5 Outlook

The use of digital technologies in spatial planning in France and Germany continues to follow a territorial and comprehensive agenda that differs from the technologically driven agenda of many (early) smart city applications. Smart cities in spatial planning are as much about equivalent living conditions or territorial cohesion as they are about the implementation and use of new technologies. Digital infrastructures and fast and

reliable broadband access are a major precondition for any digital tools and digital ways of organising cities. Providing equivalent access to all citizens in large cities and remote areas remains a cornerstone in France and Germany, with France taking a more centralised approach to implementing smart city ideas and Germany a decentralised one. In both cases, smart city agendas and spatial planning are more closely integrated today than in past years. New technologies and tools have great potential to open planning up to all citizens and to foster a democratic debate. The smart city therefore needs to be an open city, in line with what Sennett also calls a coordinative smart city (Sennett 2018: 164). At the same time, policymakers must be aware of digital divides, both spatially (urban vs rural areas, small vs large cities) and socially (rich vs poor citizens, old vs young people). Digital tools need skilled users who can use them in a public debate for collective decision making, especially if more encompassing tools like BIM and CIM enter planning debates (Sielker/Sichel/Allmendinger 2019).

To position planning and the role of planners in light of the recent generation of digital technologies, digital skills for using tools and for communicating are essential for any future planner. This also represents a task for planning education, which should integrate emerging technologies and be open, experimental and critical towards dynamically evolving technology. Contemporary discussions range from overtly cyberoptimistic (and utopian) scenarios to deeply cyberpessimistic (and dystopian) ones. Combining real and virtual spaces in planning thought, through tools like CIM or digital twins, offers opportunities for an enriched debate of urban futures (Dembski/Wössner/Letzgus et al. 2020; Sielker/Sichel/Allmendinger 2019; Yamu/Poplin/Devisch et al. 2017). At the same time, fears of centralised control, of algorithmic governance and a developing technocracy need to be taken seriously (Raco/Savini 2019; Sennett 2018; WBGU 2019). For spatial planning, it is not only about using new digital technologies. The debate moves towards questions of making planning digital as such.

During the COVID-19 pandemic since spring 2020 everybody's lives and methods of organisation and communication suddenly changed. Partial and full lockdowns due to the spread of COVID-19 have shown the vast potential of a broader and deeper digital transformation. Technology has proved to be a crucial aspect of preparedness for economic and health shocks and vital for immediate reactions. Only digital tools made it possible to organise and stay connected with others, especially in different cities and countries, during lockdown times. This digital potential extended to the development of this chapter in spring 2020. On the other hand, the crisis has underlined the ongoing value of physical human interaction, of meeting people and seeing faces. On the positive side, the coronavirus unveiled solidarity and neighbourhood action and provided a boost for the use of digital tools at all levels of daily life. On the negative side, the crisis opened debates on rising inequalities in society, on the limits of digital education and on dystopias of digital control (e.g. through tracing apps). This simultaneous process of centralising control (in platforms and in large infrastructures) and decentralising action to local collectives and citizens will shape future debates. The pandemic has made it more obvious than any event before that future planning will be digital in all its parts, but that this process needs careful management and the strong involvement of people in cities, villages and rural areas.

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CROSS-BORDER TERRITORIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY: EVOLUTION, CONVERGENCE AND PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract

Over the past thirty years, new forms and mechanisms of governance have multiplied in the border regions of Europe. The French-German border has seemed to distinguish itself as an early adopter of new cooperation frameworks, often instigated by developments on the European level on the one hand and by bilateral national cooperation on the other hand. This paper delivers an analysis of French and German policies for territorial cooperation, and of the evolution of cross-border cooperation between the two countries. Taking the example of the Greater Region and the Upper-Rhine Region, we scrutinise two different representations of cross-border institutionalisation in-depth. We then discuss the renewed prospects for border regions stemming from the bilateral French-German Aachen Treaty. Following this analysis, we make use of three conceptual lenses – multi-level governance, soft spaces and inter-territoriality – to reflect on the evolution of territorial cooperation across this border. In conclusion, our reflections on the French-German situation inspire recommendations for a next phase in the development of European cross-border cooperation.

Keywords

Cross-border cooperation – France – Germany – Treaty of Aachen – soft spaces – inter-territoriality – multi-level governance

1 Introduction

Since the European declaration made by Robert Schumann on 9 May 1950, France and Germany have been driving forces of the European integration process. Recently, on 22 January 2019, the Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration – The Treaty of Aachen – was signed, highlighting the ongoing collaboration and putting cross-border cooperation at the forefront by envisaging more competences, resources and faster procedures for the implementation of projects. This development encourages us to revisit the evolution of cross-border territorial cooperation at the French-German border, to analyse trends and processes of convergence, and to open up perspectives on other European border regions.

The shaping and reshaping of cooperation across the French-German border has advanced rapidly over the past decades. This has been in line with the dynamically changing European institutional and legal frameworks, but has also involved important bilateral and national initiatives that shape the understanding of regional cooperation. On the European level, pan-European policies such as the Territorial Agendas and Cohesion Policy provide the broader background for territorial cooperation goals. In this context multiple new forms and mechanisms of governance in and for border regions have emerged over the past thirty years, providing a significant background to understanding the French-German developments. European integration encouraged the progressive consolidation of networks of actors into more or less institutionalised cooperative organisations under varying names and labels such as Euroregions, Eurodistricts or Eurometropolises. The process of European integration furthered this phenomenon, in particular through the early development of Euroregions, which from 1990 have been linked to cross-border EU territorial cooperation funding programmes such as the INTERREG programmes and today are closely associated with the implementation of the EU's Cohesion Policy goals. More recently, the EU has supported integration in border regions through the provision of legal frameworks, such as the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation, and the recent suggestion to develop a European mechanism to overcome legal and administrative obstacles in border regions (ECBM – European Cross-Border Mechanism). The development of these manifold cooperation platforms and policies provides an important backbone for cross-border cooperation, which is further complemented by bilateral initiatives.

Against this background, we aim first to analyse the evolution of territorial and cross-border cooperation at the French-German border and, second, to examine the specificities of cross-border cooperation using conceptual lenses. We then trace the evolution of cooperation across the border, which has developed within two main areas: the Greater Region and the Upper Rhine Region. Based on these elaborations we discuss the prospects for French-German collaboration ushered in by the new Aachen Treaty. Reflecting more broadly, we mobilise three main theoretical lenses: soft spaces (Allmendinger/Haughton 2009), multi-level governance (Hooghe/Marks 2001) and inter-territoriality (Vanier 2008). Soft spaces describe the co-existence of hard administrative spaces with overlapping soft areas of cooperation where stakeholders tackle specific functional relations. Such spaces can incorporate areas of 'soft territorial cooperation' (ESPON ACTAREA 2018) or 'project territories'. Multi-

level governance describes the policymaking processes across the different levels and scales of government, both horizontally and vertically. Inter-territoriality (Vanier 2008) aims for an 'optimum' of cooperation across spatial scales and governance modalities to approach certain planning issues. These three lenses, while having significant conceptual overlaps, allow the pinpointing of the particularities and varieties of French-German border regional cooperation across scales, themes, competences and narratives, thereby opening new perspectives on other border regions in Europe.

We conclude that the French-German border seems to distinguish itself from other European borders in two ways. First, it has proven to be an early adopter of new cooperation frameworks, often instigated by developments on the European level on the one hand and by bilateral national cooperation on the other hand. We argue that the French-German border exemplifies how soft forms of governance co-exist with the use of legal and administrative tools or hard forms of governance to overcome concrete obstacles, and how, furthermore, cross-border cooperation involves multi-level and inter-territorial dynamics between the local, regional, national and European levels.

2 The consolidation of cross-border cooperation in the EU: policy, financial and legal frameworks

2.1 Policy, financial and legal frameworks for cross-border cooperation in the EU

Territorial cooperation between local authorities has been at the core of intense reflection between European countries for more than 30 years (Dühr/Colomb/Nadin 2010; Wassenberg/Reitel/Peyrony et al. 2015). The objective was to build networks across Europe, to improve understanding of national practices of spatial planning and find inspiration from them where appropriate, but also to cooperate with neighbouring countries and develop European policies, in particular at the cross-border scale and with the support of the EU cohesion policy (Perrin 2021).

Cross-border cooperation was led by consolidated networks of actors and enabled the establishment of more or less institutionalised cooperative organisations, such as Euroregions, Eurodistricts, Eurometropolises, macro-regions or alike. The process of European integration fostered these phenomena. The Madrid Outline Convention of the Council of Europe encouraged such cooperation as early as 1980. From 1990, building on the pioneering work of the Council of Europe in the framework of the Conference of Ministers responsible for Spatial/Regional Planning (CEMAT), EU Member States, with the support of the Commission, began an intergovernmental process in the field of spatial planning. This led in 1999 to the approval of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) and in 2002 to the creation of the ESPON programme: European Spatial Planning Observatory Network. Reiterated by the Territorial Agendas of 2007 and 2011, which were updated during the German EU Presidency of 2020 with the Territorial Agenda 2030, the discussions focused in particular on the concepts of balanced territorial development and polycentrism,

which imply in particular cooperation between cities and urban-rural partnerships. Progressively, the EU level took up these themes, with the inclusion of 'territorial cohesion' in the Treaty in 2007 and the publication of the Green Paper on territorial cohesion in 2008 (Peyrony 2014, Peyrony 2018). The urban agenda of 2015 is another indicator of EU involvement in planning and urban policies. In parallel to these dedicated territorial or regional policies, the EU advanced the cohesion goals and impacts on national and local planning decisions through funding schemes and directives in other spatially relevant sectoral policies, in particular in transport, energy, climate, maritime affairs and agriculture (Sielker 2018a).

In these policy documents and guidance, the cooperation between sub-state authorities, or territorial cooperation, is considered as a core modality to link territorial development and European construction. This is particularly the case for cross-border cooperation, which develops in response to functional issues that connect both sides of an inter-state boundary. The Madrid Outline Convention and the ESDP, for example, have been linked to cross-border and transnational EU territorial cooperation funding programmes such as the INTERREG programmes, launched in the 1990s, which have since followed an incremental evolution both in terms of budget and territorial scope. They have progressively covered three different scales of cooperation: cross-border, transnational and interregional – the latter referring to territorial networks with or without territorial contiguity. They have redesigned the European map and strengthened synergies within European regions that transcend traditional state borders. Since 2009, four European macro-regions have also developed, which aim to provide strategic guidance for a more targeted use of funding through transnational thematic cooperation (Sielker 2016).

The EU has nearly 40 internal border regions at NUTS 3 level, covering 40 % of its territory and accounting for nearly 30 % of its population (COM 2017). While there were only about 30 such regions in the early 1990s, the latest report cites more than 150 'active Euroregions' (Durà/Camonita/Berzi et al. 2018), not all of which are legal entities such as the ones resulting from the Madrid Outline convention or the EU's European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs). With EGTCs (COM 2006), the EU increasingly aims to support integration within border regions through the provision of legal frameworks, and most recently the proposal of a European mechanism to overcome legal and administrative obstacles (COM 2018).

The bodies that implement cross-border cooperation are only more or less formalised or institutionalised, unlike their constituent authorities that have well-defined legal statutes and competences and fixed geographical administrative borders. Territorial cooperation thus links formal and circumscribed governance units with more informal and contingent organisations that cover spaces with variable and potentially evolving boundaries. Despite the establishment of dedicated statutes such as the EGTC, these organisations do not replace the units or authorities that are members of them. Indeed, the delimitation of national borders and internal territorial organisation are fundamental attributes of the sovereignty of each state. The development of these manifold cooperation platforms and policies provides an important backbone for cross-border cooperation, which is further complemented by bilateral initiatives.

2.2 Cross-border cooperation in France and Germany

In Germany, the 16 federal states or *Länder* are the primary authorities for planning and territorial development. Nevertheless, they maintain continuous cooperation with the national departments. In 1995, 11 *Europäische Metropolregionen* (European Metropolitan Regions) were defined with the aim to adjust planning schemes or policies at the scale of functional regions (Kawka 2016). In 2011, border regions received attention when the German authorities in cross-border metropolitan regions created a network at the federal level: *Initiativkreis Metropolitane Grenzregionen* (Initiative Group of German Regions in Cross-Border Functional Regions) (BMVBS 2013). The underlying rationale is that cross-border employment and trans-European transport and energy networks have grown considerably since the integration of the European market in 1957. Territorial development can no longer be managed from a purely national perspective.

Yet, many challenges and obstacles remain. As a result, the German federal government has been working on pilot projects to contribute to cross-border territorial development. The Concepts and Strategies for Spatial Development in Germany that the federal states and the federal level approved in 2016 emphasise cross-border cooperation and highlight the potential of European cross-border integration (BMVBI 2016).

The French case is characterised by very progressive but delayed territorial reforms, especially regarding the creation of metropolitan government (see Demazière et al. 2022).

Three of the *métropoles* (metropolises) created in 2015 have a European cross-border remit: Lille, Strasbourg and Nice. They are required to elaborate a specific planning scheme, a *Schéma de coopération transfrontalière* (Cross-Border Cooperation Scheme) that must define a strategy and design a roadmap for cooperation and projects with partner authorities in their cross-border area. In addition, some *pôles métropolitains* (metropolitan poles, see Demazière et al. 2022) are located on borders and actively take part in cross-border strategy: Sillon Lorrain, Genevois français.

Taken together, France and Germany thus illustrate how planning requires a combination of institutional and functional approaches. Comparing these cases is all the more revealing as the two countries have developed different – but not incompatible – approaches to planning issues, and aim to link them along their common border.

3 French-German cross-border cooperation: appraisal and inflexions

3.1 Cooperation schemes and entities

Since the Bonn Agreements of 1975, the border between France and Germany has been the subject of intensive cross-border cooperation. This cooperation is structured around two Euroregions that will be analysed in more depth: the Upper Rhine Region

in the Rhine basin and the Greater Region in the basin formed by the Moselle and the Saar (see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Cross-border cooperation between France and Germany / Source: Mission opérationnelle transfrontalière, <http://www.espaces-transfrontaliers.org> (9 December 2021)

The entities involved in the cooperation thus extend beyond the French-German border, encompassing Switzerland in the case of the Upper Rhine, and Luxembourg and Belgium in the case of the Greater Region. The two areas have active cooperation bodies and stakeholders at the regional level, but also at the local level at which Eurodistricts have been set up, dating from the 2003 French-German summit that celebrated 40 years of the Élysée Treaty. Two of them form integrated urban agglomerations: the Basel Trinational Eurodistrict and the Strasbourg-Ortenau Eurodistrict. Three other cross-border bodies at local level are the SaarMoselle Eurodistrict, the Regio Pamina Eurodistrict and the Freiburg Region-Central and Southern Alsace Eurodistrict. With the exception of the Basel Trinational Eurodistrict, they have the status of EGTCs.

The Upper Rhine

The scope of institutional cooperation is identical to that of the INTERREG programme. At the local level, the four Eurodistricts are contiguous and cover almost all of the Upper Rhine territory. Finally, the Upper Rhine has a dense network of medium-sized cities. The specificity of the Upper Rhine territory is the overlapping of different cross-border perimeters and themes, as illustrated by Figure 2.




Figure 2: Institutional Mapping of Trinational Metropolitan Region Upper Rhine /Source: ESPON ACTAREA (2018)

The Trinational Metropolitan Region Upper Rhine (*Région métropolitaine trinationale du Rhin supérieur / Trinationale Metropolregion am Oberrhein*) overlaps with the Upper Rhine Conference, the four Eurodistricts, the agglomeration of Basel and the Euregio Basel. Interactions between these structures remain limited and a certain illegibility of the different bodies persists. In addition, contacts between Euroregional (Conference, Council) and local (Eurodistricts) cooperation bodies are limited. Cross-border cooperations are also weakly linked with each other, as well as with higher-level authorities or government services.

Following the ESPON project Metroborder (ESPON 2010), which concomitantly supported a similar strategy in the Greater Region, the trilateral metropolitan region, illustrated by the green area in Figure 2, was set up to simplify and rationalise the cooperation area, to optimise governance, to improve the links between cooperation scales and to integrate the political, economic, research and civil society dimensions (Pupier 2019). This requires work on complementarity and adjustment between existing bodies by redefining their roles and scope, in particular the Rhine Council and the Upper Rhine Conference. In addition, the Trilateral Metropolitan Region aims to improve multi-level coordination by taking into account networks (economic actors, civil society, Upper Rhine Cities Network) and local cooperation territories and structures (Eurodistricts).

The Greater Region

The governance of the Greater Region shows more national-level involvement than on other borders, in particular due to the involvement of the 'state-region' Luxembourg in the partnership, with several cooperation bodies formed at Euroregional scale: the Executive Summit, the Interregional Parliamentary Council, the Economic and Social Committee. The Summit, as the body representing the executives of the regions and Luxembourg, set up a permanent secretariat with a dedicated team to ensure the sustainability of initiatives beyond the rotating presidencies. The existence of a body of elected representatives and another bringing together socio-economic actors is rather rare. However, quite similarly to conditions in the Upper Rhine, the large number of structures leads to entanglements and duplication, especially on the level of working groups. This situation progressively underlined the necessity to draw up a concrete strategy for the Greater Region and to move from political intent to operational action.

The partners of the Greater Region launched the *Région métropolitaine polycentrique transfrontalière / Grenzüberschreitende polyzentrische Metropolregion* (Polycentric Transborder Metropolitan Region) project with the aim of rationalising governance and improving communication, coherence and complementarity between cooperative bodies and schemes. The ESPON project Metroborder, German domestic policy developments and the MORO projects presented above stimulated this approach. In the Greater Region, the main objective is to provide the area with a critical mass by relying on the structuring networks of medium-sized cities and on rural areas and natural spaces that offer diversified economic and socio-cultural resources. It is thus important to ensure the links between the 'greater-regional' scale and cross-border entities at the local level, like the Eurodistrict Saar Moselle or the EGTC Alzette Belval. This strategy can inform an overall vision of spatial planning and foster thematic issues such as academic cooperation in the form of the University of the Greater Region; environmental issues like river protection, cross-border water treatment plants and the promotion of biodiversity in nature parks; transport; culture and other issues.

Moreover, different views have developed in the area about whether the Greater Region should focus on dealing with the whole institutional territory of the polycentric region or concentrate on Luxembourg and its functional urban area, so as to better manage its cross-border spillovers and initiate the necessary co-development

strategy. Planning stakeholders of the Greater Region are currently involved in an INTERREG project to draw up a spatial plan for the region (*Schéma de développement territorial de la Grande Région / Raumentwicklungskonzept der Großregion*).

For around ten years it has thus been possible to observe that new approaches of cross-border polycentric metropolitan regions have developed in the two main areas of French-German cross-border cooperation. Germany took the lead with its MORO pilot projects, coordinated with European approaches, while France has so far concentrated on territorial reforms concerning regions and cities (including metropolises) with, as far as cross-border aspects are concerned, greater attention being paid to urban agglomerations, reflecting their weight in the French territorial system. These new approaches are now reinforced by the bi-national Aachen Treaty.

3.2 Renewed prospects: from the Aachen Treaty to the EU Cross-Border Mechanism

On 22 January 2019 in Aachen, Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron signed a new treaty on cooperation and integration between Germany and France. This agreement extends the Élysée Treaty of 1963 with a real strategy of convergence. It reaffirms the strength of the French-German alliance and asserts the will to give concrete form to a closer relationship and a common commitment to European integration.

The Aachen Treaty marks a real recognition of cross-border cooperation as a central element in European construction, with Chapter IV of the Treaty being entirely devoted to this topic. Its main objective is the elimination of cross-border obstacles to facilitate the implementation of projects and simplify the daily lives of border region inhabitants. To this end, ‘the two countries shall provide local authorities in border regions and cross-border entities such as Eurodistricts with appropriate competences, dedicated resources and accelerated procedures to overcome obstacles to the implementation of cross-border projects’; and ‘if no other instrument allows them to overcome such obstacles, adapted legal and administrative provisions, including derogations, may also be provided for’ (Chapter IV, Article 13, Paragraph 2). The treaty focuses on Eurodistricts as they are products of French-German cooperation, while the two Euroregions involve other states.

The setting-up of a Franco-German Cross-Border Cooperation Committee is one of the treaty’s flagship measures. It comprises ‘such stakeholders as national, regional and local authorities, parliaments and cross-border entities such as Eurodistricts and, where necessary, the Euroregions concerned. This Committee shall coordinate all aspects of cross-border observation (...), draw up a common strategy for identifying priority projects, monitor difficulties encountered in border regions and elaborate proposals to address them, as well as analyse the impact of new legislation in border regions’ (Chapter IV, Article 14).

While the Elysée Treaty triggered controversy about its compatibility with European structures, the Aachen Treaty insists in the preamble that French-German cooperation promotes ‘European unity, efficiency and cohesion’, and is ‘open to all Member States of the EU’ (ibidi.). This is also true for Chapter IV on cross-border cooperation. This is manifest, for instance, in the field of the cross-border monitoring that France and Germany propose to develop on all their borders, joining their efforts in a European perspective (BBSR/MOT 2019). The first implementation of the Treaty’s objectives was the establishment of the European Territorial Authority of Alsace with a specific cross-border remit, as presented below.

The renewed French-German agenda for cross-border cooperation echoes the proposal of the European Commission in its draft regulations for ‘a mechanism to resolve legal and administrative obstacles in a cross-border context’ (COM 2018). The regulation is based on an initiative taken by the Luxemburg EU Presidency in 2015 that set up, with the support of France and the MOT, a working group involving around ten states, EU institutions and stakeholders (MOT 2017). Such a mechanism would allow ‘a common cross-border region, in a given Member State’ to apply ‘the legal provisions from the neighbouring Member State if applying its own laws would present a legal obstacle to implementing a joint project’, under the control of the states concerned and for a cross-border project (COM 2018, Chapter 1). The regulation would also make it compulsory to create cross-border coordination points at national or regional level, facilitating joint action on each border to resolve obstacles and working with the existing European cross-border coordination point (ibidi.). This represents an innovation in terms of designing a multi-level architecture for overcoming obstacles. The proposal, which could represent a critical juncture in the development path of EU cross-border cooperation, still needs to be validated by the European Council and Parliament. If validated this mechanism will represent a paradigm shift, ‘empowering border areas to manage their own integration (functional-horizontal) and institutionalise a policy pathway for resolving border-specific legal or administrative obstacles (institutional-vertical)’ (Engl/Evrard 2019). Yet, since its inception the proposal has at times faced fierce critique and numerous concerns have been raised regarding legal justification, state sovereignty, compliance with the subsidiarity and proportionality principle, thematic and territorial scope, voluntariness and the administrative burden (Sielker 2018b). Though German experts were proactive in the working group that developed the ECBM concept, the position of Germany in official negotiations in the Council has so far been half-hearted (information dated May 2021), while the European Parliament has (with some changes to the legal text) agreed to take the proposal to the next step – insisting on the role of a network of cross-border coordination points. The French government has supported the initiative and the current state agenda considers that, beyond the traditional *égalité républicaine* (republican equality), differentiation and experimentation are core dimensions of territorial development and governance, including in border areas, as seen with the *Collectivité européenne d’Alsace* (European Collectivity of Alsace) (see Section 3.1).

In May 2021, after a meeting of the Council group in charge, the Portuguese Presidency concluded that a majority of Member States wished the withdrawal of the text. The Commission and the Parliament will continue the discussion. So, the exact shape and form that this proposal will take remains unclear. In this sense, the provisions of the Aachen Treaty appear to be at the forefront of such an evolution.

At the same time, the French-German case raises issues about the institutional evolution of cross-border bodies, like EGTCs for instance, which are not supposed to have specific competences. The members of an EGTC conduct their tasks within the scope of their common capacity. The perspective of further cross-border integration, such as that designed by the Aachen Treaty, raises the question of whether EGTCs or equivalent cross-border bodies should receive specific competences (for instance, to manage public services), under democratic control – as Germany always insists.

Overall, we can assert that while Germany and France share common objectives within the Aachen Treaty, they do not draw on the same background. For the German side, cross-border entities could be provided with real competences on condition that representatives were elected by universal suffrage at the cross-border level. The Karlsruhe agreement (1996)¹ already stated that German federal states can in certain cases transfer sovereign competences to local institutions of cooperation, providing the conditions of internal law are met. In France, Sylvain Waserman (2018), the French MP who drew up a report for the French government to prepare the Aachen Treaty, advocated providing cross-border local authorities with exclusive competences and their own fiscal resources (*Établissements publics de coopération intercommunale [EPCI] transfrontaliers* – Cross-border Public Body for Intermunicipal Cooperation). This proposal was not retained by the French negotiators, who objected that it would not be compatible with the French constitution.

Are functional arrangements the ultimate model for European territorial cooperation, or does this model lack a real cross-border democratic dimension? Cross-border regions are emblematic arenas to explore and test social and political evolution. Such perspectives imply a new way to look at Europe, not from the capitals but from peripheries and borders (Balibar 2009), as places to resolve contradictions between states, and to invent shared or post sovereignty. The Treaty of Aachen and the new regulation proposed by the Commission intend to tackle such issues.

4 Reflections on the French-German cross-border experiences through three conceptual lenses: soft spaces, multi-level governance and inter-territoriality

These policy orientations and territorial evolutions were informed and influenced by diverse theoretical inputs from different academic fields with, on the one hand, some key concepts from planning theory and political science, and, on the other hand, the formation of the cross-cutting scientific field of border studies. The evolution and outcomes of the Franco-German cooperation illustrate three conceptualisations in particular, all of which have been repeatedly taken up by practitioners and urban academics or territorial thinkers of various disciplines to theorise cross-regional and cross-national collaboration: soft spaces, multi-level governance and inter-territoriality (see Table 1).

1 https://www.euroinstitut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/02_Ueber_Uns/Struktur/Accord_Karlsruhe_Karlsruher_Ubereinkommen.pdf (14.12.2021).

	Multi-level governance	Soft spaces	Inter-territoriality
Origin in field of research	Political science	Spatial planning	Spatial planning, political geography
Key message	<p>Differentiation between two types of multi-level governance, overriding the dominance of government on administrative scales:</p> <p>I: Small number of nested jurisdictions serving a general purpose in a hierarchical order (Russian doll set) and with responsibility towards mutually exclusive territories, (institutional).</p> <p>II: Task-specific cooperation, fluid, with intersecting memberships aiming to solve problems or provide services, functional arrangements with many, often overlapping units (functional approach).</p>	<p>Soft spaces describe the co-existence of hard (administrative) spaces and fluid, functional, relational spaces.</p> <p>Spatial planning, a discipline which ultimately is linked to legal specifications over use of space, did not follow the presumption that relational and networked spaces are the future. Instead, the argument developed that both types of spaces will co-exist.</p>	<p>Combination of the territorial and relational approaches to planning spaces and areas. Attempt to reconcile and combine 'fixed' territories (of policies) and 'mobile' networks (of life).</p> <p>Pluralities of both experienced and perceived territorialities. Daily lives cross residential, professional, recreational or service areas and places.</p> <p>Interconnection between these diverse spatial occupations and usages has been facilitated by the improvement of mobility and communication.</p> <p>The interweaving of life and policy territories calls for a reconfiguration of planning systems with more coordination and linkages between stakeholders and institutions to implement common policies in a relevant common area.</p>

	Multi-level governance	Soft spaces	Inter-territoriality
Foundation in theoretical debates	Governance, authority over jurisdictions, distribution of policy competence, European integration.	Territoriality (relational, network and territorial, administrative conceptualisations)	
Key authors	Hooghe/Marks 2001	Allmendinger/ Haughton 2009	Vanier 2008
Commonalities	Reflection on the co-production of government and policies across scales Role of spatial planning and territorial cooperation to respond to a situation of coopacity: adjust policy schemes to multi-scale and multi-actor ensembles that bridge institutional boundaries without changing institutional and policy prerogatives.		

Table 1: Overview of theoretical concepts /Source: authors' elaboration

4.1 Soft spaces

The concepts of 'soft spaces' (developed by Allmendinger/Haughton in 2009) and 'soft planning' are particularly insightful when considering cross-border ensembles with fuzzy boundaries, which are set up at diverse scales or for specific development operations and which often overlap administrative or institutionalised hard boundaries. Soft spaces refer to a flexible and potentially evolving delimitation of regions, depending on the objectives pursued and the partners involved (Allmendinger/ Haughton 2009; Allmendinger/Chilla/Sielker 2014). These overlap with the existing hard spaces and may be temporary or may 'harden' (Metzger/Schmitt 2012). It did not take long until the concept of soft spaces was used to explain developments at the European scale. Paasi (2012) argued that border studies were being reanimated through debates on soft spaces, overcoming the traditional territorial-relational divide. Faludi (2013) and Sielker (2014) used the concept to explain macro-regional cooperation across the EU. Sielker (2014) raises the argument that, building on the soft spaces literature, one can understand borders as 'soft borders', where new, sometimes flexible borders develop alongside territorial or national ones.

Allmendinger, Chilla and Sielker (2014) argue that soft spaces offer an opportunity for re-territorialisation, and that actors on the European scale use these fuzzy frameworks for agenda-setting activities. Yet, taking a relational view towards territory and cross-border cooperation, following Nienaber and Wille (2019), continues to be of help for understanding the nexus between networks, governance and territorialisation in informal cross-border planning activities in particular. These concepts can be applied to European cross-border or transnational regions whose limits and fields of action are not stabilised compared to institutionalised territorial units.

In Section 3 we illustrated the manifold territorial cooperation structures that are more or less formalised at the Franco-German border. As at other European borders, and despite the establishment of EGTCs, these organisations are not intended to replace the units or authorities that are members of them. Indeed, territorial organisation and planning competences remain a fundamental attribute of the sovereignty of each Member State. Yet, the overlapping project territories and ‘areas of soft territorial cooperation’ (ESPON ACTAREA 2018) that shape the border regions offer a variety of spaces to tackle specific problems and include the stakeholders needed for specific tasks. For example, the Eurodistricts may be institutions to manage funds. However, they constitute scales to meet common challenges. So far Eurodistricts do not manage large funds or process significant investments (e.g. the Strasbourg–Kehl Tram) but in the most advanced cases of Basel or Geneva, the Eurodistricts or equivalent bodies play an essential coordinating role. The question is whether the French and German sides would be willing to increase their competences (with cross-border democratic control). Ultimately, the issue concerns how soft and hard governance forms can be combined. Some softer forms of cooperation such as the Trinational Metropolitan Region may also serve the purpose of coordinating transport policies or other sectoral planning approaches. We conclude that the French-German border illustrates the increasing co-existence of soft forms of governance and the use of legal and administrative tools or hard forms of governance to overcome concrete obstacles.

4.2 Multi-level governance

The concept of multi-level governance, developed by Hooghe and Marks (2001) to explain the functioning of the EU, also proves insightful to analyse cross-border governance arrangements. The ability of actors to adjust their interests, to implement collaborative approaches, is a key variable for the operability of such arrangements. The cooperative dynamics of governance systems is all the more important in cross-border unconventional spaces that integrate new and changing combinations of actors from different national systems. In this sense cross-border cooperation embodies a situation of ‘cooperability’, which characterises many planning operations and refers to the combination between complexity – of spatial and governance configurations – and cooperation – between involved stakeholders (Perrin 2022).

The French-German border illustrates such intertwined coordination amongst multiple layers of government. To truly foster cross-border integration, coordination is needed on a horizontal as well as on a vertical level. The various cooperation forms presented above show that the border reality calls for a coordination mechanism to link the levels of French and German authorities that deal with similar topics and themes. The Eurodistricts are a prominent example. Yet, it is not always sufficient to coordinate between territorial stakeholders on the vis-à-vis level. Rather, for territorial coordination and integration such stakeholders also need to coordinate with the levels above and below. All together a picture appears where bilateral approaches serve the purpose of informing the national level, e.g. through GIS platforms, while cooperation platforms instigated by European developments serve the purpose of coordination with the EU level, e.g. through INTERREG implementation. Border regions are there-

fore in particular need of human resources to organise cross-border multi-level integration. The Treaty of Aachen is a new development that explores the competences needed for further integration at this point, and instigates new multi-level governance perspectives.

4.3 Inter-territoriality

The concept of inter-territoriality (Vanier 2008) specifies and adapts multi-level and multi-stakeholder governance approaches to territorial and planning issues. Like in the soft space approach it takes the planning analysis beyond the territorial-relational divide. It draws on the fact that more and more territories have become plural and overlap in everyday life, between residential, professional, recreational or service functions. Interconnections between these lived territories is made easier by the improvement of mobility and communication capacities. This territorial intertwining implies a reconfiguration of planning mechanisms to better coordinate and articulate the concerned actors and institutions, to combine fixed territorial policies with variable territorial usages. This approach assumes that the network and cooperative dimension of territorial organisation will progressively prevail over the logics of division and fixed boundaries. The challenge is less to change the institutions' legal or geographical perimeters, in other words to look for a 'territorial optimum', and rather to improve their capacity to cooperate. This vision is particularly relevant in France, in a context of so-called 'horizontal' decentralisation in which the hierarchy remains weak between the different territorial authorities and their groupings, many of which have relatively limited budgets and relatively unspecialised prerogatives, while the state and its services remain transversal actors in public policies. However, the inter-territorial approach applies to various domestic or transnational planning contexts that must respond to a situation of 'complexity', which as we saw particularly concerns cross-border cooperation.

Similarly to cross-border cooperation in Europe in general, the French-German border tackles an immense diversity of themes relevant for territorial development, as represented by innovative governance structures embedded within the existing stakeholder landscape. The identification and implementation of joint cross-border agendas is unique to every border despite the common set of tools offered by European territorial cooperation. Inter-territoriality helps us to understand the amendments of the different units of cooperation to the issues at stake, and ultimately suggests that the picture seen today is bound to change with the topics and agendas of the future.

All in all, these three lenses indicate that the French-German border specificities involve developing ever more nested arenas of cooperation, which are prone to constant amendments and re-evaluations.

5 Conclusion and recommendations

In a context of growing Euroscepticism, cross-border cooperation between France and Germany can play an important role in promoting the potential of border territories and their contribution to European integration.

A high-level political agenda and concrete initiatives confirm these perspectives. The Aachen Treaty represents an important step since it dedicates a specific chapter to cross-border cooperation, which acknowledges the role of Eurodistricts and installs a bi-national, multi-level, cross-border cooperation committee. It could be the forefront of a generalisation in cross-border mechanisms, as proposed by the European Commission. Additionally, this new framework is concomitant with the creation of the European Collectivity of Alsace.

The cases of France and Germany thus show that cross-border cooperation can advance and reinforce an innovative path, in spite of very different state territorial and policy organisation. They signal more general dynamics of spatial and territorial Europeanisation. With the development of territorial cooperation in a constantly top-down and bottom-up process, European policy guidelines and programmes help promote renewed meta-geographical references and normalise innovative bodies on transnational and cross-border scales. Europeanisation is also observed in the interaction between the French-German bi-national agenda for cooperation and the EU proposals for a cross-border mechanism. The French-German situation furthermore shows that state capacity remains a significant variable in the advancement of territorial and cross-border cooperation, be it a central or federal state, or in the frame of the European Council.

Cross-border cooperation between France and Germany also confirms both the complex and 'intermediary' situation of cross-border schemes. In the Upper Rhine and the Greater Region, the vitality of cooperation led to the multiplication of bodies, based on diverse and evolving arrangements. Currently we observe trends towards a certain rationalisation and 'de-complexifying' of the cross-border schemes, with the projects of *Région métropolitaine trinationale du Rhin supérieur / Trinationale Metropolregion am Oberrhein* (Trinational Metropolitan Region Upper Rhine) and *Région métropolitaine polycentrique transfrontalière / Grenzüberschreitende polyzentrische Metropolregion* (Polycentric Transborder Metropolitan Region). Such dynamics question the institutional capacity of cross-border bodies, which so far remain in a sort of 'in-between' functional and institutional situation: between soft spaces of cooperation, flexible and low intensity governance schemes, and hard perimeters and the effective capacity of the authorities that compose them. Indeed, cross-border coordination and development is dependent on a border-based mix of soft forms of governance and uses of legal and administrative tools, or hard forms of governance.

The joint action of Germany and France can represent a step further in cross-border European construction. If they coordinate their efforts, the two states have the capacity to promote the approach defined by the Aachen Treaty, and they can set up

joint pilot projects, such as those of cross-border metropolitan regions. In this sense, the evolution of cross-border cooperation between France and Germany during the forthcoming 2021-2027 programming period can achieve significant inflexion and represents a salient experiment for the future of EU territorial integration.

The Franco-German experience can inspire developments in other cross-border cooperation areas. We suggest three main directions:

Recommendation 1: Institutional and civil empowerment of cross-border cooperation

- > Transfer of appropriate capacity, dedicated resources and accelerated procedures for border and cross-border authorities to overcome obstacles to the implementation of their cross-border projects, with a flexible combination of institutional (hard) and functional (soft) approaches. The terms of the Aachen Treaty, or the project of ECBM, can inspire such institutional evolution.
- > Full and systematic involvement of citizens through civil fora or generalisation of people-to-people projects. This evolution can be a first step towards a more formal democratisation of cross-border bodies, like the cross-border elections of representatives.

Recommendation 2: Streamlining and normalisation of cross-border cooperation

- > Reinforcement and streamlining of the monitoring of cross-border cooperation into a multi-level harmonised mechanism, which could jointly coordinate cross-border affairs on each border at all levels: within each state (inter-ministerial coordination and coordination with territorial authorities), between states and territorial authorities, and with EU authorities. Such a mechanism could be in charge of coordinating the transposition of EU directives and regulations (particularly the potential ECBM regulation), contribute to the co-elaboration of EU or intergovernmental policies (cohesion policy, other EU policies, territorial or urban agendas) and coordination of EU programmes, coordinate cross-border observation, define a common strategy for choosing priority projects, and monitor the difficulties encountered in order to find solutions. The French-German Cross-border Cooperation Committee can act as a first model to inspire the creation of such a mechanism.
- > Systematic inclusion of cross-border issues in the national or any other domestic planning documents and policies. This calls for systematic coordination between the concerned authorities and stakeholders of a common border area.
- > Better contribution by the European territorial cooperation programmes (2021-2027) towards identifying territorial priorities and obstacles, and fostering an appropriate cross-border governance and development strategy on a specific border, defined in collaboration with the concerned stakeholders, including the citizens.

Recommendation 3: Observation and scientific support for cross-border cooperation

- > Better capitalisation and dissemination of the immense amount of work and studies on cross-border cooperation at national and European level, via the network of cross-border contact points, with the financial support of national and European technical assistance and network programmes (Interact, Urbact, ESPON...). The mobilisation of this corpus can support and orientate the institutional evolutions recommended above.
- > Setting up an operational system of cross-border observation, linking local, national and European observation apparatuses at the service of cross-border data production and analysis. This project can draw on French and German initiatives like the Cross-border Strategic Committee (CST) on observation or the Memorandum for a European Network for Cross-border Monitoring (BBSR 2019). Sharing better common knowledge on cross-border dynamics can allow narratives to be shared and a common narrative to be built, which, beyond institutional or functional evolution, represents another crucial issue for European and cross-border integration.

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RÉSUMÉ AND OUTLOOK

The preceding chapters have clearly shown the starting points and lines of development of cities and urban systems in Germany and France in their thematic spectrum. Under consideration of different types of cities and different planning systems, the socio-economic and demographic backgrounds as well as the political conditions of the current structural and functional transformation in both countries have been demonstrated. Common as well as divergent aspects of urban change and future challenges for spatial planning and urban and regional development have been made clear. In particular, the importance of the German-French border regions for harmonised spatial development in both countries and, indeed, for the entire Central European region has been underlined.

In spite of different theoretical concepts, guiding objectives and the distinctive institutional design of the planning and spatial development systems in France and Germany, a paradigm shift towards a more governance-oriented, i.e. participatory and democratic, understanding of planning has occurred in the planning cultures of both countries in recent years. The pace and specific characteristics of this shift differed between the two countries and, in retrospect, it is clear that this development is undoubtedly more established in Germany than in France.

More than in the past, urban and regional development policy is understood as requiring cooperation between the public and private actors involved. At the same time, it is a task that can only be fulfilled through goal-oriented cooperation between different planning and decision-making levels in the form of integrated planning processes. Increasingly, urban development requires thinking and acting in changing regional and urban functional areas. However, the different ideas of planning that have developed over time have given rise to differences in the traditional planning systems and the socio-political values associated with them. This manifests itself in differences both in classical approaches to planning and in current trends in the development processes in both countries, e.g. with regard to the decentralisation of decision-making levels or the overcoming of sectoral planning frameworks.

In France, the development of the urban system is based on a commitment to the balanced development of the country's sub-regions, while in Germany the emphasis is on ensuring the 'equivalence of living conditions'. These commitments are linked to social megatrends that impact both sides of the Rhine: digitalisation, new mobility, the changing worlds of work and lifestyles. They are reflected in urban development and create new perspectives involving needs-oriented urban qualities and urban-regional functional spaces. Both cities and rural areas are affected by changing values. Demographic change, above all migration, and climate change, loss of biodiversity and many other factors are creating challenges that both countries have to face. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the development of cities and urban systems in hitherto unknown ways. Indeed, the pandemic has confronted some metropolitan residents with the difficult experience of living and working in sometimes

cramped housing, while cultural amenities, large urban parks or gatherings have been out of reach (Brajon 2020). Conversely, those who had previously commuted daily to the main employment centres of metropolitan areas have experienced a more equal balance between personal and professional life as a result of the pandemic. The hypothesis – put forward particularly during the pandemic by the media – that a higher quality of life will henceforth be possible not only in big cities but also in small and medium-sized towns, has been largely confirmed. In both France and Germany it is especially the medium-sized cities that show remarkable demographic growth. The changes in the world of employment and the organisation of public services brought about by the pandemic may have implications that could be crucial for future urban and regional development, e.g. for land management, building use and neighbourhood revitalisation. New strategies thus need to be found to effectively tackle these trends and challenges.

Metropolises and large cities have long since ceased to be the sole drivers of regional development. Medium-sized towns and cities (in Germany also small towns) are increasingly proving to be places of innovation and economic stability. In both countries – despite divergent approaches to definition in Germany and France –, they also have an impact on the development of rural areas. Currently, in German as well as in French spatial planning, urban-rural regions beyond the metropolises are also attracting attention. At the same time, they are increasingly understood as cooperation areas with their own specific characteristics. In both countries, it is becoming clear that decision making takes place here in a different way than in metropolitan areas. Academic debates in France and Germany have included consideration of suitable forms of organisation that provide efficient management and decision making, and discussion about suitable institutional frameworks for urban-regional cooperation areas. In the future there will continue to be virulent questions about the limits of the democratic legitimacy of decision making that is undertaken outside established administrative structures in such cooperation arenas. Particularly in view of the different planning systems in Germany and France, exchanges of experience across the borders can help to find local answers and solutions that are adapted to the problem at hand within the framework of future governance.

Last but not least, EU and international policy – with the New Leipzig Charter (EU 2020, see BBSR 2021a), the New Urban Agenda (UN 2016, see BBSR 2017), the New Territorial Agenda 2030 (EU 2020) and the International Urban Agenda (UN 2016) – have set programmatic frameworks for urban and regional development and urban planning. All these documents and agreements formulate clear mandates for national urban and territorial policies to concretise and implement the agreed guiding principles in terms of content, process and organisation. The EU's 'Green Deal' (Europäische Kommission 2020) with its climate protection and adaptation targets for the EU area goes beyond this and once again reveals the breadth of the policy field in which urban development will take place in the future, in both Germany and France, and indeed, throughout Europe.

In recent years, Germany and France have already responded to many of these demands in different ways and with different emphases. Thus, despite a federal (Germany) or still strongly centralised (France) state structure, approaches to

balancing territorial development can be identified in both countries. The focus is not only on the development of large metropolitan areas, but also on the development of medium-sized and small towns (the latter mainly in Germany) as locations for public services and the economy. The guiding goals of the ‘New European Leipzig Charter’ (BBSR 2021a) are reflected in current funding programmes for urban development and building culture, including in Germany, for example, the programme *Städtebauförderung* (urban development promotion) (BMI 2021) and in France, for example, the programmes *Action coeur de ville* (Heart of Town – City Centre Action) and *Petites villes de demain* (Small Towns of Tomorrow) (Ministère de cohésion des territoires et des relations avec des collectivités territoriales 2019 a; b). The *Modellvorhaben der Raumordnung* (MORO – Model Project of Spatial Planning) ‘Strengthening cross-border components in spatial development and spatial plans: two Franco-German planning games’ (BBSR 2021b), which was launched under German leadership at the end of 2020, takes up the special role of harmonised cross-border development from the perspective of optimising planning processes, cooperation and decision-making structures. Last but not least, the focus is on strengthening the border regions in their special role for European cohesion. The cross-border spatial observation established between France and Germany in 2019 is also committed to the same goal (CGET/Ministère de Cohésion des Territoires et des Relations avec des Collectivités territoriales/BMI 2019).

The approach of establishing comparative urban monitoring and making urban development measurable in terms of sustainability (BBSR 2021c) not only follows the goals of the UN’s New Urban Agenda but is also an expression of the efforts of both countries to coordinate spatial observation and monitoring more closely than before. This should provide a basis for future spatial development, for the future design of national funding instruments, for closer coordination of content and a continuous exchange of experience.

In view of the transformations and tendencies discussed, both countries are faced with the central, mega-challenge of introducing paradigms of ‘post-growth’ into future spatial development, a challenge that subsumes many requirements and demands. In addition to sustainability objectives, the goal of comprehensive resilience is becoming increasingly important. To further urban resilience, in the future it will be more important than ever to develop strategies from social, economic and ecological points of view and to include factors related to cooperation and networking. Only so will urban systems be able to develop the capacities that are necessary to effectively tackle increasingly complex and dynamic transformations, i.e. to develop adaptive and innovative capabilities. This concerns both the urban systems with their sub-regional interconnections and central-place functions, and urban development issues such as a far-sighted approach to the problems of growing development pressure and land take, building culture, the design of public spaces, the provision of affordable housing, integration, social mixing, civic engagement and public participation. The multi-dimensionality of the task of strategic and integrated urban development becomes clear here. Digitalisation undoubtedly brings technical innovations to this field of activity and can contribute to the goal-oriented management of planning and development processes. However, this must be flanked by measures to promote acceptance and competence.

Joint spatial and planning research can lead to knowledge gains and findings relevant to practice beyond spatial observation. The research funding of both countries can secure the path to exchanging experience and transferring results also in the future. The primary task is now to pursue and extend this 'future proofing' in the outlined approaches to action. The answers to the questions discussed above also have a key function for European cohesion. In the European core area, the joint bilateral agreements and exchange relations between France and Germany, achieved in the years dating from the post-war period to the present day, provide a unique basis. They can be used to make national spatial developments, and similarly those of the cities and metropolises, the subject of bilateral cooperation, exchange and learning processes in the future, to an even greater extent than was hitherto the case. With the transfer of knowledge to the European level, there is an opportunity to strengthen the political weight of both states for European cohesion and territorial cohesion. However, an indispensable prerequisite for this, in France as in Germany, is to continue to promote understanding of the politics and society of the other country in education and further training, to impart knowledge about the other planning culture and its respective characteristics, and to overcome the language barriers that so often continue to exist.

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ABSTRACT

Cities and Metropolises in France and Germany

In both countries, France and Germany, there is great pressure to change and adapt towards new forms of urbanity and to conceive new strategic approaches with limited public finance and a need for economic efficiency. Not all types of urban areas are equally affected by these issues. The book aims to do justice to this situation, considering in both cases the context of the national urban systems. As it proved impossible to address all the topics relevant to the spatial development of urban and rural areas, the authors decided to concentrate on a number of important topical themes which are undoubtedly relevant in both countries, albeit in different ways, and which could be significant for a comparison. The focus is thus on issues related to metropolises, small and medium-sized towns and particularly current issues of urbanity, sustainability, Smart Cities, transport and mobility, and the role of cross-border urban development. The structure of the chapters is conceived in these terms. Besides scientific and theoretical approaches, the authors also consider the practical planning perspective and methodological aspects of the topic at hand. They mainly address three relevant factors: the differences between the two institutional systems, the development paths and historical constants, and how new challenges are addressed on both sides of the border.

Keywords

France – Germany – metropolises – small and medium-sized towns – planning systems

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of English terms

Abbreviation in original language	Termini in original language
BIM	Building Information Modelling
CAS	complex adaptative system
CBD	Central Business District
CBMR	Cross-Border Metropolitan Polycentric Region
CEMAT	Conference of Ministers Responsible for Spatial/Regional Planning
CIM	City Information Modelling
CST	Cross-border Strategic Committee
ECBM	European Cross-Border Mechanism
EGTC	European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation
ESDP	European Spatial Development Perspective
ESPON	European Spatial Planning Observatory Network
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
IoT	Internet of Things
PPP	private-public partnership
WHO	World Health Organisation

Abbreviations of French terms

Abbreviation in original language	Termini in original language	English translation of the termini
ACA		Automobile Club Association
ADEME	Agence de l'environnement et de la maîtrise de l'énergie	Agency for the Environment and Energy Management
AdN	Agence du numérique	Digital Agency
ALUR	loi pour l'accès au logement et un urbanisme rénové	Law on Access to Housing and Urban Renewal
AML	Aire métropolitaine de Lille	Metropolitan Region of Lille
ANAH	Agence nationale de l'habitat	National Housing Agency
ANCT	Agence nationale de la cohésion des territoires	National Agency for Territorial Cohesion
ANRU	Agence nationale pour la rénovation urbaine	National Urban Renewal Agency
ART	Autorité de régulation des transports	Regulatory Transport Authority

Abbreviation in original language	Termini in original language	English translation of the termini
CELIB	Comité d'étude et de liaison des intérêts bretons	Committee to Assess and Represent Breton Interests
CEREMA	Centre d'études et d'expertise sur les risques, l'environnement, la mobilité et l'aménagement	Centre for Studies and Expertise on Risks, the Environment, Mobility and Development
CGET	Commissariat général à l'égalité des territoires	General Commission for Territorial Equality
CNFPT	Centre national de la fonction publique territoriale	National Centre of Territorial Public Service
CODER	Commission de développement économique régional	Commission for Regional Economic Development
COFIT	Conférence permanente intercommunale transfrontalière	Permanent Intermunicipal Border-crossing Conference
CPER	Contrat de plan État Régions	Plan Contract State Regions
CT	Conseils de territoire	territorial councils
CUDL	Communauté urbaine de Lille	Urban Community of Lille
DATAR	Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale	Interministerial Delegation for Spatial Planning and Regional Attractiveness
DSQ	Développement sociale des quartiers	Social Neighbourhood Development
ENA	Ecole nationale d'administration	National Administration School
ENE	loi portant engagement national pour l'environnement	Law on National Commitment for the Environment
Epareca	Établissement public national d'aménagement et de restructuration des espaces commerciaux	National Public Body for the Development and Restructuring of Commercial Areas
EPCI	Etablissement public de coopération intercommunale	Public Body for Intermunicipal Cooperation
EPCI <i>transfrontalier</i>	Etablissement public de coopération intercommunale transfrontalier	Cross-border Public Body for Intermunicipal Cooperation
EPR	Établissements publics régionaux	Public Regional Bodies
FANT	Fonds d'aménagement numérique des territoires	Digital Territorial Development Fund
GECT	Groupement européen de coopération territoriale	European Association for Territorial Cooperation
GLCT	Groupement local de coopération transfrontalière	Association for Cross-border Cooperation
GPU	Grands projets urbains	Major Urban Projects
GPV	Grands projets de ville	Major Urban Projects

Abbreviation in original language	Termini in original language	English translation of the termini
Insee	Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques	National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
LMCU	Lille métropole communauté urbaine	Urban Community of Lille
LOF	loi d'orientation foncière	Basic Land Act
LOFU	loi d'orientation foncière et urbaine	Land and City Act
LOM	loi d'orientation des mobilités	Mobility Orientation Act
LOV	loi d'orientation pour la ville	Urban Policy Law
MAPTAM	loi de modernisation de l'action publique territoriale et d'affirmation des métropoles	Law on Modernisation of Public Territorial Action and Affirmation of Metropolises
MEL	Métropole européenne de Lille	European Metropolis of Lille
NOTRe	Nouvelle administration territoriale de la République	Law on the New Territorial Organisation of the Republic
NPNRU	Nouveau programme national de renouvellement urbain	New National Urban Renewal Programme
OPAH	Opération programmée d'amélioration de l'habitat	Programmes for the Improvement of Living Conditions
PADOG	Plan d'aménagement et d'organisation générale de la région parisienne	Development and General Organisation Plan for the Paris Region
PDU	Plan directeur d'urbanisme	Urban Master Plan
PIA	Programmes d'investissement d'avenir	Future Investment Programmes
PLU	Plan local d'urbanisme	Local Urban Plan
PLUi	Plan local d'urbanisme intercommunal	Local Plan for Intermunicipal Urbanism
PNRU	Programme national de rénovation urbaine	National Urban Renewal Programme
POPSU	Plateforme d'observation des projets et stratégies urbaines	Platform of Observation of Urban Projects and Strategies
POS	Plan d'occupation des sols	Land-Use Plan
PUD	Plan d'urbanisme directeur	Urban Master Plan
RER	Réseau express régional	Regional Express Network
RMPT	Région métropolitaine polycentrique transfrontalière	Polycentric Transborder Metropolitan Region

Abbreviation in original language	Termini in original language	English translation of the termini
SCET	Société centrale d'équipement du territoire	Central Corporation for Territorial Infrastructure Development
SCoT	Schéma de cohérence territoriale	Scheme for Territorial Coherence
SD	Schéma directeur	Master Plan
SDAU	Schéma directeur d'aménagement et urbanisme	Master Plan for Development and Urban Planning
SDAURP	Schéma directeur d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région de Paris	Development and Urban Planning Master Plan for the Paris Region
SDTGR	Schéma de développement territorial de la Grande Région	Spatial Plan for the Greater Region
SEM	Société d'économie mixte	semi-public company
SLO	services librement organisés	services organised on a liberal basis
SPL	Sociétés publiques locales	Local Public Companies
SPLA	Sociétés publique locales d'aménagement	Local Public Development Companies
SRADDET	Schéma régional d'aménagement, de développement durable et d'égalité des territoires	Regional Scheme for Planning, Sustainable Development and Territorial Equality
SRDEII	Schéma régional de développement économique, d'innovation et d'internationalisation	Regional Scheme for Economic Development, Innovation and Internationalisation
SRU	loi solidarité et renouvellement urbain	Law on Urban Solidarity and Renewal
TER	Transport express régional	regional express transport
TET	Train d'équilibre du territoire	territorial equilibrium trains
ZAC	Zone d'aménagement concerté	Concerted Development Zone
ZFU	Zones franches urbaines	Urban Free Zones
ZPPAUP	Zone de protection du patrimoine architectural, urbain et paysager	Conservation Zone for Architectural, Urban and Landscape Heritage
ZRU	Zones de revitalisation urbaine	Urban Revitalisation Zones
ZUP	Zone à urbaniser en priorité	Prioritised Urban Development Zone
ZUS	Zones urbaines sensibles	Sensitive Urban Zones

Abbreviations of German terms

Abbreviation in original language	Termini in original language	English translation of the termini
BauGB	Baugesetzbuch	Federal Building Code (since 1987)
BBauG	Bundesbaugesetz	Federal Building Act (1960–1987)
BBSR	Bundesinstituts für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung	Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development
BNatSchG	Bundesnaturschutzgesetz	Federal Nature Conservation Act
BUGA	Bundesgartenschau	Federal Garden Show
BVWP 2030	Bundesverkehrswegeplan 2030	Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2030
DB	Deutsche Bahn	German Railways
DGB	Deutsche Bundesgartenschau Gesellschaft	German Federal Garden Show Society
GG	Grundgesetz	German Basic Law
GHS	Gesellschaft für Hafen- und Standortentwicklung	Port Area Development Corporation
HCKF	HochschulCampus Kleinstadt-Forschung	University Campus Small Town Research
IBA	Internationale Bauausstellung	International Building Exhibition
IfL	Institut für Länderkunde	Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography
IHK	Integriertes Handlungskonzept	Integrated Action Concept
IHK	Industrie- und Handelskammer	Chamber of Commerce and Industry
MKRO	Ministerkonferenz für Raumordnung	Joint Conference of Ministers for Spatial Planning and Regional Development
ROG	Raumordnungsgesetz	Spatial Planning Act
StBauFG	Städtebauförderungsgesetz	Urban Renewal and Development Act
StVO	Straßenverkehrsordnung	Road Traffic Regulations
WGBU	Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen	German Advisory Council on Global Change

In both countries, France and Germany, there is great pressure to change and adapt towards new forms of urbanity and to conceive new strategic approaches with limited public finance and a need for economic efficiency. Not all types of urban areas are equally affected by these issues. The book aims to do justice to this situation, considering in both cases the context of the national urban systems. As it proved impossible to address all the topics relevant to the spatial development of urban and rural areas, the authors decided to concentrate on a number of important topical themes which are undoubtedly relevant in both countries, albeit in different ways, and which could be significant for a comparison. The focus is thus on issues related to metropolises, small and medium-sized towns and particularly current issues of urbanity, sustainability, Smart Cities, transport and mobility, and the role of cross-border urban development. The structure of the chapters is conceived in these terms. Besides scientific and theoretical approaches, the authors also consider the practical planning perspective and methodological aspects of the topic at hand. They mainly address three relevant factors: the differences between the two institutional systems, the development paths and historical constants, and how new challenges are addressed on both sides of the border.



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