Reducing Land Take in Europe: Key Observations and Blind Spots from 14 countries
Despite No Net Land Take (NNLT) being a European policy objective, its implementation across countries remains largely in its infancy – except from a few frontrunners (Lacoere et al., 2024). Each country relies on different land policy strategies to pursue the goal of reducing land consumption. To better understand these implementation challenges, enable mutual learning, and facilitate structured reflection, the international working group (IWG) on NNLT convened its first in person meeting in Ghent, Belgium.
The meeting brought together not only the core members of the working group but also associate members, many of whom joined on their own budget and even took vacation days to participate. In total, 22 academics and practitioners met for one and a half days to discuss the state of NNLT policies in 14 European countries.
In preparation for the meeting, a more than 100 page booklet was compiled based on voluntary contributions from members and associate members of the group. The booklet includes country factsheets summarising key information on policies addressing land take and the current status of implementation, as well as reflections on national land policy strategies. This document provided the basis for the discussions in Ghent. The exchange was further enriched by presentations on land take policies in Flanders, discussions with representatives of the Flemish ministry responsible for spatial planning, and a series of interactive workshop and roundtable formats.
Based on a common template, information on NNLT policies was collected for each participating country. The template ensured a consistent structure for gathering information across different national contexts and allowed for systematic comparison. Each participant completed a factsheet for the country in which they primarily conduct their research or professional work.
Key observations
Across the fourteen country factsheets, several recurring patterns emerged. Five key observations stand out.
1. Strong constitutional protection of private property rights → hamper implementation of NNLT policies
Across virtually all countries examined, private property rights are constitutionally entrenched and interpreted in a strongly owner protective manner. While this protection is fundamental to democratic legal systems, it significantly constrains the ability of public authorities to actively steer land use in support of NNLT objectives. Instruments such as downzoning may trigger compensation claims (Lacoere et al., 2023), expropriation is politically sensitive, and activating idle or speculative land is often difficult. Belgium, for example, highlights that its historically weak planning tradition is shaped by strong protection of property rights; recent reforms have increased compensation rights for landowners, making downzoning financially prohibitive for municipalities. Austria similarly notes that property rights leave “only a few operational entry points in land management,” while Poland reports that constitutional protection of property rights often prevails over the public interest, discouraging municipalities from imposing development restrictions.
2. Growth oriented municipal fiscal incentives → lead to a structural bias toward new land designation
Municipal fiscal systems frequently create incentives for local governments to promote spatial growth. Because local revenues depend on inhabitants and business activity, municipalities benefit financially from attracting residents and companies. This creates a structural bias toward designating new development areas and approving greenfield projects, even when national policies aim to reduce land take. Austria notes that providing cheap building land is one of the easiest ways to increase municipal income. Germany reports similar dynamics through income and business tax revenues, while Switzerland highlights fiscal competition among municipalities as a driver of urban sprawl. Ukraine describes comparable structural incentives for municipalities to zone generously in order to attract investment and population.
3. Legacy oversupply of designated building land → entrenched development rights
In many countries, zoning plans adopted during periods of rapid growth in the second half of the twentieth century designated far more land for development than was ultimately needed. These designations have since become legally entrenched and economically valued as development rights, making them difficult to reverse. Belgium identifies the sub regional plans introduced under the 1962 Planning Act as a major structural obstacle that continues to generate an oversupply of residential land. Italy reports that inherited zoning designations function as de facto building rights for developers, limiting the scope for reducing land take risks in new plans.
4. Fragmented multi level governance → weak translation of national targets into local practice
NNLT is often formulated as a strategic objective at national or regional levels, yet land use decisions are largely made by municipalities. In many governance systems, mechanisms that translate national targets into binding local obligations remain weak. As a result, ambitious strategic goals often lose force during implementation. Germany notes that the constitutional planning autonomy of municipalities can hinder nationwide land reduction strategies, as existing planning law merely requires land saving development to be “considered.” In France, smaller municipalities often lack the financial and administrative capacity to reconcile development pressures with the national ZAN policy. Norway attributes persistent land take partly to its highly decentralised planning system, while Ukraine points to weak vertical coordination between national, regional, and local levels.
5. Conflicts with dominant sectoral policy agendas
Policies aiming to reduce land take frequently compete with other political priorities such as housing provision, infrastructure expansion, or economic development. In practice, these competing agendas often enjoy stronger political support and shorter time horizons, meaning that NNLT objectives tend to be treated as negotiable. Germany’s 2025 “BauTurbo” reform, which encourages accelerated housing development, illustrates how housing policies can undermine land take reduction. The Netherlands abolished the “ladder for sustainable urbanisation” in 2025 in order to speed up housing construction, while Luxembourg is considering a tax on undeveloped building land that could stimulate construction but also increase land consumption. In Ukraine, reconstruction and economic recovery policies frame land consumption as a necessary cost of development rather than a problem to be managed.
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> More Information: Land Take in Europe - In Pursuit of Net Zero | ARL-Net
